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I. Introduction
The modern definition of torture makes clear that torture can 
be either physical or psychological in nature.1  The U.N. Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, which entered into force in 19872 and which the U.S. 
ratified in 1994, defines torture in just those terms.3  In particular, 
that convention defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on 
a person” for a prohibited purpose, such as to obtain a confession 
or to punish.4  The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture likewise defines torture “to be any act intentionally 
1 The Oxford English Dictionary (1971) defines torture as “severe or 
excruciating pain or suffering (of body or mind).” Accord David Luban, 
Torture, Power, and Law 116 (2014); WMA Declaration of Tokyo, World 
Med. Ass’n (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-
declaration-of-tokyo-guidelines-for-physicians-concerning-torture-and-
other-cruel-inhuman-or-degrading-treatment-or-punishment-in-relation-to-
-detention-and-imprisonment/ (“For the purpose of this Declaration, torture 
is defined as the deliberate, systematic or wanton infliction of physical or 
mental suffering by one or more persons acting alone or on the orders of any 
authority, to force another person to yield information, to make a confession, or 
for any other reason.”). The World Medical Association’s Declaration of Tokyo 
was originally adopted by the 29th World Medical Assembly in Tokyo, Japan, 
in October 1975. Id.; see also Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence 
and International Law 78 (2010) (“The traditional definition of torture 
contains four elements: severe pain and suffering, whether mental or physical; 
intent; purpose; and state involvement.”).
2  A total of 163 countries are parties to the convention. United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-
9&chapter=4&lang=en (listing parties).
3  United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S 113 
[hereinafter “Convention Against Torture” or “CAT”]; Jennifer K. Elsea 
et al., The Treatment of Prisoners: Legal, Moral or Criminal? 
211 (Ralph D. McPhee ed., 2006) (noting that the U.S. “signed CAT on 
April 18, 1988, and ratified the Convention on October 21, 1994, subject to 
certain declarations, reservations, and understandings”).
4 CAT, supra note 3, at art. 1. Cf. Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court art. 7(2)(e), July 17, 1998 (“‘Torture’ means the intentional infliction 
of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in 
the custody or under the control the accused; except that torture shall not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, 
lawful sanctions.”); David Weissbrodt & Cheryl Heilman, Defining Torture and 
Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 29 L. & Ineq. 343 (2011) (discussing 
the definition of torture).
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performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted 
on a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of 
intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a 
penalty, or for any other purpose.”5
Death threats, because of their unlawful and invidious nature6 
and their potentially coercive effects, normally have significant, 
adverse legal consequences.7  They may result in the evidentiary 
exclusion of confessions obtained through such means,8 amount 
to persecution,9 or lead to civil liability, whether for intentional 
5 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention to Prevent 
and Punish Torture art. 2, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67. “Torture,” that 
convention continues, “shall also be understood to be the use of methods 
upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to 
diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical 
pain or mental anguish.”  Id.  As that convention further provides: “The 
concept of torture shall not include physical or mental pain or suffering 
that is inherent in or solely the consequence of lawful measures, provided 
that they do not include the performance of the acts or use of the methods 
referred to in this article.”  Id. 
6 See Lacey v. Allstate Indemnity Co., No. 2:12-cv-02051-SGC, 2015 WL 
875379, at *7 n.7 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 2, 2015) (“‘barbaric means’ included death 
threats toward the plaintiff and his children”).
7 1 Encyclopedia of Death and the Human Experience 553 
(Clifton D. Bryant & Dennis L. Peck eds., 2009) (“In general, a death threat 
is not protected speech if there is intent to follow through with the threat.  
Other factors are considered in determining an unlawful death threat, 
such as the context in which the threat occurred and whether the target is 
fearful of serious harm.  The means by which an illegal death threat can be 
communicated include speech, telecommunications, mail, e-mail, and the 
Internet.”).
8 See United States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1991) (“the beatings 
and death threats alone were sufficient to make the initial confession 
coerced”); id. at 940 (“the implicit threat of a repetition of the beatings and 
the fear that the police might make good on their twice-promised death 
threat were sufficient to render Jenkins’s 2:00 a.m. confession coerced”); 
Browner v. State, 765 S.E.2d 348, 352 (Ga. 2014) (“Physical or mental 
torture is the type of fear of injury that prevents a confession from being 
admissible . . . .”); David H. Kaye et al., The New Wigmore: A 
Treatise on Evidence, Expert Evidence § 8.8.3(5)(ii) (2d ed. 2018) (“A 
credible death threat is an enormous risk factor for confessions in general—
when this factor is present, a confession is much more likely to occur . . . .”).
9 Lomtyeva v. Sessions, 704 F. App’x 677, 678 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation 
omitted) (finding that “a ‘specific and menacing death threat’ from a police 
official” is “‘strong evidence of persecution’”); Marcos v. Gonzales, 410 
F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Credible death threats . . . can support a 
finding of past persecution.”); Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947−48 
(8th Cir. 2004) (a “specific, credible, and immediate” death threat can 
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infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”),10 by creating a hostile work 
environment,11 or otherwise.12  For example, threats of murder13 
constitute persecution); Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“threats of violence and death are enough” to establish persecution); 
see also Singh v. Lynch, 637 F. App’x 320 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Credible death 
threats, combined with an actual assassination attempt shortly thereafter, 
substantially supports a finding of past persecution.  Therefore, Singh has 
unquestionably demonstrated that he suffered past persecution . . . .”); 
Gutierrez-Vidal v. Holder, 709 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Persecution 
‘includes the credible threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or 
liberty on account of a protected ground,’ but does not include ‘low-level 
intimidation and harassment.’” (citing Matul-Hernandez v. Holder, 685 
F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2012)); Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120 
(9th Cir. 2004) (“Persecution may be emotional or psychological, as well 
as physical.”); id. at 1121 (“Viewed cumulatively, Zakia’s evidence of a 
death threat, violent physical attacks against her husband and sons, a near-
confrontation with a violent mob, vandalism, economic harm and emotional 
trauma compels a finding of past persecution.”); Reyes-Guerrero v. INS, 192 
F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999) (death threats against prosecutor were on 
account of his political opinion, supporting claim of a well-founded fear of 
persecution).
10 Bobola v. F/V Expectation, 204 F. Supp. 3d 382 (D. Mass. 2016) 
(“[A]llegations involving extreme or outrageous threats, such as death 
threats, can be sufficient to state a claim for IIED.”); Denton v. Silver Stream 
Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 739 A.2d 571, 577 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding 
that death threats by a coworker, who was found to be in possession of a 
firearm at work, stated an IIED claim).
11 Pryor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 791 F.3d 488, 496−97 (4th Cir. 2015) (a 
death threat left for an airline employee in a secure, restricted space, along 
with the “ample evidence” that the employee was “subjectively terrified after 
receiving the threats,” were sufficient to find a hostile work environment); 
Allen v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 405, 411 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that a hostile work environment existed where the individual received a 
threatening letter that contained a death threat; the note was signed by the 
“KKK” and contained a reference to lynching, a drawing of a stick figure 
with a noose around its neck). Those making death threats to coworkers are 
subject to termination of employment.  Stephenson v. Amsted Industries 
Inc., No. 09-CV-12267, 2010 WL 5894939, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 13, 2010) 
(“[S]everal courts have held that death threats against coworkers constitute 
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination . . . .” (citing Smith v. 
Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2000)).
12 Death threats—it has been written—“are not ‘acts which merely 
constitute harassment, disrespectful or disparate treatment, a hostile 
work environment, humiliating criticism, intimidation, insults or other 
indignities.’”  Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 217, 255 
(W.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Lydeatte v. Bronx Overall Econ. Dev. Corp., No. 
00 Civ. 5433, 2001 WL 180055, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001)).
13 Amouri v. Holder, 572 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (“To 
establish persecution, an alien must demonstrate that the harm (whether 
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or putting a gun to one’s head as part of a threat to kill can be 
compelling evidence of past persecution.14  Death threats can also 
lead to the dismissal of a civil case,15 result in criminal prosecutions 
and convictions,16 show consciousness of guilt for an underlying 
actual or feared) is more than the sum total of ordinary harassment or 
mistreatment.  We need not probe that point too deeply; this case involves 
claimed threats of murder—and threats of murder easily qualify as 
sufficiently severe harm.”); Lin Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir. 
2005) (citing Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 570 (1st Cir. 1999)) (“It 
seems to us that credible verbal death threats may fall within the meaning 
of ‘persecution.’  We have indicated that a threat to life could amount to 
persecution.”). 
14 Singh v. Holder, 585 F. App’x 530, 531 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Singh’s statement 
that the KLF members held a gun to his head when they threatened him was 
a particularly important aspect of his claim to consider in assessing whether 
he had experienced past persecution.”).
15 Kalwasinski v. Ryan, No. 96-cv-6475, 2007 WL 2743434, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 17, 2007) (“Death threats directed at an opposing party and a witness 
are sufficiently serious to warrant the sanction of dismissal.”); see also 
Michael v. Boutwell, 138 F. Supp. 3d 761, 785 (N.D. Miss. 2015) (“When 
considering whether dispositive relief is an appropriate sanction for witness 
intimidation, other courts have considered: (1) the nature of the threat; 
(2) whether the threat is likely to have a chilling effect on testimony; (3) 
whether the threats ‘are the result not of malice but of mental illness;’ 
and (4) whether the threats are the only instance of improper litigation 
conduct.”).
16 United States v. Mann, No. 99-4115, 2000 WL 372243 (8th Cir. Apr. 12, 
2000) (affirming conviction for mailing threatening letter to the President 
of the United States); Li v. Shelhamer, No. 5:12-CV-1435 (LEK/DEP), 
2013 WL 4483081, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013) (following a jury trial, 
a person was convicted of eleven counts of transmitting death threats in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 875 and sentenced to 114 months in prison); Baldwin 
v. Commonwealth, No. 0740-17-4, 2018 WL 3430995, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. 
July 17, 2018) (affirming conviction following man’s guilty plea for sending 
written threat to kill or do bodily harm to woman and her daughter); 
State v. Cameron, No. 48619-9-II, 2017 WL 2365118, at *1 (Wash. Ct. 
App. May 31, 2017) (affirming conviction for “felony harassment-death 
threats”); see also Radford v. State, 538 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018) 
(citation omitted) (“A person commits the offense of first-degree terroristic 
threatening if, with the purpose of terrorizing another person, he or she 
threatens to cause death or serious physical injury to another person.”); 
State v. Robb, 723 N.E.2d 1019, 1034−35 (Ohio 2000) (“Defendant’s 
threats to kill a guard or cut off a guard’s hand helped prove his intent to kill 
. . . .”).
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offense,17 create a conflict of interest,18 and lead to aggravated 
sentences.19 
Because of their severity, credible death threats have been 
found to be torturous in nature,20 with the Convention Against 
17 United States v. Castleman, 795 F.3d 904, 915 (8th Cir. 2015) (citations 
omitted) (“[E]vidence of death threats against witnesses . . . is generally 
admissible against a criminal defendant to show consciousness of guilt of 
the crime charged.”); State v. Diggins, 836 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 2013) 
(citations omitted) (“Evidence of a threat made by the defendant against a 
witness is relevant to show the defendant’s ‘consciousness of guilt.’”).
18 Locascio v. United States, 395 F.3d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[N]o one would 
question that a credible death threat from a co-defendant ordering a lawyer 
to sacrifice a client’s interests constitutes an actual conflict of interest.”); 
People v. Avila, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 657, 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“Here, 
there was a credible death threat resulting in the filing of new criminal 
charges against appellant. The public defender is both the named victim and 
a necessary witness at any trial on those charges. The trial court properly 
concluded that the removal of the public defender and the appointment of 
conflict counsel was an appropriate way to proceed.”); State v. Barrett, No. 
M2009-02636-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2870571, at *34 (Tenn. Crim. App., 
July 13, 2012) (“[E]vidence of the Defendant’s statements about having 
killed before and his threats to kill other inmates was admissible.”).
19 United States v. Dougherty, 632 F. App’x 993, 995 (11th Cir. 2015) (“In 
explaining why an upward variance was warranted in this case, the district 
court also noted that it had considered the death threats made to bank 
customers and employees . . . .”); United States v. Sogan, 388 F. App’x 521, 
523 (6th Cir. 2010) (“This court has repeatedly held that notes containing 
the statement, ‘I have a gun,’ qualify for the enhancement for threats.”); 
United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994, 999 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he district 
court properly enhanced Hunn’s sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) 
for his death-threats made during the bank robbery.”); Perkins v. State, 559 
N.W.2d 678, 692 (Minn. 1997) (“The sentencing judge found ‘particular 
cruelty’ in Perkins’ death threats to A.L. and her children . . . .”); State v. 
Brown, No. A15-0108, 2016 WL 281072, at *1−2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 
2016) (“The PSI identified aggravating factors, including . . . appellant’s 
threats against her family . . . .”); State v. Jackson, 596 N.W.2d 262, 267 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (finding “multiple aggravating factors,” including 
holding gun to victim’s head and threatening to kill her, made defendant’s 
crimes “severe”; “death threats and use of handcuffs, and the psychological 
impact of his crimes” justified “a double-durational departure from the 
sentencing guidelines”).
20 Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R40139, Closing the 
Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues 25 (2009) (“In 
November 2008, a military commission judge ruled that statements made 
by a detainee to U.S. authorities were tainted by his earlier confession to 
Afghan police hours before, which had purportedly been made under threat 
of death.  The judge concluded that the coercive effects of the death threats 
producing the detainee’s first confession had not dissipated by the time of 
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Torture itself barring the use of any statement made as a result 
of torture.21  The right to be free from torture is a universal, non-
derogable right,22 and not even prisoners or heinous offenders can 
be subjected to torturous treatment or punishment.23  As both 
the second.  Subsequently, a federal habeas court ruled that ‘every statement 
made by the detainee since his arrest [was] a product of torture. . . .’”) 
(citing United States v. Jawad, D-021 (Nov. 19, 2008)).
21 CAT, supra note 3, at art. 15 (“Each State Party shall ensure that any 
statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture 
shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person 
accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.”).
22 G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
art. 7 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter “ICCPR”] (“No one shall be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”); 
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5 (Dec. 
10, 1948) [hereinafter “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”] (“No one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.”). See also G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), annex, Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, at art. 3 (Dec. 9, 1975) 
[hereinafter “Declaration on the Protection of All Persons”] (“No State may 
permit or tolerate torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.  Exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat 
of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not 
be invoked as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”); ICCPR, supra, at art. 4(2) (“No derogation 
from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made 
under this provision.”); Daniel O’Donnell, The Obligation to Establish Sentences 
for Torture that Are Commensurate with the Gravity of the Offense, 22 Buff. 
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 95, 96 (2015) (citation omitted) (“The prohibition of 
torture is jus cogens—a peremptory norm that applies to all members of the 
international community, independently of their treaty obligations.  One 
of the many obligations concerning torture recognized by international law 
is that of criminalizing torture and making it ‘punishable by appropriate 
penalties which take into account [the] grave nature’ of this crime.”).
23 Human Rights Watch, Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and 
Offenders with Mental Illness 204 (2003) (“The ICCPR is the 
most comprehensive international human rights treaty the United States 
has ratified and it includes provisions explicitly intended to protect 
prisoners from abuse or mistreatment.  Under ICCPR article 7, no one 
‘shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.’  The prohibition against such abusive treatment applies to 
prison authorities, governing both actions against individual prisoners as 
well as the overall conditions of confinement in which prisoners live.”). Cf. 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“By protecting even those 
convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of 
the government to respect the dignity of all persons.”).  The Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights has held on multiple occasions 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) make clear: “No 
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”24  While courts have not always found 
death threats to be credible or to amount to torturous conduct,25 
threats that place individuals in great fear can (and often have been 
found to) constitute acts of mental or psychological torture.26
With credible death threats producing psychological terror 
already treated as torturous in nature, this article explores what 
the collateral consequences are for capital prosecutions and death 
sentences.27  After all, death threats are ordinarily unlawful28 and 
that the prohibition against torture makes for no exceptions. E.g., El-Masri 
v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Maced., App. No. 39630/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 
195 (2012). 
24 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 22, at art. 5; ICCPR, 
supra note 22, at art. 7.
25 See Velasco v. Holder, 436 F. App’x 379, 379 (5th Cir. 2011); Salan-Espinoza 
v. Holder, 446 F. App’x 833, 834 (9th Cir. 2011).  A finding of torture 
requires a case-by-case examination, and factfinders must sort through 
whether acts, including particular threats, rise to the level of torture or 
not.  Seth Lowry, Truth Be Told: Truth Serum and Its Role in the War on Terror, 20 
Regent U. L. Rev. 337, 348−50 (2008) (“[C]ourts have opted to analyze 
torture claims on a case-by-case basis and usually base their decision on the 
gruesomeness, intensity, or shock value of the treatment alleged . . . .”).
26 John D. Bessler, The Death Penalty as Torture: From the Dark 
Ages to Abolition 218 (2017) (“[T]he Tennessee Supreme Court noted 
of ‘threats to kill’ that ‘the anticipation of physical harm to one’s self or a 
loved one constitutes mental torture.’”); id. (discussing the interrogation of 
criminal suspects who were suffocated with plastic bags and had loaded guns 
pointed at their heads during rounds of Russian roulette).
27 Collateral consequences—in ordinary parlance—“are the legal disabilities that 
attach as an operation of law when an individual is convicted of a crime but 
are not part of the sentence for the crime.”  Clair A. Cripe et al., Legal 
Aspects of Corrections Management 505 (3d ed. 2013).  “Examples 
of collateral consequences include the denial of government issued licenses 
or permits, ineligibility for public services and public programs, and the 
elimination or impairment of civil rights.”  Id.  In this article, the collateral 
consequences terminology is employed in a slightly different manner.  It refers 
here to the consequences flowing from the fact that death threats are already 
treated by the law as illegal, cruel, and torturous acts.
28 Death threats are serious offenses.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1994) (“Whoever 
knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for a delivery 
from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, 
missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or 
to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, the President-
elect, the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession 
to the office of President of the United States, or the Vice President-elect, 
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capital charges and death sentences are, at bottom, nothing more 
than state-sponsored threats of death.29   While the Convention 
Against Torture has a “lawful sanctions” exception to torture,30 and 
while the death penalty remains on the books in certain nations 
and locales at this point in time,31 if death threats, because of their 
immutable characteristics, qualify as acts of torture, then that 
fact should logically have serious implications for death penalty 
jurisdictions.  The world’s nations, by signing and ratifying the 
Convention Against Torture, have collectively agreed to prevent and 
criminalize torture in all forms.32  Indeed, torture has, for decades, 
or knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the 
President, President-elect, Vice President or other officer next in the order 
of succession to the office of President, or Vice President-elect, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”). 
29 Proponents of capital punishment frequently ground their defense of it on 
the idea that the threat of death may deter crime.  Glenn M. Bieler, Death 
Be Not Proud: A Note on Juvenile Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. 
Rts. 179, 179 (1990) (“Proponents claim the threat of death deters severe 
criminal behavior.”).  In fact, the death penalty has not been shown to be 
a greater deterrent to violent crime than life-without-parole sentences.  
See National Research Council of the National Academies, 
Deterrence and the Death Penalty (2012) (reviewing three 
decades of research and concluding that the research on the effect of 
capital punishment on homicide is not informative about whether capital 
punishments decreases, increases or has no effect on homicide rates).
30 The definition of torture in the Convention Against Torture “does not include 
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions.”  CAT, supra note 3, at art. 1(1).
31 Facts About the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated 
Sept. 17, 2018) (listing death penalty and non-death penalty states); The 
Death Penalty in 2016: Facts and Figures, Amnesty International (Apr. 
11, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/04/death-
penalty-2016-facts-and-figures/ (giving statistics on the death penalty’s use 
worldwide).
32 The Convention Against Torture provides: “Each State Party shall take 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent 
acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”  CAT, supra note 3, at 
art. 2(1).  “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war 
or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, 
may be invoked as a justification of torture.” CAT, supra note 3, at art. 2(2).  
“An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked 
as a justification of torture.”  CAT, supra note 3, at art. 2(3). The Convention 
Against Torture also provides: “Each State Party shall ensure that all acts 
of torture are offences under its criminal law.  The same shall apply to an 
attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes 
complicity or participation in torture.”  CAT, supra note 3, at art. 4(1); see also 
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been universally prohibited by international law and been seen by 
U.S. courts as a clear violation of the “law of nations.”33
Although judges seem to have no difficulty identifying and 
condemning physical torture,34 they have been more reticent to 
recognize psychological forms of torture, at least in certain contexts.35 
This article argues that twenty-first century jurists need, at long last, 
to take psychological torture seriously.  And in the death penalty 
CAT supra note 3, at art. 4(2) (“Each State Party shall make these offences 
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave 
nature.”).  “CAT claims require the adjudicator to consider the possibility 
of future torture.”  Saleh v. Sessions, No. 18-3212, 2018 WL 5304812, at 
*3 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 2018) (citation omitted); accord Gomez-Domingo v. 
Sessions, No. 16-2669, 2018 WL 4492433, at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2018) 
(“The agency must consider ‘all evidence relevant to the possibility of future 
torture’ . . . .”) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) (2018)); Bartolome v. 
Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 2018) (“During the reasonable fear 
determination, the asylum officer elicits ‘all information relating both to 
fear of persecution and fear of torture.’”) (quoting Reasonable Fear of 
Persecution & Torture Determinations, INS AOBT 8/6/2008, at *21, 2008 
WL 7226112 (Aug. 6, 2008)).
33 E.g., Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884−85 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[O]fficial 
torture is now prohibited by the law of nations.  The prohibition is clear and 
unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and 
citizens . . . .  [I]nternational law confers fundamental rights upon all people 
vis-a-vis their own governments.  While the ultimate scope of those rights 
will be a subject for continuing refinement and elaboration, we hold that the 
right to be free from torture is now among them.”).
34 “One of the reasons physical torture is constitutionally out of the question,” 
one legal commentator has noted, “is that the constitution protects bodily 
integrity against invasion and physical torture always involves such an 
invasion.”  Jeremy Waldron, Torture, Terror and Trade-Offs: 
Philosophy for the White House 240 (2010) (citing the work of 
Seth Kreimer).  In 2008, the Nebraska Supreme Court forthrightly declared 
the electric chair to be unconstitutional and torturous in nature.  “[S]ome 
prisoners will be tortured during electrocutions,” the court ruled, noting 
that “unconsciousness and death are not instantaneous for many condemned 
prisoners” and that “[t]hese prisoners will, when electrocuted, consciously 
suffer the torture that high voltage electric current inflicts on the human 
body.”  State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 270, 279 (Neb. 2008).
35 Sean Kevin Thompson, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in 
Intelligence Interrogation, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1601, 1625 (2005) (“Thus far, 
cases of mental torture tend to be limited to severe forms of mental suffering 
occasioned by actions such as mock execution or threatened dismemberment 
or castration.”) (citing War Crimes Documentation Cent., U.S. Dep’t of the 
Army, Report on Iraqi War Crimes (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) 8 (1992) 
(unclassified version), reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 16−18, U.N. 
Doc. S/25441 (1993)).
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context, that means recognizing capital prosecutions and death 
sentences for what they are: torturous threats of death.36  Death 
threats and mock executions, both of which inflict trauma and severe 
pain and suffering, are already classified as psychological torture,37 
and many sources,38 including a U.N. guide to investigating torture, 
36 Death threats are made in many contexts for a wide variety of reasons.  E.g., 
U.S. Dep’t of State, 110th Congress, Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 2007, 568, 2402, 2590, 2593, 2615, 2664, 2666 
(Joint Comm. Print 2008) (describing anonymous death threats against 
journalists, human rights activists and a political cartoonist); Sara Schatz, 
Impact of Organized Crime on Murder of Law Enforcement 
Personnel at the U.S.-Mexican Border 83 (2014) (describing death 
threats by organized crime elements); The SAGE Encyclopedia of 
Terrorism 200 (Gus Martin ed., 2d ed. 2011) (“One of the most famous 
‘death’ fatwas in modern times was the 1989 decree issued by the Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, the then leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, calling 
for the death of the British writer Salman Rushdie.  The fatwa declared that 
Rushdie should be executed for having insulted Islam in his novel The Satanic 
Verses, published in late 1988.”).
37 See generally The Trauma of Psychological Torture (Almerindo E. 
Ojeda ed., 2008). Accord 1 Trauma Psychology: Issues in Violence, 
Disaster, Health, and Illness 37 (Elizabeth K. Carll ed., 2007) 
(“Psychological torture occurs in many forms, some of which are highly 
subtle, yet quite devastating.”); id. (citations omitted) (“Threats of death and 
mock executions convince the victim that he or she could certainly die at the 
hands of the torturer.  Often torturers threaten to arrest, torture, or kill a 
victim’s family members, including children.  Another devastating form 
of torture is to be forced to listen to others being tortured without being able to 
intervene, or to witness the torture of others, including family members and 
friends.”); Donna E. Arzt, The Lockerbie “Extradition by Analogy” Agreement: 
“Exceptional Measure” or Template for Transnational Criminal Justice?, 18 Am. 
U. Int’l L. Rev. 163, 206 n.143 (2002) (“Forms of psychological torture 
and ill-treatment include death threats and threats of abuse against the 
prisoner’s family . . . .”).
38 E.g., Handbook of Multicultural Assessment: Clinical, 
Psychological, and Educational Applications 168 (Lisa A. Suzuki 
& Joseph G. Ponterotto eds., 3d ed. 2008) (“Psychological torture may 
include, among other techniques, humiliation, degradation, death threats, 
mock executions, being forced to violate taboos, forced confessions, being 
forced to reveal intimate personal information, and being forced to witness 
the torture of others, including family members.”). Some of the “more 
commonly used psychological torture methods” have been listed as follows: 
“Threats,” “Mock executions,” “Isolation,” “Witnessing torture sessions,” 
“Sleep deprivation,” “Loud noise,” “Constant exposure to bright light,” 
“Total sensory deprivation,” “Sexual humiliation,” “Not allowed to wear 
clothes,” “Constant interrogation,” “Not allowed to wash or to go to toilet,” 
“Not allowed to be alone in the toilet,” “Excrement abuse.” Forensic 
Medicine: Clinical and Pathological Aspects 62 (Jason Payne-
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list varieties of mental torture (e.g., “Threats of death, harm to family, 
further torture, imprisonment, mock executions”; “Threats of attack 
by animals, such as dogs, cats, rats or scorpions”; and “Forcing the 
victim to witness torture or atrocities being inflicted on others.”).39 
Part II of this article describes the illegality of death threats, 
highlighting how credible death threats are ordinarily treated as 
criminal, tortious, or torturous acts.40  The article then describes 
the process by which the death penalty is administered, laying 
out the collateral consequences for capital punishment of credible 
death threats already being classified as illegal and as unlawful 
acts of torture.  Part III thus details the process by which capital 
charges are leveled and death sentences are sought, obtained, and 
carried out.  That section reveals that threats to execute offenders 
are, in effect, nothing more than torturous threats of death, albeit 
ones made by state actors in a particular context.  Finally, Part IV 
argues that, given the absolute and existing legal prohibition against 
psychological torture, lawyers and judges should no longer tolerate, 
or be complicit with, criminal justice systems that make use of death 
threats of whatever kind or nature.  Because death threats are already 
properly classified as torturous acts in multiple contexts, including 
James et al. eds., 2003); see also id. (“Sham executions are an ultimate form 
of psychological torture and they are carried out with the utmost care to 
make them realistic.  The victim is not always relieved when the soldiers fire 
blanks, but may end up wanting them to end his life.”).
39 Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (Geneva), 
Professional Training Series No. 8/Rev. 1, Istanbul Protocol: Manual on the 
Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment p. 29, ¶ 145 (2004).
40 See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 300 F. Supp. 3d 758, 781 
(E.D. Va. 2018) (citing a 1997 report of the Committee Against Torture 
concluding that “threats, including death threats,” constitute torture); 
Jordan J. Paust et al., International Criminal Law 712, 866 
(4th ed. 2013) (discussing the Committee Against Torture’s condemnation 
of “threats, including death threats,” as “either torture or cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment”). See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts, art. 75(2)(e), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3 (proscribing “[t]hreats to commit” “[m]urder”, “[v]iolence to the life, 
health, or physical or mental well-being of persons”, “[t]orture”, 
 “[m]utilation”, “humiliating and degrading treatment and any form of 
indecent assault”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, art. 4(2)(h), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (proscribing 
threats to commit the same and additional conduct).
14 Bessler
in the context of torture-murder prosecutions, the use of death 
threats as part of any crime and punishment regime is inconsistent 
with human rights principles.41  The article concludes that the death 
penalty should be classified under the rubric of torture.
II.  The Illegality and Torturous Nature of Threats of Death 
A. Existing Legal Protections Against Death Threats Against 
Individuals
Death threats may be either express or implied.42  Public 
officials sometimes receive illicit death threats,43 but state actors—
as history shows—also sometimes make death threats or fail to 
protect prisoners or others following the making of death threats.44 
In the latter circumstances, death threats can result in liability for 
government officials for which there is no qualified immunity.45 
41 This article provides an in-depth examination of an argument I have 
explored elsewhere.  See generally Bessler, The Death Penalty as 
Torture, supra note 26. 
42 United States v. Sogan, 388 F. App’x 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2010).
43 E.g., Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Levin, No. 03-15-00044-CV, 2007 WL 
2302603, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. May 25, 2017).
44 Prison officials are legally obligated to protect prisoners from harm. 
Handbook on Prisons 575 (Yvonne Jewkes ed., 2013) (“[I]t has long 
been accepted that the authorities have a duty to protect prisoners against 
third parties, such as fellow prisoners who might harm them.”).
45 Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[A] reasonable jury 
could conclude that Clubbs issued the death threats because Santiago had 
filed and pursued his excessive force grievance. Thus, Clubbs is not entitled 
to qualified immunity regarding the retaliatory death threats.”); Irving 
v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2008) (“We conclude that, when 
viewed in the light of their retaliatory nature, their objectively credible basis, 
and their fear-inducing result, the death threats allegedly made by Brigance 
form the basis of an injury sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth 
Amendment.”); Rodriguez v. Secretary for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 
617 n.12 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e conclude that the gang-related threats 
made on Rodriguez’s life, which were explicitly reported to prison officials, 
present a substantial enough risk of harm to trigger a prison official’s 
Eighth Amendment duty to act; that is, to take some steps to investigate the 
likelihood that the reported threat will materialize and to take some steps 
aimed at reducing the likelihood of the risk.”); Odom v. S. Carolina Dep’t of 
Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003) (inmate-on-inmate assault, preceded 
by death threats, was sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment 
purposes to survive summary judgment); see also Wright v. Fry, No. 1:18-cv-
00016-KGB/JTK, 2018 WL 5266845 *1 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 22, 2018) (citations 
omitted) (“While allegations of verbal threats, taunts, name calling, or the 
use of offensive language alone do not support claims for use of excessive 
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For example, in Jones v. Carroll,46 a former inmate, Charles Jones, 
brought a section 198347 claim for violation of his civil rights against 
prison employees, alleging that they failed to protect him from an 
attack by another inmate, Anibal Melendez.  The federal district 
court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether Jones told prison officials about violent threats he received 
from Melendez, whom had threatened to kill Jones.48  In that case, 
the federal district court ruled that “a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude, based on plaintiff’s evidence,” that the “State defendants 
. . . subjectively knew of the substantial risk of harm that Melendez 
posed to plaintiff based on Melendez’s death threats.”49
Death threats are illegal and extremely shocking and 
outrageous acts,50 and they are frequently used by criminals or 
force, an exception is recognized ‘when the state official engaged in a brutal 
and wanton act of cruelty even though no physical harm was suffered.’”); 
Irving v. Wells, No. 1:18-CV-47 JMB, 2018 WL 2868927, at *2 (E.D. Mo. 
June 11, 2018) (“Although verbal threats are normally insufficient to violate 
the Constitution, the Eighth Circuit has concluded that death threats . . . 
may form the basis of an injury sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth 
Amendment.”) (citing Irving, 519 F.3d at 448−49); Titus v. Does #10-20, No. 
17-cv-1315-MJR, 2018 WL 558532, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2018) (citations 
omitted) (“Courts must apply an objective standard to determine whether a 
particular threat, given all the circumstances, may amount to a constitutional 
violation.  The pertinent inquiry is whether a ‘reasonable’ victim would fear 
for his or her life or safety as a result of the threat; not whether this plaintiff 
experienced actual fear.”).
46 Jones v. Carroll, 628 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D. Del. 2009).
47 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2017) allows prisoners to seek redress for the 
deprivation, under color of state law, of rights guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution or federal laws.  Perry v. Garcia, No. 09cv622 LAB (RBB), 2010 
WL 3633042, at *12 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2010); Norton v. Garro, 957 F. Supp. 
1067, 1070 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Webb v. Hopkins, No. 88 CV 2501, 1989 WL 
15814, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1989).
48 Jones, 628 F. Supp. 2d at 553−55.
49 Id. at 560. As that court further ruled: “The court finds that the failure to 
protect an inmate from another inmate who had issued continuing death 
threats poses an objective risk of excessive harm to the threatened inmate.”  
Id. at 560 n.9.
50 E.g., Neumeyer v. Wawanesa General Ins. Co., No. 14cv181-MMA (RBB), 
2015 WL 1924981, at *24 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2015) (“death threats 
constitute criminal behavior”); Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1249 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (“Of course death threats are extreme . . . .”); see also Cal. Penal 
Code § 422 (2011) (making death threats a crime); U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)
(2)(F) (2016) (providing for the upward adjustment of a defendant’s base 
offense level for robbery by two levels “if a threat of death was made”); 
United States v. Fontanez, No. 17-13944, 2018 WL 3239249, at *2 n.3 
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totalitarian or repressive regimes for illicit purposes.51  Death threats, 
it has been held, are completely unjustified and unjustifiable,52 
and because of their nature, they can themselves be evidence of 
aggressive or murderous intent.53  The seriousness of death threats 
is even reflected in the application of evidentiary rules.  As the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emphasized in a recent case: 
It is long settled that the admissibility of death threats 
made by a defendant is evaluated in accordance with 
the ordinary principles of Federal Rule of Evidence 
403.  At the same time, the potential for unfair 
prejudice is so great that Rule 403’s balancing test 
permits admission of death threat evidence only if 
there is clear need for the evidence and it serves an 
important purpose.54  
As the Second Circuit ruled in that case: “It is hard to deem harmless 
the erroneous admission of death threat evidence. In this instance, 
the evidence was toxic.”55
(11th Cir. June 3, 2018) (noting that the defendant “received a two-level 
enhancement for making a threat of death” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)
(2)(F) (2016)).
51 Stephen J. Morewitz, Death Threats and Violence: New 
Research and Clinical Perspectives 101 (2008) (citation omitted).
52 See Schanze v. Schanze, No. A15-0231, 2015 WL 8548626, at *3 n.2 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2015) (“We categorically reject Daniel’s argument that the 
harm threatened was not imminent because it was contingent on Danielle 
having an extramarital affair.  To adopt this argument could be read to 
suggest that an extramarital affair somehow justifies death threats.  The 
unfortunate occurrence of an extramarital affair does not ever justify death 
threats.”).
53 Hernandez v. Stainer, No. 1:11-cv-00489-AWI-JLT, 2013 WL 5773041, at 
*16 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2013) (“[W]here both perpetrators made death 
threats against the victims, each assisting the other in what appears to be 
a highly coordinated assault, and where the shooting does not appear to 
have been either an accident or impulse by Ramirez, but rather part of a 
jointly understood and planned strategy of attack, the evidence is certainly 
sufficient to support a finding by reasonable jurors that Petitioner shared the 
same homicidal mind state as Ramirez.”); People v. Gamble, 899 N.Y.S.2d 
207, 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (“Defendant’s pattern of aggressive conduct 
toward the victims, including specific death threats and menacing with a 
handgun, was highly probative of motive and intent . . . .”).
54 United States v. Morgan, 786 F.3d 227, 229 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation 
omitted).
55 Id. at 234. See also United States v. Tarantino, No. 08-CR-0655 (JS), 2012 
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 Death threats are not constitutionally protected speech.56 
“[T]he First Amendment,” the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, 
“permits a State to ban a ‘true threat.’”57  As the Supreme Court has 
explained: “‘[T]rue threats’ encompass those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group 
of individuals.”58  “Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable 
sense of the word,” the Court emphasized, “is a type of true threat, 
where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with 
the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”59 
Thus, the constitutional rights of someone making a true threat are 
not violated if an adverse action (e.g., a criminal prosecution or the 
termination of employment) follows the making of that threat.60 
WL 1458197, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2012) (citations omitted) (“Death 
threats, like other evidence, are subject to the usual Rule 403 balancing test.  
Nevertheless, courts are mindful that ‘the potential prejudice from death 
threats may be great’ and may tend to ‘exclude death threats more frequently 
than other evidence.’”).
56 United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 227 (1st Cir. 2011) (“The law is 
crystal clear that threats are not constitutionally protected speech.”). See 
Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 992 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[A] reasonable jury 
could find that threats of death, issued by a correctional officer tasked with 
guarding a prisoner’s segregated cell, would chill a prisoner of ordinary 
firmness from engaging in the prison grievance process . . . .”); Van Deelen 
v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A]llegations of physical 
and verbal intimidation, including a threat by a deputy sheriff to shoot him if 
he brought any more tax appeals, would surely suffice under our precedents 
to chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to seek redress for 
(allegedly) unfair property tax assessments.”).
57 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (quoting Watts v. United States, 
394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam)).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 360; see also Baumgartner v. Eppinger, No. 1:10CV2810, 2013 WL 
5563913, at *17 (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 27, 2013) (citations omitted) (“The 
Seventh Circuit, in a case involving 18 U.S.C. § 876, stated that, in order 
for the government to establish a ‘true threat,’ it must demonstrate that 
a reasonable person would foresee that the statement at issue would be 
interpreted by the recipient as ‘a serious expression of an intention to 
inflict bodily harm upon,’ or to kill, that person.  The court emphasized the 
importance of the context of the statement in determining whether it was a 
true threat or merely political hyperbole.”). 
60 See, e.g., Smith v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 109 A.D.3d 701, 702−03 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2013) (holding that disciplinary proceeding and ultimate discipline 
imposed against tenured teacher, that is, termination of employment, did 
not violate teacher’s right to free speech under the First Amendment, 
where teacher’s death threats against initial arbitrator in a prior disciplinary 
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That is because it is improper to threaten someone with death. 
The Supreme Court, in fact, has made clear that a victim’s fear, if 
reasonable or grounded in reality, mandates that threatening speech 
lose its First Amendment protection.61
B. Death Threats, Persecution, and the U.S. Constitution’s 
Eighth Amendment
The U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment imposes a duty 
on prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of 
proceeding were true threats not entitled to First Amendment protection, 
and they did not implicate matters of public concern); Misiak v. Boening, 
No. C09-0716-JCC, 2010 WL 55857, at *4−5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2010) 
(“The state courts neither misinterpreted nor misapplied Supreme Court 
authority in determining that prohibiting inmates from making death threats 
is related to the legitimate penological interest of protecting correctional 
officers.”).  A person subjected to a plausible and imminent threat of serious 
injury or death is entitled to the law’s protection—a principle that, as a 
general matter, applies equally to inmates.  Valdez v. City of New York, 
No. 11 Civ. 05194(PAC)(DF), 2013 WL 8642169, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
3, 2013) (“[C]ourts have consistently required plaintiffs in inmate-safety 
cases to allege that they either suffered a physical injury or were subject to 
an imminent threat of serious physical injury in circumstances making the 
threat plausible.”).  Of course, an inmate is legally protected from harm only 
if the threat is real.  See Chalif v. Spitzer, No. 9:05-CV-1355 (LEK/DEP), 
2008 WL 1848650, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2008) (finding no substantial 
risk of serious harm where plaintiff alleged that he was “subjected to 
psychological torture by imminent threat of death” but complaint did not 
include “any incident[] whereby he was assaulted by any fellow inmates, 
or that such an assault was threatened and imminent”). See also Richardson 
v. Castro, No. 97-CV-3772 (SJ), 1998 WL 205414, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 
1998) (citation omitted) (“[V]erbal threats do not violate the constitution 
‘unless accompanied by physical force or the present ability to effectuate the 
threat.’”). 
61 Joshua Azriel, First Amendment Implications for E-Mail Threats: Are There Any 
Free Speech Protections?, 23 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 845, 
846 (2005) (citation omitted) (“The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided 
a case where the victim’s fear mandates that threatening speech lose its 
First Amendment protection.  The Court, in a 6-3 decision, ruled that 
cross burning is not protected speech when it is used to intimidate an 
individual or a group of people.  The salient part of the Court’s ruling is 
that intimidation is a true threat, and a prohibition on intimidating threats 
protects people from a fear of violence.  The Court stated that the speaker 
does not actually have to carry out the threat for it to be illegal.  This follows 
the reasoning of several lower court decisions that use a reasonable person 
standard to determine the efficacy of a threat.”).
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other prisoners”62 and prison guards.63  The Eighth Amendment, in 
fact, has already been found to protect inmates from death threats.64 
One federal district court articulated the applicable standard: “Courts 
must apply an objective standard to determine whether a particular 
threat of death or harm, given all the circumstances, may amount 
to a constitutional violation.”65  “The pertinent inquiry,” that court 
stressed, “is whether a ‘reasonable’ victim would fear for his or her 
life as a result of the threat; not whether this plaintiff experienced 
actual fear.”66  In that case, the court observed that “repeated threats 
to beat and kill Plaintiff and to have officers at his next prison ‘get’ 
him” may have “violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”67  “These 
actions,” the court concluded, taking note of how the inmate was 
forced to strip and spread his buttocks for an inordinate length of 
time, were calculated “to strike fear into Plaintiff, to humiliate him, 
and to emphasize that the Defendants had the power to harm and 
62 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citation omitted).
63 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (a correctional officer’s use of 
excessive physical force against a prisoner may, in appropriate circumstances, 
constitute a cruel and unusual punishment even though the prison does 
not suffer either “significant injury” or “serious injury”); McClanahan v. 
Butler, No. 16-cv-340-SMY, 2016 WL 4154910, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2016) 
(“The intentional use of excessive force by prison guards against an inmate 
without penological justification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment and is actionable under § 1983.”); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2012) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by 
a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other correctional facility for mental 
or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of 
physical injury. . . .”); Johnson v. Bradford, 72 F. App’x 98, 99 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(“Johnson’s challenge to the defendants’ alleged death threats does not 
present a claim of physical injury and therefore fails to state an excessive 
force claim.”).
64 Dobbey v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 574 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations 
omitted) (“[A] threat, which is how the plaintiff interpreted the incident, 
can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.”); id. (“‘Mental 
torture is not an oxymoron, and has been held or assumed in a number of 
prisoner cases to be actionable as cruel and unusual punishment,’ . . . —
imagine falsely informing a prisoner that he has been sentenced to death.”); 
Lamon v. Brown, No. 12-cv-1176-JPG-DGW, 2013 WL 6508490, at *2 (S.D. 
Ill. Dec. 12, 2013) (citation omitted) (“[T]hreats or mental torture can rise 
to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.”).
65 Bardo v. Stolworthy, No. 15-cv-1193-JPG, 2015 WL 7713710, at *8 (S.D. Ill. 






American jurists have long classified verbal threats as 
potentially violative of the Eighth Amendment if accompanied by 
extreme psychological torment or harm.69  For instance, in Babcock 
v. White,70 the Seventh Circuit held that “the Constitution does not 
countenance psychological torture merely because it fails to inflict 
physical injury.”71  Likewise, in Northington v. Jackson,72 an inmate, 
Craig Northington, filed a civil rights action against sheriff’s deputies, 
corrections officers, and a county sheriff’s department alleging that 
law enforcement officers stopped him on his way from the Denver 
County Jail to his community placement worksite.73  In that case, 
Northington alleged that a captain put a revolver to his head and 
threatened to kill him.74  In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit, noting that 
Northington “alleged psychological injury as a result of the alleged 
death threat,”75 explicitly ruled: “Under these circumstances, if true, 
it could be ‘malicious and sadistic’ for a corrections officer to place a 
revolver to a prisoner’s head and threaten to pull the trigger.”76  “Mr. 
Northington’s allegations, accepted as true, may state a violation of 
68 Id.
69 Cummings v. Harrison, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1272 (N.D. Fla. 2010); 
see also id. at 1273 (“[D]espite the general principle that verbal threats 
are insufficient to state a claim, some cases have recognized that verbal 
threats to kill an inmate do present an Eighth Amendment claim.”).  In 
Cummings, the court ruled: “The threats as presented in Plaintiff’s affidavit 
reveal sufficient psychological harm to survive.  This is especially true as 
the verbal threats are alleged to have been continuing and combined with 
physical assaults.”  Id.; see also Gomez v. Birondo, No. 91-15731, 1992 WL 
153007, at *2 (9th Cir. July 6, 1992) (“Gomez’s allegations of excessive force 
combined with death threats arguably state a[n] [E]ighth [A]mendment 
claim.”); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1029−30, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(finding that a prisoner stated an Eighth Amendment claim by alleging that 
an officer struck him and threatened to kill him), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 
(1973); cf. United States v. Gore, 592 F.3d 489, 491−92 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(the government “concedes that some minimal right of self-defense must 
be available to inmates charged under 18 U.S.C. § 111 because disabling an 
inmate entirely from protecting himself from wanton, unlawful aggression 
threatening death or serious bodily injury would violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments”).
70 Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996).
71 Id. at 273.
72 Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1992).
73 Id. at 1520, 1522.
74 Id. at 1522.
75 Id. at 1524.
76 Id.
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the Eighth Amendment,” the Tenth Circuit determined.77
In immigration and asylum cases, prior death threats are 
used to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.78  For instance, in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch,79 the 
Fourth Circuit held that a native and citizen of El Salvador, Maydai 
77 Id. at 1525.  In its ruling, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Collins v. Cundy, 603 
F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979), in which the Tenth Circuit had previously ruled 
that a sheriff’s “idle threat to hang a prisoner” did not give rise to a section 
1983 claim. Northington, 973 F.2d at 1524 (citing Collins, 603 F.2d at 827); 
see also Clark v. Ellis, No. 4-11-cv-00135-KGB-JTK, 2012 WL 3595973, at *4 
(E.D. Ark. May 24, 2012) (citations omitted) (“[M]ere verbal threats made 
by a state-actor do not constitute a § 1983 claim . . . .  [T]he constitution 
does not protect against all intrusions on one’s peace of mind.  Fear of 
emotional injury which results solely from verbal harassment or idle threats 
is generally not sufficient to constitute an invasion of an identified liberty 
interest.”).
78 Death threats are a frequent staple of persecution claims.  E.g., Tairou 
v. Whitaker, No. 17-1404, 2018 WL 6252780, at *4 (4th Cir. Nov. 30, 
2018) (“Because Tairou received multiple, explicit threats of death both 
during and after the village gathering, the BIA’s conclusion as to past harm 
contravenes our express and repeated holding that the ‘threat of death’ 
qualifies as persecution.”); Lomtyeva v. Sessions, 704 F. App’x 677, 681 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (“[W]hile ‘death threats alone can constitute 
persecution,’ the context in which the threat is made ultimately determines 
its persecutory impact[.]”); Godoy v. Holder, 434 F. App’x 634, 635 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (“[D]eath threats, when combined with other 
factors present here (including the murders of family members and physical 
confrontations with persecutors), may constitute persecution.”); Ramirez-
Recinos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 406 F. App’x 457, 459 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e 
upheld a persecution claim where an alien received numerous death threats, 
was dragged by her hair out of her car and beaten, had her groundskeeper 
tortured and killed by attackers looking for her, and was further kidnapped 
and beaten.”); Kumar v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that threats to kill individual if he returned to India “require a 
finding that he has met his burden of showing a well-founded fear of future 
persecution”); Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[M]enacing 
death threats can constitute a primary part of a past persecution claim, 
particularly where those threats are combined with confrontation or other 
mistreatment.”); Sackie v. Ashcroft, 270 F. Supp. 2d 596, 602 (E.D. Pa. 
2003) (“Given Mr. Sackie’s undisputed and uncontroverted testimony that 
he was threatened with imminent death on numerous occasions, frequently 
given mind altering substances and suffered cuts to his back and arms, we 
must find that he has met his burden of proving that he was tortured in his 
native country.”). Cf. Pabon v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 704 F. App’x 903, 907 (11th 
Cir. 2017) (“Being intentionally shot at is sufficiently extreme to establish 
persecution, even if the attack is unsuccessful, and there is no strict physical 
harm requirement to establish persecution.”).
79 Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944 (4th Cir. 2015).
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Hernandez-Avalos (“Hernandez”), had sufficiently proven past 
persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution based on 
a gang’s death threats.80  In 2007, members of the Mara 18 gang 
had killed the cousin of Hernandez’s husband for refusing to join 
the gang.81  Hernandez had not witnessed the murder, but she later 
identified the body and took it home for burial.82  After that burial, 
gang members had come to her home and threatened to kill her if 
she fingered the gang members responsible for the murder.83  Within 
a few months, Hernandez was threatened with death again when 
Mara 18 gang members returned to her home and put a gun to her 
head after she told them her 12-year-old son would not join the 
gang.84  After Hernandez was similarly threatened with death yet a 
third time by gang members, she fled to the United States with the 
help of a smuggler.85 
In Hernandez-Avalos, the Fourth Circuit took note of the death 
threats, emphasizing that its jurisprudence made clear that “the threat 
of death qualifies as persecution.”86  “Because Hernandez credibly 
testified that she received death threats from Mara 18,” the Fourth 
Circuit determined, “she has proven that she has a well-founded fear 
of future persecution were she to return to El Salvador.”87  “[I]n this 
case,” the Fourth Circuit stressed, “Mara 18 threatened Hernandez 
in order to recruit her son into their ranks, but they also threatened 
Hernandez, rather than another person, because of her family 
connection to her son.”88  Acknowledging the corruption and the 
power of gangs within Salvadoran prisons and El Salvador’s judicial 
system,89 and finding that Hernandez had established her eligibility 
for asylum, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Hernandez’s credible 
testimony “is legally sufficient under the circumstances present here 
to establish that the Salvadoran authorities are unable or unwilling 
to protect her from the gang members who threatened her.”90  In 
80 Id. at 946−53.





86 Id. at 949.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 950.
89 Id. at 952−53.
90 Id. at 953.
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reality, death threats have long been a problem in El Salvador,91 as 
they have been in many other countries.92
American courts have wrestled on more than one occasion 
with cases involving death threats made against inmates.  For 
example, in Chandler v. D.C. Department of Corrections,93 a threat was 
made against an inmate’s life and the inmate alleged it had caused 
him “psychological damage” and that his fear that the threat would 
be carried out caused him to suffer “[n]ightmares and [to] wak[e] 
up in a frantic sweat.”94  In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia began its analysis by stating: “We note 
at the outset that verbal threats, without more, may be sufficient 
to state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment.”95  The 
Court of Appeals then concluded that, “[d]epending on the gravity 
of the fear,” “the credibility of the threat,” and the targeted person’s 
“psychological condition,” a death threat “could have caused more 
than de minimis harm and therefore could have been sufficient 
to state a claim of excessive use of force.”96  “These issues,” the 
Court of Appeals ruled, reversing the district court’s dismissal of 
91 See, e.g., Lawrence Michael Ladutke, Freedom in Expression in 
El Salvador: The Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy 
58 (2004); Thomas L. Pearcy, The History of Central America 110 
(2006).
92 Human Rights in Developing Countries: Yearbook 1997 196−97 
(Hugo Stokke et al. eds.) (discussing death threats in Guatemala); Silvio 
Waisbord, Watchdog Journalism in South America: News, 
Accountability, and Democracy 60 (2000) (discussing death threats 
in South America against journalists).
93 Chandler v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
94 Id. at 1359.
95 Id. at 1360.  In support of that proposition, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia cited Justice Harry Blackmun’s concurrence 
in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).  In that concurrence, Justice 
Blackmun observed: “It is not hard to imagine inflictions of psychological 
harm—without corresponding physical harm—that might prove to be cruel 
and unusual punishment. . . .  [T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of ‘pain,’ rather than ‘injury.’  ‘Pain’ in 
its ordinary meaning surely includes a notion of psychological harm.”  Id. 
at 16 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also id. at 17 (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(“Psychological pain often may be clinically diagnosed and quantified 
through well-established methods, as in the ordinary tort context where 
damages for pain and suffering are regularly awarded.”). The U.S. Supreme 
Court, in a recent Eighth Amendment case, has itself found that “it is proper 
to consider . . . psychiatric and professional studies.”  Hall v. Florida, 134 S. 
Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014).
96 Chandler, 145 F.3d at 1361.
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the inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim, “cannot be resolved without 
more factual development.”97
Similarly, in Burton v. Livingston,98 an inmate alleged that 
an officer pointed a gun at him and threatened to shoot him.  The 
officer allegedly asked the inmate to “run” so he could “blow” the 
inmate’s “Goddamn brains out.”99  In that case, the officer reportedly 
used racial epithets and, through his words, tried “to scare” the 
inmate into running, potentially allowing the officer to shoot the 
inmate in the back and then later falsely claim that the inmate was 
trying to escape.100  As the Eighth Circuit described the lawsuit’s 
allegations: “The complaint states that Sgt. Livingston pointed a 
lethal weapon at the prisoner, cocked it, and threatened him with 
instant death.  This incident occurred immediately after the prisoner 
had given testimony against another guard in a § 1983 action.”101 
Faced with those allegations, the Eighth Circuit ruled: “The complaint 
describes in plain words a wanton act of cruelty which, if it occurred, 
was brutal despite the fact that it resulted in no measurable physical 
injury to the prisoner.”102  “The day has passed,” the Eighth Circuit 
held, “when an inmate must show a court the scars of torture in 
order to make out a complaint under § 1983.”103  As the Eighth 
Circuit emphasized: “We hold that a prisoner retains at least the 
right to be free from the terror of instant and unexpected death at 
the whim of his allegedly bigoted custodians.”104
97 Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994)).  As the Court of 
Appeals stressed: “[T]he risk that Corporal Brooks’s threat might be carried 
out, if left unaddressed (a matter upon which the district court made no 
findings), could amount to ‘a sufficiently substantial “risk of serious damage 
to [Chandler’s] future health”’ to be actionable as an unconstitutional 
condition of confinement.”  Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843). 
98 Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99−100 (8th Cir. 1986).
99 Id. at 99.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 100.  “Apparently,” the Eighth Circuit reported, “another guard who 
was present took the threat seriously enough to step between the prisoner 
and Sgt. Livingston.”  Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. The Eighth Circuit further ruled: “So far as we can tell at this early 
stage of the case, the guard’s conduct was not motivated by the necessity 
of correcting a rebellious inmate or by legitimate concerns for institutional 
security.  Neither is it an instance of rough language which resulted only in 
bruised feelings.”  Id.  “This is rather,” the Eighth Circuit emphasized, “a 
complaint that a prison guard, without provocation, and for the apparent 
purpose of retaliating against the prisoner’s exercise of his rights in 
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The case of Hudspeth v. Figgins105 is also illustrative.  In that 
case, a prisoner, James Hudspeth, sued two prison guards who 
had allegedly impaired his right of access to the courts, with one 
correctional officer reportedly threatening to transfer Hudspeth to 
a work detail where the inmate, per the threat, would be shot by 
“accident.”106  In that case, the Fourth Circuit ruled: “A threat of 
physical harm to a prisoner if he persists in his pursuit of judicial relief 
is as impermissible as a more direct means of restricting the right of 
access to the courts.”107  “It is enough,” the Fourth Circuit explained, 
pointing out that the inmate need not have actually succumbed to the 
threat, “that the threat was intended to impose a limitation upon the 
prisoner’s right of access to the court and was reasonably calculated 
to have that effect.”108  If Hudspeth was intentionally placed “in fear 
for his life if he pressed his court actions,” the Fourth Circuit added, 
“that would inflict such suffering as to amount to unconstitutional 
punishment.”109  “The life of a prisoner is a dreary one of suffering,” 
it concluded, “but the Constitution prohibits the infliction upon 
a prisoner of unnecessary suffering which is inconsistent with 
contemporary standards of decency.”110
petitioning a federal court for redress, terrorized him with threats of death.”  
Id. at 100−01.  “Under the circumstances of this incident,” the Eighth 
Circuit concluded, “the guard’s actions, if proved, were a violation of Mr. 
Burton’s rights under the First Amendment and under the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 101; see also 
Shamsud’Diyn v. Moyer, No. ELH-17-3271, 2018 WL 3022660, at *9 (D. Md. 
June 18, 2018) (“[A] ‘complaint that a prison guard, without provocation, 
and for the apparent purpose of retaliating against the prisoner’s exercise 
of his rights in petitioning a federal court for redress, terrorizing him with 
threats of death,’ would be sufficient to state a claim.”) (quoting Burton, 
791 F.2d at 100−01)); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1346 
(N.D. Ga. 2002) (“Mental torture consists of ‘prolonged mental harm caused 
by or resulting from: the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of 
severe physical pain or suffering; . . . the threat of imminent death; or the 
threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, [or] 
severe physical pain or suffering.’  As set out above, plaintiffs noted in their 
testimony that they feared that they would be killed by Vuckovic during the 
beatings he inflicted or during games of ‘Russian roulette.’  Each plaintiff 
continues to suffer long-term psychological harm as a result of the ordeals 
they suffered at the hands of defendant and others.”).
105 Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1978).
106 Id. at 1347.
107 Id. at 1348.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.  The U.S. Supreme Court has been using the “evolving standards of 
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A provision of federal law put in place as part of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act111 regulates the ability of inmates to bring 
claims for compensatory damages for prison conditions that relate 
to an inmate’s mental health.  According to the provision of that law 
now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e): 
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner 
confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, 
for mental or emotional injury suffered while in 
custody without a prior showing of physical injury or 
the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 
2246 of Title 18).112  
But that law plainly does not allow government actors to 
psychologically torture prisoners with impunity.113  As the Seventh 
Circuit wrote in rejecting the Attorney General’s contention that 
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) makes a showing of physical injury a filing 
prerequisite for every civil rights lawsuit involving mental or 
emotional injury: “This contention if taken to its logical extreme 
would give prison officials free reign to maliciously and sadistically 
inflict psychological torture on prisoners, so long as they take care 
not to inflict any physical injury in the process.”114
decency” test since 1958 to gauge what violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 
(1958) (determining that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society”). 
111 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2013).
112 Id. § 1997e(e).
113 Scarver v. Litscher, 371 F. Supp. 2d 986, 997−98 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (citation 
omitted) (“A plaintiff who has suffered psychological torture but not physical 
injury may still obtain nominal or punitive damages.”).
114 Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003).  As the Seventh 
Circuit determined in that case: “As we have observed before and 
reemphasize here, ‘[i]t would be a serious mistake to interpret section 
1997e(e) to require a showing of physical injury in all prisoner civil rights 
suits.’  On several occasions we have explained that § 1997e(e) may limit 
the relief available to prisoners who cannot allege a physical injury, but it 
does not bar their lawsuits altogether.  As its title suggests, § 1997e(e) is a 
‘limitation on recovery.’  Accordingly, physical injury is merely a predicate for 
an award of damages for mental or emotional injury, not a filing prerequisite 
for the federal civil action itself.” Id.; see also id. at 941 (“Although § 1997e(e) 
would bar recovery of compensatory damages ‘for’ mental and emotional 
injuries suffered, the statute is inapplicable to awards of nominal or punitive 
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As a general matter, the Eighth Amendment thus ordinarily 
protects inmates from harm, further requiring that they be clothed, 
fed, sheltered, and provided with adequate health care.115  “The 
Eighth Amendment,” as one federal district court put it, “requires 
the government ‘to provide medical care for those whom it is 
punishing by incarceration.’”116  And the Eighth Amendment has 
long been read to require the provision of mental health services for 
inmates117 and to bar torture.118  For example, in Estelle v. Gamble,119 
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that “the primary concern of the 
drafters” of the Eighth Amendment was “to proscribe ‘torture[s]’ 
and other ‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment.”120  In that 1976 
decision, the Supreme Court went on to declare: “Our more recent 
cases, however, have held that Amendment proscribes more than 
damages for the Eighth Amendment violation itself.”).
115 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) (“Prisoners are dependent on 
the State for food, clothing, and necessary medical care.”); id. at 511 (“If 
government fails to fulfill this obligation, the courts have a responsibility 
to remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment violation.”); id. at 538 
(“Establishing the population at which the State could begin to provide 
constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care, and the 
appropriate time frame within which to achieve the necessary reduction, 
requires a degree a judgment.”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 
(1994) (citations omitted) (“[P]rison officials must ensure that inmates 
receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take 
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates’ . . . .”).
116 Scarver, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (quoting Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 
(7th Cir. 1996)).
117 Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations 
omitted) (“Courts have repeatedly held that treatment of a psychiatric 
or psychological condition may present a ‘serious medical need’ under 
the Estelle formulation.”); King v. Litscher, No. 17-CV-201-JPS, 2017 WL 
4334133, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 28, 2017) (“It is well settled that the Eighth 
Amendment protects the mental health of prisoners no less than their 
physical health.”); Green v. Grams, No. 10-cv-745-slc, 2011 WL 5151520, at 
*3 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2011) (same).
118 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (noting that “the primary 
concern of the drafters” of the Eighth Amendment “was to proscribe 
‘torture[s]’ and other ‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment”); see also Taylor 
v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1082 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain through torture, 
barbarous methods, or methods resulting in a lingering death.”); Snipes 
v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[R]ecent Supreme Court 
decisions have held that the Eighth Amendment proscribes more than just 
‘physically barbarous punishments.’”).
119 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
120 Id. at 102.
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physically barbarous punishments.”121  “We therefore conclude,” the 
Court held, “that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 
of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”122  
A failure to provide adequate psychiatric and mental 
health care services to inmates is deliberately indifferent to their 
serious medical needs and thus constitutes an Eighth Amendment 
121 Id.  As the Court in Estelle v. Gamble put it: “The Amendment embodies 
‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and 
decency . . . ,’ Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968), against 
which we must evaluate penal measures.  Thus, we have held repugnant 
to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with ‘the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” 
Id. In Jackson v. Bishop, the Eighth Circuit—in an opinion authored by then 
- Judge Harry Blackmun—concluded in 1968: “[W]e have no difficulty in 
reaching the conclusion that the use of the strap in the penitentiaries of 
Arkansas is punishment which, in this last third of the 20th century, runs 
afoul of the Eighth Amendment; that the strap’s use, irrespective of any 
precautionary conditions which may be imposed, offends contemporary 
concepts of decency and human dignity and precepts of civilization which 
we profess to possess; and that it also violates those standards of good 
conscience and fundamental fairness enunciated by this court . . . .” Jackson, 
404 F.2d at 579.
122 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104−05 (citation omitted); see also id. (“This is true 
whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to 
the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying 
access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once 
prescribed.  Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a 
prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.”). 
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violation.123  As the Second Circuit put it in Langley v. Coughlin,124 
“the basic legal principle is clear and well established . . . that when 
incarceration deprives a person of reasonably necessary medical 
care (including psychiatric or mental health care) which would be 
available to him or her if not incarcerated, the prison authorities 
must provide such surrogate care.”125  In 2011, the U.S. Supreme 
Court itself considered an Eighth Amendment case involving prison 
overcrowding and inadequate provision of services.  In that case, the 
Supreme Court emphasized: “For years the medical and mental health 
care provided by California’s prisons has fallen short of minimum 
constitutional requirements and has failed to meet prisoners’ basic 
health needs.  Needless suffering and death have been the well-
documented result.”126  The Court stressed that California prisoners 
“with serious mental illness do not receive minimal, adequate care,” 
with suicidal inmates held “for prolonged periods in telephone-
booth-sized cages without toilets.”127
123 Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Hoptowit v. 
Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982)); see also Kothmann v. Rosario, 
558 F. App’x 907, 910 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (“A correctional 
system’s deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, 
including ‘psychiatric or mental health needs,’ violates the Eighth 
Amendment.”); Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Mental 
torture is not an oxymoron, and has been held or assumed in a number 
of prisoner cases, such as Joseph v. Brierton, 739 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1984); 
Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525−26 (9th Cir. 1993), and Northington 
v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1992), to be actionable as cruel 
and unusual punishment.”); Green v. Wilson, No. PWG-15-3866, 2018 WL 
3629970, at *5 (D. Md. July 31, 2018) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
does not recognize “any distinction between the right to medical care for 
physical ills and its psychological and psychiatric counterparts”); Bentz v. 
Mulholland, No. 18-cv-1064-DRH, 2018 WL 2735483, at *9 (S.D. Ill. June 
7, 2018) (holding that when harassment by prison officials is “accompanied 
by actions which suggest that the harassment is persistent or results in pain 
(either physical or psychological),” such “verbal harassment may support 
an Eighth Amendment claim”); Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 
1256 n.81 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (“ADOC’s failure to provide mental-health 
and correctional staffing sufficient to operate a minimally adequate mental-
health system is in itself an unreasonable response under the deliberate-
indifference standard.”); Henderson v. S. Carolina Dep’t of Corr., C/A 
No.: 4:17-287-BHH-TER, 2017 WL 2199020, at *5 (D. S.C. Apr. 25, 2017) 
(citation omitted) (“Claims regarding mental health treatment fall under a 
claim for deliberate indifference to medical care.”). 
124 Langley v. Coughlin, 888 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989).
125 Id. at 254. 
126 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 501 (2011).
127 Id. at 503.  
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Prisoners, like non-incarcerated human beings, have both 
physical and psychological needs.  “Serious medical needs” in the 
prison context encompasses “conditions that are life-threatening or 
that carry risks of permanent serious impairment if left untreated, 
those that result in needless pain and suffering when treatment 
is withheld and those that have been diagnosed by a physician as 
mandating treatment.”128  Suicide is but one objectively serious harm 
that prison officials must guard against,129 and it has been specifically 
held that, in the prison context, “[t]he Eighth Amendment protects 
inmates’ mental health as well as their physical health.”130  An inmate 
can therefore state a claim for deliberate indifference by alleging that 
“his ‘pleas’ for psychological treatment were ‘ignored,’”131 with one 
U.S. magistrate judge allowing an inmate’s complaint to proceed 
past a motion to dismiss where the inmate alleged a deliberate 
indifference to his serious medical needs that resulted “in increased 
pain, potentially life threatening spikes in blood pressure, dizzy 
spells, anxiety, and other psychological trauma.”132
In the immigration context, case law makes clear that 
“credible, specific threats can amount to persecution if they are severe 
enough.”133  “‘[T]hreats of murder,’” the First Circuit has explained, 
“fit squarely within this rubric.”134  Although the Immigration 
128 Scarver v. Litscher, 371 F. Supp. 2d 986, 999 (W.D. Wis. 2005).
129 Id.; see also Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 860 (8th Cir. 2018) 
(“The Eighth Amendment prohibits jail officials from acting with deliberate 
indifference towards risks of suicide.”); Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 158 
(3d Cir. 2017) (noting that a “vulnerability-to-suicide claim . . . is simply a 
more specific articulation of the Eighth Amendment rule that prison officials 
must not be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs”).
130 Scarver, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 1000 (citing Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 
940 (7th Cir. 2003); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 
1987)).
131 Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Harris 
v. Billington, No. 12-cv-437-wmc, 2015 WL 1893240, at *14 (W.D. Wis. 
Apr. 24, 2015) (holding that a delay in treatment “can, under certain 
circumstances, constitute deliberate indifference”).
132 Davis v. Hyden, No. A02-214 CV (JKS), 2005 WL 3116641, at *1, 5 (D. 
Alaska Nov. 21, 2005).
133 Javed v. Holder, 715 F.3d 391, 395−96 (1st Cir. 2013); see also Barreto v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 392 F. App’x 689, 691 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e have held that 
a minor beating, a detention of 11 hours, and a credible death threat by a 
person who had the immediate ability to act on it constituted persecution.”).
134 Javed, 715 F.3d at 396 (quoting López de Hincapié v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 
213, 217 (1st Cir. 2007)); see also Sumschi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 677 F. App’x 
579, 581 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
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and Nationality Act (“INA”)135 contains no statutory definition of 
“persecution,”136 that term has been interpreted to cover a “threat 
of death, torture, or injury to one’s person”137 or—as another court 
put it—“severe humanitarian mistreatment, such as ‘death threats, 
involuntary confinement, torture, and other severe affronts to the life 
or freedom of the applicant.’”138  As the Ninth Circuit ruled in 1996: 
“There is no question that persistent death threats and assaults on 
one’s life, family, and business rise to the level of persecution.”139 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit summarized its prior case law as 
follows:  “In several cases, we have found that where the applicant 
was the target of repeated beatings, death threats, and expressions 
of hatred, a finding of persecution is compelled.”140
525 F.3d 999, 1009−10 (11th Cir. 2008)) (“[W]e previously concluded 
that the record compelled a finding that an alien was persecuted when 
she received repeated death threats over the course of two years and was 
dragged from her vehicle by her hair, was traumatized by the torture and 
murder of a family groundskeeper who refused to reveal her whereabouts, 
and was kidnapped and beaten.”); Sanchez Jimenez v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 
1223, 1233 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that past persecution included death 
threats, attempted kidnapping, and armed men shooting at the petitioner 
in a moving car); Lobo v. Holder, 684 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations 
omitted) (“[C]redible verbal death threats may fall within the meaning 
of ‘persecution[]’ . . . only when the threats are so ‘menacing as to cause 
significant actual suffering or harm.’”); Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 
1042 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he warning that the Andriasians would be killed 
if they did not leave Azerbaijan immediately—which was made all the 
more credible by the fact that the Azeri thugs who issued the threat had 
just murdered Mr. Andriasian’s neighbor in cold blood—would by itself be 
sufficient to establish past persecution.”).
135 Under the INA, “the Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to 
a noncitizen who is unable or unwilling to return to his home country 
‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.’”  née Joseph v. Sessions, No. 17-1403, 2018 WL 3549714, 
at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 20, 2018) (citations omitted).
136 Id. at *3.
137 Id.; Yan Zhang v. Sessions, 681 F. App’x 554, 559 (8th Cir. 2017) (citations 
omitted); but see Jimenez v. Att’y Gen., 737 Fed. Appx. 117, 118 (3d Cir. 
2018) (“To meet the legal definition of torture, the threat of harm must be 
‘by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.’”) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.18(a)(1) (2018)).
138 Huang v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 620 F.3d 372, 380 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 341 (3d Cir. 2008)).
139 Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1996).
140 Marzbanian v. Holder, 597 F. App’x 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2015).  The U.N. 
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While menacing threats can constitute persecution, empty 
or unsubstantiated threats unsupported by evidence of danger do 
not meet the standard for a persecution claim.141  For example, it 
has been held that “mere threats, such as anonymous death threats 
through the telephone, without more, do not rise to the level of 
persecution.”142  But it is clear, as the Eleventh Circuit has stated, that 
“[a] credible death threat by a person who has the immediate ability 
to act on it constitutes persecution regardless of whether the threat 
is successfully carried out.”143  “We are more likely to conclude,” 
the Eleventh Circuit has observed, “that the record compels a 
finding of past persecution when an applicant faced imminent and 
credible death threats.”144  “We are also more likely to conclude,” 
the Eleventh Circuit has stressed, “that the record compels a finding 
Human Rights Committee has itself determined, in a different context, 
that States cannot ignore “known threats to the life of persons under their 
jurisdiction, just because he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained.” 
International Human Rights Law 270 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 
2d ed. 2014) (citing Delgado Páez v. Columbia, CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985 
(12 July 1990), para. 5.5). The Human Rights Committee has thus “found 
violations of the right to security where there was a failure to investigate 
credible death threats.” Id.
141 Lemus-Arita v. Sessions, 854 F.3d 476, 481 (8th Cir. 2017) (citations 
omitted) (“a threat that is ‘exaggerated, nonspecific, or lacking in immediacy 
may be insufficient’”; “[t]hreats alone constitute persecution in only a small 
category of cases, and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause 
significant actual suffering or harm”); Hernandez-Lima v. Lynch, 836 F.3d 
109, 114 (1st Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (“Death threats rise to the 
level of persecution only when ‘so menacing as to cause significant actual 
suffering or harm.’  Evidence that such threats were entirely empty ‘plainly 
supports [a] determination’ that they did not meet that standard.”); Vera v. 
Holder, 425 F. App’x 604, 605 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (“Only in 
‘extreme cases’ involving ‘repeated and especially menacing death threats’ 
have we held such threats establish past persecution.”).
142 Cordero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 374 F. App’x 882, 887 n.1 (11th Cir. 2010).
143 Diallo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 596 F.3d 1329, 1333−34 (11th Cir. 2010).  Credible 
death threats can and do result in criminal prosecutions.  E.g., United 
States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Polson, 
154 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1231, 1234 (S.D. Ohio 2001).  “In general, whether a 
communication constitutes a ‘threat’ within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 876 
is a question of fact for the jury so long as a reasonable recipient, familiar 
with the context of the communication, could interpret it as a threat.”  Id. 
at 1235; see also State v. January, No. 75170-1-I, 2017 WL 5127889, at *3 
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2017) (“The nature of a threat depends on all the 
facts and circumstances and is not limited to a literal translation of the 
words spoken.”).
144 Gutierrez-Granda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 386 F. App’x 848, 851 (11th Cir. 2010).
33VOL. 11, NO. 1 NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of past persecution when the applicant has suffered physical injury 
along with death threats.”145  “A specific threat of harm to an asylum 
applicant,” a guide produced by the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association observes, “is usually sufficient to demonstrate a well-
founded fear of persecution.”146
C.   The Torturous and Coercive Nature of Threats of Death
Death threats and threats of physical harm not only induce 
fear147 and suffice for purposes of inmates setting forth legitimate 
section 1983 claims,148 but they can also, in particular circumstances, 
terrorize149 and constitute acts of torture, that is, the extreme or 
aggravated form of cruelty.150  In Death Threats and Violence: New 
145 Id. 
146 Regina Germain, AILA’s Asylum Primer: A Practical Guide 
to U.S. Asylum Law and Procedure 68 (2005).  That standard for 
making out a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution has been laid out 
in a number of cases.  E.g., Dong Ming Wu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 270 F. App’x 
211, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (noting that a well-founded 
fear of persecution “encompasses ‘threats to life, confinement, torture, 
and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or 
freedom,’ including forced sterilization”); accord Yu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 
F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2008).
147 Fortson v. Eppinger, No.: 1:15 CV 2078, 2017 WL 603086, at *6 (N.D. Ohio 
Feb. 15, 2017) (“[T]he jury was well aware that both women were extremely 
reluctant to testify.  The record reveals that Andee Caver was afraid to testify 
because she had received death threats . . . .”); see also Kenneth L. Karst, 
Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1337, 1341−44 (2006) (“Death threats are particularly harmful, for 
they trigger short-term fear and long-term anxiety.”).
148 McKenney v. Farrinton, 2:16-cv-00630-JAW, 2017 WL 825280, at *5 (D. Me., 
Mar. 2, 2017) (citations omitted) (“Several circuit courts of appeals have 
held that . . . threats can constitute the necessary adverse action. . . .  [A] 
verbal insult alone does not constitute adverse action.  Death threats and 
threats of serious physical harm, however, generally suffice.”); see also Dixon 
v. Groeger, 2:16-cv-00178 NT, 2016 WL 4532066, at *2, *4 (D. Me., Aug. 
29, 2016) (“[D]eath threats and threats of serious physical harm generally 
suffice.”).
149 In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1104 (S.D. Fla. 2016) 
(“AUC was a violent terrorist organization which had unleashed a systematic 
campaign of terror—death threats, extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, 
kidnappings, forced disappearances and looting—against vast swathes of the 
Colombian civilian population”).
150 Azadeh v. Government of Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 1:16-cv-1467 (KBJ), 
2018 WL 4232913, at *11 (D. D.C. Sept. 5, 2018) (noting that “torture” 
is a label “usually reserved for extreme, deliberate and unusually cruel 
practices”).  See also Michael John Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., 
RL32438, U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT): Overview 
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Research and Clinical Perspectives, Stephen Morewitz, citing a 2006 
study and noting the prevalence of death threats varies by context 
and the underlying motivations for them, emphasizes: “Death threats 
are a prevalent form of psychological torture.  Based on a study of 69 
refugees who were torture survivors, Olsen et al. (2006) discovered 
that death threats were the most prevalent method of torture.”151  As 
Morewitz notes: “They are prevalent in domestic violence episodes, 
in time of war, and especially during periods of racial and ethnic 
conflicts and political instability.”152  Though death threats are often 
coupled with physical abuse and beatings,153 threats of death—all 
by themselves—can thus be torturous, as the legal classification 
of mock executions as acts of psychological torture makes crystal 
clear.154
and Application to Interrogation Techniques 18 (2009) (“U.S. 
courts and administrative bodies have found that severe beatings, maiming, 
sexual assault, rape, and (in certain circumstances) death threats may 
constitute ‘torture’ for purposes of either CAT or TVPA”); Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons, supra note 22, at art. 1(2) (“Torture constitutes an 
aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”).  Threats made in interrogation settings have sometimes been 
described as constituting “psychological torture.”  Crowe v. County of San 
Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 432 (9th Cir. 2010). 
151 Stephen J. Morewitz, Death Threats and Violence: New 
Research and Clinical Perspectives 5 (2008); see also id. at 99 
(“Death threat victims can suffer severe impairment in their occupational 
functioning.  They are at increased risk of suffering severe anxiety, 
depression, and other stress-related health problems and may be at risk for 
engaging in suicidal behaviors.”).
152 Morewitz, supra note 151, at 6.  Threats to kill or threats of harm are 
prohibited by international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law.  See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights on the Battlefield, 47 Geo. Wash. 
Int’l L. Rev. 509, 540−41 (2015) (“[T]he following unlawful interrogation 
tactics are absolutely prohibited under both human rights law and the laws 
of war: (1) torture that occurs from the use of waterboarding or related 
forms of inducement of suffocation, (2) the cold cell and related forms of 
inducement of hypothermia, (3) rape and other forms of sexual violence as 
an interrogation tactic or other form of conduct during war, (4) threats to 
kill the detainee and/or others, and (5) use of snarling dogs against naked 
persons in order to induce intense fear or terror.”).
153 E.g., Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, No. 1:90-CV-2010-GET, 1993 WL 814304, at *1 
(N.D. Ga., Aug. 20, 1993) (describing the “interrogation and torture” of a 
woman in the presence of several men, where she was “told to take off her 
clothes,” where her “arms and legs were then bound and she was whipped 
with a wire on her legs and her back,” and where she was “repeatedly 
threatened with death if she did not reveal the location of a gun”).
154 Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International 
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III.  The Nature of Capital Prosecutions 
A.   Threats of Death in Penal Systems
Threats have long been used in penal systems and by judges, 
as the history of capital and corporal punishments demonstrates.155 
In colonial times, a common punishment was to make an offender 
sit on the gallows with a noose around the neck.156  For example, 
in colonial Massachusetts, in an effort to curtail stealing, a 1736 
Humanitarian Law in War 668 (2d ed. 2016) (“The U.N. Human 
Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights consider mock executions torture.”); see also Torture and Its 
Consequences: Current Treatment Approaches 204 (Metin 
Başoğlu ed. 1992) (“Sham executions are a well-known and frequently 
reported form of torture (e.g., Allodi & Cowgill, 1982; Benfeldt-Zachrisson, 
1985; Goldfeld et al., 1988).”). Sometimes the detainee is subject to a 
prolonged threat of execution.”); id. at 475 (“Commonly used psychological 
methods of torture include . . . threats of torture to self or relatives and 
sham executions.”).
155 E.g., John D. Bessler, The Anomaly of Executions: The Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause in the 21st Century, 2 Brit. J. Am. Leg. Studies 
297 (2013) (describing the history of capital punishment and corporal 
punishments in the United States).  Of course, making threats against 
judges is a criminal offense.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 115 (2012) (making it a crime 
to threaten “to assault, kidnap, or murder . . . a United States judge”); 
Judicial Independence in Transition 1248 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 
2012) (“Violence or threats made to judges or those close to them is a 
criminal offence.”); Life Under Death Threats: Dangers Faced by Judges, Prosecutors, 
NPR, (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/04/01/175938445/the-
dangers-facing-judges-and-prosecutors (“In 2012, 1,370 threats were made 
against federal judges.”).
156 Jeannine Marie DeLombard, In the Shadow of the Gallows: 
Race, Crime, and American Civil Identity 341 n.31 (2012) 
(noting that a man was found guilty of attempted rape and sentenced “to 
sit on gallows”); Daniel Allen Hearn, Legal Executions in New 
England: A Comprehensive Reference, 1623−1960, at 117 (1999).  
As one source notes, citing a newspaper story from 1752: “At the Court of 
Assize, at Springfield, the 2d Tuesday of September last, Daniel Bailey and 
Mary Rainer, of a Place adjoining to Sheffield in that county, were convicted 
of Adultery, and were sentenced to suffer the Penalty of the Law therefor, 
viz. to sit on the Gallows with a Rope about their Necks, for the Space of 
an Hour; to be whipt forty Stripes each, and to wear for ever after a Capital 
A, two Inches long, and proportionable in bigness, cut out in Cloth of a 
contrary Colour to their Cloaths, and sewed upon their upper Garments, 
either upon the outside of the arm, or on the back.” George Francis 
Dow, Every Day Life in the Massachusetts Bay Colony 214 n.* 
(1988) (citing Boston Evening-Post, Oct. 9, 1752).
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law subjected thieves to increasing penalties—and escalating 
threats of death—for each offense.157  A first-time offender was 
to be fined or whipped; a second offense required the thief to pay 
tremble damages, sit upon the gallows platform for an hour with 
a rope around his neck, and then to receive up to thirty stripes at 
the whipping post; and, finally, to be hanged for a third offense.158 
“The colonists’ rationale,” one historian notes, “was clear: anyone 
impervious to the fine and the whip, who did not mend his ways after 
an hour with a noose about him, was uncontrollable and therefore 
had to be executed.”159  The punishment of sitting on the gallows 
continued to exist in Massachusetts after the Revolutionary War,160 
though it eventually passed from the scene along with the corporal 
punishments of branding, whipping, ear cropping, and standing in 
the pillory.161
Living under a threat of death, the evidence shows, is a 
deeply depressing experience, especially when one is confined in 
prison—and particularly when one is confined in isolation on death 
row with all that entails.162  “Most significantly for the offender,” 
157 The Charters and General Laws of the Colony and Province 
of Massachusetts Bay 509 (1814).
158 Id. at 509−10.
159 David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order 
and Disorder in the New Republic 52 (rev. ed. 2017).
160 1 The Perpetual Laws of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, from the Establishment of Its Constitution, 
in the Year 1780, to the End of the Year 1800, at 351 (Boston, I. 
Thomas & E.T. Andrews 1801) (reprinting a 1786 law that provided for the 
following punishment: “to sit on the gallows with a rope round his neck 
for the space of one hour”); 1 The General Laws of Massachusetts, 
from the Adoption of the Constitution, to February, 
1822, at 65, 183, 185 (Boston, Wells & Lily and Cummings & Hillard 
1823) (referencing 1782 and 1785 Massachusetts laws providing for the 
punishment of “sitting on the gallows, with a rope about the neck,” “sitting 
on the gallows with a rope about his neck,” and “sitting on the gallows 
the space of one hour, with a rope about his neck”); Andrew Dunlap, A 
Speech Delivered Before the Municipal Court of the City of 
Boston, in Defence of Abner Kneeland, on an Indictment for 
Blasphemy 2, 44 (Boston, 1834) (referencing the punishment of “sitting 
on the gallows, with a rope about the neck”).
161 Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, at the 
Semi-Annual Meeting, Held in Boston, April 28, 1875, at 69−70 
(Worcester, Charles Hamilton, Paladium Office 1875).
162 Handbook of Correctional Mental Health 467 (Charles L. Scott 
2d ed., 2010) (“Treating psychiatrists may encounter death row inmates 
experiencing overwhelming fear, helplessness, recurrent depression, and 
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Carol and Jordan Steiker write in Courting Death: The Supreme Court 
and Capital Punishment, “extended death row incarceration presents 
special problems of cruelty, especially given the prevailing harsh 
conditions of death row confinement.”  “Condemned inmates,” they 
explain, “now face multiple punishments: lengthy incarceration in 
solitary-style conditions; the anguish of perpetually living under a 
sentence of death; and actual execution.”163  It is a dreary existence, 
with death row inmates using the phrase “Dead Man Walking”—
the expression popularized by Sister Helen Prejean’s book of the 
same name164—to refer to the condemned before execution.165  In 
the late-nineteenth-century case of In re Medley,166 the U.S. Supreme 
Court itself emphasized that “when a prisoner sentenced by a court 
to death is confined in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of 
the sentence, one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be 
subjected during that time is the uncertainty during the whole of 
it.”167
The process of state-sanctioned killing begins with a 
prosecutor’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty.  Under 
federal law, the prosecutor advises the defendant and the court “a 
reasonable time before trial,” or before the acceptance of a plea, 
of the government’s intention to seek the death penalty.168  The 
self-mutilation.”); id. (“Another phenomenon not uncommonly seen on 
death row is an inmate who voluntarily waives appeals in an effort to hasten 
the execution.  The motivations of these so-called volunteers may be rooted 
in depression, resentment, or simple demoralization.”); see also Smith v. 
Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 999 (9th Cir. 2010) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“At the 
time of the arraignment, he was deeply depressed because he had been in 
solitary confinement for some time and subjected to harsh living conditions.  
He had received death threats from Native American inmates and believed 
that he would be killed in prison.”).  The issue of “volunteers” has been 
discussed at length elsewhere.  E.g., John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: 
“Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 939 (2005); C. Lee 
Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the Ethics of Death Row 
Volunteering, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 849 (2000).
163 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Courting Death: The 
Supreme Court and Capital Punishment 207 (2016).
164 Helen Prejean, Dead Man Walking: An Eyewitness Account of 
the Death Penalty in the United States (1993).
165 David W. Neubauer & Henry F. Fradella, America’s Courts and 
the Criminal Justice System 386 (10th ed. 2011).
166 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
167 Id. at 172.
168 Charles Doyle Sr., The Death Penalty: Capital Punishment Legislation in the 110th 
Congress, in Capital Punishment Update 8 (Lorraine V. Coyne ed., 
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U.S. Department of Justice has a death penalty protocol whereby 
a local U.S. attorney cannot seek the death penalty without prior 
authorization from the Attorney General of the United States.  Per 
that protocol, U.S. attorneys are required to submit to the Department 
of Justice’s Capital Case Unit of the Criminal Division all cases 
involving a charge for which the death penalty is a legally authorized 
sanction, regardless of whether the U.S. attorney recommends 
seeking the death penalty.  After the Capital Case Unit reviews 
the case and prepares an initial analysis and recommendation, the 
Attorney General’s Capital Case Review Committee, composed of 
senior Justice Department lawyers, meets with the U.S. attorney and 
defense counsel, reviews all documents submitted by the parties, and 
makes its recommendation to the Attorney General.  The Attorney 
General then makes the final decision regarding whether to seek the 
death penalty.169
Part and parcel of torture is instilling the fear of death 
or bodily harm,170 and capital charges backed by the resources 
of federal, state, or local prosecutors—ones designed to take a 
person’s life—certainly cannot be taken lightly by those facing such 
charges.171  In fact, threats of bodily harm or death, the U.N. Human 
2007).
169 Samuel Walker et al., The Color of Justice: Race, Ethnicity, 
and Crime in America 388 (6th ed. 2016).
170 On the practice of torture in prior centuries, one commentator writes: 
“Often, the intent was to instill the fear of death, as in the use of water 
torture.”  The Torture Debate in America 4 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 
2006).  Instilling intense fear remains the goal of modern torture techniques. 
Kerim Yildiz & Juliet McDermott, Torture in Turkey: The 
Ongoing Practice of Torture and Ill-Treatment 105 (2004); see 
also id. at 39 (“[T]orture terrorizes.  The body in pain winces; it trembles.  
The muscles themselves register fear.  This, too, is rooted in pain’s biological 
function of impelling us in the most urgent way possible to escape from 
the source of pain—for that impulse is indistinguishable from panic.  U.S. 
interrogators have used the technique of “waterboarding” to break the will 
of detainees.  They are strapped to a board and immersed repeatedly in 
water, just short of drowning.  As anyone knows who has ever come close to 
drowning or suffocating, the oxygen-starved brain sends panic-signals that 
overwhelm everything else.”). 
171 Neuroscientists have noted that psychological torture—sometimes called 
“no-touch” torture—releases stress hormones by creating intense fear.  
Armin Krishnan, Military Neuroscience and the Coming Age 
of Neurowarfare 200 (2017); see also Diarmuid Cunniffe, The Worst Scars 
Are in the Mind: Deconstructing Psychological Torture, 7 ICL J. 1, 14−16 (2013) 
(discussing how threats induce fear, can weaken resistance and “break the 
will of detainees,” “are a particularly cruel form of psychological suffering,” 
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Rights Committee has determined, can constitute psychological 
torture.  For instance, in Estrella v. Uruguay, a concert pianist—an 
Argentine national, Miguel Angel Estrella, then living in France—
filed a communication with the Human Rights Committee about 
his detention in a Uruguayan prison.  Estrella’s communication 
asserted that, in December 1977, he was subjected to torture after 
armed individuals in civilian clothes broke into his house, threatened 
him with death, and he was punched and kicked, had his feet and 
hands bound, and was blindfolded and hooded.172  The alleged 
psychological torture he was subjected to was said to consist “chiefly 
in threats of torture or violence to relatives or friends, or of dispatch 
to Argentina to be executed,” and “in threats of making us witness 
the torture of friends.”  “For hours upon end,” Estrella asserted of 
his tormentors, “they put me through a mock amputation with an 
electric saw, telling me: ‘we are going to do the same to you as Victor 
Jara’”—a reference to a well-known Chilean singer and guitarist 
who was found dead, with his hands completely smashed, at the 
end of September 1973 in a stadium in Santiago, Chile.  On March 
25, 1982, the Human Rights Committee decided that Estrella “was 
subjected to severe physical and psychological torture, including the 
threat that the author’s hands would be cut off by an electric saw, in 
an effort to force him to admit subversive activity.”173
and how “[t]he sensation of fear or exposure to life-threatening situations 
and fear of death is, in psychological and psychiatric terms, described as a 
major ‘stressor’”).
172 Estrella v. Uruguay, Communication No. 74/1980, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
OP/2 at 93 (1990), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/newscans/74-1980.
html.  “The alleged physical torture consisted of electric shocks, beatings 
with rubber truncheons, kicks and punches, hanging him up with his hands 
tied behind his back, pushing him into water until he nearly drowned, and 
making him stand with his legs apart and arms raised for up to 20 hours.”  
Id.
173 Id.; see also Nigel Rodley (Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human 
Rights), Question of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, at 3, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/56/156 (July 3, 2001) (“As stated by 
the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 20 (10 April 
1992), on article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the Special Rapporteur would like to remind Governments that the 
prohibition of torture relates not only to acts that cause physical pain but 
also to acts that cause mental suffering to the victim, such as intimidation 
and other forms of threats.”); id., at 3, para. 4 (“A number of decisions by 
human rights monitoring mechanisms have accordingly referred to the 
notion of mental pain or suffering, including suffering through intimidation 
and threats, as a violation of the prohibition of torture and other forms 
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has itself 
repeatedly concluded that fear and terror are sufficient to establish 
mental torture.  If a person is threatened with bodily harm, it is 
characterized as psychological torture.  Thus, in Maritza Urrutia 
v. Guatemala, the Inter-American Court concluded in 2003: “An 
international juridical regime of absolute prohibition of all forms 
of torture, both physical and psychological, has been developed 
and, with regard to the latter, it has been recognized that the threat 
or real danger of subjecting a person to physical harm produces, 
under determined circumstances, such a degree of moral anguish 
that it may be considered ‘psychological torture.’”174  Likewise, 
in Baldeón García v. Peru, the Inter-American Court found in 2006 
that “threats and real danger of physical harm causes, in certain 
circumstances, such a degree of moral anguish that it may be 
considered psychological torture.”175  And in Tibi v. Ecuador,176 the 
Inter-American Court found that the victim “was threatened” during 
his detention in violation of Article 5 of the American Convention177 
and that such conduct, which “made him feel panic and fear for his 
life, . . . is a form of torture.”178  That decision made clear that the 
American Convention’s prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading punishment or treatment extends to not only physical 
of ill-treatment.  In particular, the Special Rapporteur would like to draw 
Governments’ attention to the views expressed by the Human Rights 
Committee in the case of Estrella v. Uruguay.”); id., at 4, para. 8 (“It is the 
Special Rapporteur’s opinion that serious and credible threats, including 
death threats, to the physical integrity of the victim or a third person can 
amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or even to torture, 
especially when the victim remains in the hands of law enforcement 
officials.”).
174 Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 147, para. 92 (Nov. 27, 2003), http://www.
corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_103_ing.pdf.
175 Baldeón García v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 147, para. 119 (Apr. 6, 2006), http://www.corteidh.
or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_147_ing.pdf.
176 Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 
147, para. 147 (Sept. 7, 2004).
177 Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides in part: 
“Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity 
respected.”  Organization of American States, American Convention on 
Human Rights art. 5(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
“No one,” that article further provides, “shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment.”  Id. at art. 5(2).
178 Tibi v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 114, para. 149.
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suffering but also psychic and moral anguish.179  “[T]hreats and the 
real danger of subjecting a person to physical injury,” that court 
emphasized, “may be considered psychological torture.”180
A recent report of the Human Rights Clinic of the University 
of Texas School of Law, “Designed to Break You: Human Rights 
Violations on Texas’ Death Row,” specifically documents the torture 
and inhumanity associated with life on death row.181  In that report, 
its authors note that every individual on Texas’ death row “spends 
approximately 23 hours a day in complete isolation for the entire 
duration of their sentence, which, on average, lasts more than a 
decade.”182  As the report then emphasizes: “This prolonged solitary 
confinement has overwhelmingly negative effects on inmates’ mental 
health, exacerbating existing mental health conditions and causing 
many prisoners to develop mental illness for the first time.”183  “In 
addition to the detrimental effects of isolation,” the report notes, 
“the practice of setting multiple execution dates means that many 
prisoners are subjected to the psychological stress of preparing to 
die several times during their sentence.”184  “The right to be free 
179 Id. at para. 147 (“The Court has also recognized that threats and the real 
danger of subjecting a person to physical injury, under certain circumstances, 
cause such a moral anguish that they may be considered psychological 
torture.”).
180 Id.
181 Jacey Fortin, Report Compares Texas’ Solitary Confinement Policies to Torture, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 26, 2017 (citing Human Rights Clinic, The University 
of Texas School of Law, Designed to Break You: Human Rights 
Violations on Texas’ Death Row (2017)); see also A Death Before 
Dying: Solitary Confinement on Death Row, Am. Civ. Liberties Union (July 
2013),  www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/deathbeforedying-
report.pdf; Corinna Barrett Lain, Following Finality: Why Capital Punishment 
Is Collapsing Under Its Own Weight, in Final Judgments: The Death 
Penalty in American Law and Culture 30, 40 (Austin Sarat ed., 
2017) (“On death row, each condemned prisoner spends at least 22 hours 
a day, typically 23, within the confines of a windowless cell the size of a 
standard parking lot space. . . .  Most are not allowed contact visits from 
family or friends.  Death row inmates are typically allowed an hour or less of 
exercise each day, and typically that takes place in caged exercise pens akin 
to dog runs.”).
182 Human Rights Clinic, The Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, supra note 
181, at 5; see also Lain, supra note 181, at 40.
183 Human Rights Clinic, The Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, supra note 
181, at 5.
184 Id.; see also Robert M. Bohm, DeathQuest: An Introduction to 
the Theory and Practice of Capital Punishment in the United 
States 225 (5th ed. 2017) (“In all death penalty jurisdictions, a death or 
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from torture is an absolute human right, and it is submitted that the 
current conditions of confinement on Texas’ death row, including 
mandatory indefinite isolation, amount to a severe and relentless 
act of torture,” the report concludes.185  “Inmates held in solitary 
confinement,” the report assesses, “are effectively subject to a severe 
form of psychological torture every day of their lives.”186
The uncertainty and unknowns associated with capital cases 
only serve to amplify the torturous nature of death penalty regimes. 
“Another particularly stressful experience is the anticipation of 
torture,” Metin Başoğlu and Susan Mineka emphasize in Torture and 
Its Consequences.  As they write in that book: “This vulnerability is 
often exploited by the torturers who make verbal threats of torture. 
Many survivors report that having to wait to be taken from their 
cell to the torture chamber can be even more distressing than 
torture itself.”187 “The anticipatory distress,” they explain, “seems 
to be greater if the intervals between sessions are variable and/or if 
there is an uncertainty about the nature of the next torture session; 
both of these factors obviously maximize unpredictability.”188 
“Such observations,” they point out, “are corroborated by research 
in animals showing that shocks delivered at variable intervals (as 
opposed to fixed intervals) produce greater heart rate elevations and 
more ulceration.”189  Death row inmates clearly endure enormous 
execution warrant instigates the execution process.  A death warrant, which 
typically sets the date and place for a prisoner’s execution, usually is issued 
by a state’s governor, or the president of the United States in federal death 
penalty cases, and authorizes a warden or other prison officials to carry 
out a death sentence.  In Texas, a district court judge sets the execution 
date. . . .  The length of time before a death warrant expires and has to be 
reissued varies from a few days to several months.”).
185 Human Rights Clinic, The Univ. Tex. Sch. Law, supra note 181, at 7.
186 Id. at 21.  One former death row inmate described life on death row as a 
“slow mental, physical and spiritual torture.”  Id. at 22. 
187 Metin Başoğlu & Susan Mineka, The Role of Uncontrollable and Unpredictable 
Stress in Post-Traumatic Stress Responses in Torture Survivors, in Torture and Its 
Consequences: Current Treatment Approaches 182, 206 (Metin 
Başoğlu ed., 1992).
188 Id.
189 Id.  In that source, Metin Başoğlu and Susan Mineka further emphasize: 
“Certain forms of torture seem to have a much greater impact than others in 
inducing loss of control and feelings of helplessness in the detainee.  Those 
that involve a perceived risk of death during the process appear to be more 
traumatic than the ones that merely involve physical pain but no real threat 
to life.  Submersion of the head under water until near-asphyxiation or sham 
executions are examples of such methods.” Id.
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uncertainty and mental anguish, vacillating between hope and 
intense fear and despair while coping with severe depression and 
psychological trauma and, often, suicidal thoughts or ideation.190
B.  Capital Charges, Death Sentences, and Execution 
Protocols
Capital charges—or threats of death by police or prosecutors—
are themselves extremely problematic when analyzed through the 
lens of the legal prohibition against torture.  It is well known that 
confessions can be obtained through coercion or torture,191 and 
those facing death threats can be compelled to make choices—often 
as a result of duress—they might not have made had the prospect 
of death been removed from the equation.192  False or coerced 
190 John D. Bessler, Cruel and Unusual: The American Death 
Penalty and the Founders’ Eighth Amendment 225 (2012) 
(“Condemned inmates, suffering from bouts of depression, often take their 
own lives . . . .  One Florida study showed that 35 percent of death row 
inmates in that state attempted suicide and that 42 percent considered 
suicide.”).
191 George Ryley Scott, The History of Torture Throughout the 
Ages 276 (2009) (“Terror induced by threats is frequently tried to induce 
admission of guilt.  A police officer may threaten to shoot the accused, 
and has been known to go so far as to press a revolver, loaded with blank 
cartridges, against the head or stomach and pull the trigger.”); see also 
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944) (“The Constitution of the 
United States stands as a bar against the conviction of any individual in an 
American court by means of a coerced confession.  There have been, and 
are now, certain foreign nations with governments dedicated to an opposite 
policy: governments which convict individuals with testimony obtained by 
police organizations possessed of an unrestrained power to seize persons 
suspected of crimes against the state, hold them in secret custody, and 
wring from them confessions by physical or mental torture.  So long as the 
Constitution remains the basic law of our Republic, America will not have 
that kind of government.”); Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
237−38 (1940) (referring to “physical and mental torture and coercion” in 
the context of “secret inquisitorial processes”).
192 Bessler, The Death Penalty as Torture, supra note 26, at 83 (“[I]n 
1994, an Illinois federal district court emphasized that duress is a valid 
defense where there is ‘(1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily 
harm; (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out; and (3) 
no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm.’  And in the early 
twentieth century, American marriages were invalidated where the consent 
of grooms was not freely given, but were obtained through threats of death 
by the fathers of the brides. . . .  In a New Jersey case from the 1950s, 
‘threats of gangster violence’ and ‘arsenic poisoning’ against a husband 
were themselves found to raise important questions of fact as to whether 
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confessions occur with some frequency,193 and the risk of miscarriages 
of justice is heightened significantly in situations involving threats 
of death.194  As one law review article reports: “The threat of a death 
conveyances to the wife of property were procured by means of duress.  In 
that case, Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, the husband’s allegations of threats of 
arsenic poisoning were given weight because the wife’s father was then 
serving a life sentence in a Pennsylvania prison for murder committed when 
he was associated with an ‘arsenic ring’ engaged in killings to defraud life 
insurers.  Because the threat of arsenic poisoning was credible, the court 
gave significance to it.”). 
193 E.g., Daniel Reisberg, The Science of Perception and Memory: 
A Pragmatic Guide for the Justice System 193 (2014) (providing 
estimates on the number of false confessions); Wrightsman’s 
Psychology and the Legal System 158 (Edie Greene & Kirk Heilbrun 
eds., 7th ed. 2011) (“It is undisputed that false confessions led to the 
wrongful conviction and imprisonment of five people in Beatrice, Nebraska 
in a case known as the Beatrice Six . . . .”); id. at 159 (“The Beatrice Six—five 
people who falsely confessed and one who was wrongfully convicted of the 
1985 rape and murder of 68-year-old Helen Wilson in Beatrice, Nebraska—
set the record for the most people exonerated by DNA evidence in one 
case. Their exonerations and pardons in 2008 shed light on the way that 
interrogators were able to get detailed statements from the suspects about 
a crime they did not commit.”); id. (“Suspect Joann Taylor confessed after 
interrogators told her they wanted her to be the first female on Nebraska’s 
death row. In fact, five of the six suspects, easily influenced and probably 
confused, falsely confessed to escape the threat of a death penalty.”); 
Mordecai Specktor, Minneapolis Attorney Steve Kaplan Helps to Free Death Row 
Inmate Damon Thibodeaux, Who Had Been Wrongly Convicted of Rape and Murder, 
American Jewish World (Feb. 1, 2013), https://www.tcdailyplanet.net/
minneapolis-attorney-steve-kaplan-helps-free-death-row-inmate-damon-
thibodeaux-who-h/ (“After nine hours of police grilling, and going without 
sleep for more than 30 hours, Thibodeaux cracked and falsely confessed to 
committing rape and murder.”).
194 E.g., McHenry v. United States, 308 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1962) (citations 
omitted) (“An involuntary confession or one obtained by means of threats 
and promises which subject the mind of the accused to the torture or fear 
of flattery of hope is inadmissible in a criminal trial.”).  As one court put 
it, in a situation where a man in police custody was threatened with the 
electric chair should he remain silent, thereby causing him to lose his 
capacity for rational calculation: “When a confession is forced from the 
mind by the flattery of hope or by the torture of fear, it is unreliable and 
no credit ought to be given to it.  Promises or suggestions of leniency 
in exchange for waiving the Fifth Amendment privilege create a flattery 
of hope, which is made even more powerful by the torture of fear that 
accompanying threats of punishment induce in the mind of the accused.” 
State v. Petitjean, 748 N.E.2d 133, 141, 145 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (italics in 
original); accord David V. Baker, Women and Capital Punishment 
in the United States: An Analytical History 183 (2016) (“Police 
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sentence causes many defendants to plead guilty in exchange for 
a life sentence, rather than risk the outcome of a trial.”195  Just as 
death threats by prison guards can chill inmates’ exercise of their 
First Amendment rights,196 the prospect of being sentenced to death 
in a court of law is also likely to influence the decision-making of 
investigators and state prosecutors used the threat of the death penalty 
to coerce false confessions from Ada JoAnn Taylor, Debra Shelden, and 
Kathy Gonzales.”); Joe Duggan, Beatrice 6 Member Says Threat of Death Penalty 
Persuaded Her to Confess to a Slaying She Didn’t Commit, World-Herald 
Bureau (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.omaha.com/news/crime/beatrice-
member-says-threat-of-death-penalty-persuaded-her-to/article_51ebcf4f-
7299-5d08-8dfa-ebae55f0f5c2.html (“[W]hen the prosecutor agreed to 
take the death penalty off the table in exchange for a guilty plea and her 
cooperation, Taylor and her court-appointed attorney decided it was the 
best option. . . . Taylor said the decision to give a false confession may 
have saved her life, but it cost her more than 19½ years of freedom.”); 
see also Statement of Robert Dunham, Executive Director of the Death 
Penalty Information Center, on the release of the National Registry of 
Exonerations’ reports Exonerations in 2016 and Race and Wrongful Convictions 
in the United States (Mar. 7, 2017), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
DPICStatementOnNationalRegistryReports.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2018) 
(“Our review of the 2016 data [from the National Registry of Exonerations] 
reveals that the death penalty played a role in nearly a quarter of the 54 
homicide exonerations last year. In at least six of the wrongful homicide 
convictions, prosecutors had sought the death penalty at trial; in another, an 
innocent defendant had pled guilty to avoid the death penalty; and at least 
six additional exonerations were the product of witnesses having falsely 
implicated innocent defendants after police had threatened the witness or 
a loved one with the death penalty unless the witness cooperated with the 
investigation . . . .”). 
195 Rachel King, No Due Process: How the Death Penalty Violates the Constitutional 
Rights of the Family Members of Death Row Prisoners, 16 Pub. Int. L.J. 195, 214 
(2007).
196 Schleig v. Borough of Nazareth, No. 16-3499, 2017 WL 2591408, at *4 (3d 
Cir. June 15, 2017) (“In the few cases in which government officials have 
made death threats in response to constitutionally protected activity, no one 
has tried to claim that the offending official’s behavior is something other 
than unlawful retaliation.”); Knecht v. Collins, Nos. 96-3682, 96-3735, 
96-4114, 1999 WL 427173, at *3 (6th Cir. June 15, 1999) (per curiam) 
(a reasonable jury could conclude that prison guards’ acts of filing false 
disciplinary charges and issuing death threats were sufficient to deter a 
prisoner of ordinary firmness from exercising First Amendment rights); 
Walker v. Firman, No. 16-cv-02221-RBJ-MEH, 2017 WL 4652015, at *10 
(D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2017) (“It is also clearly established that making death 
threats in retaliation for protected conduct violates the First Amendment.”); 
Silverburg v. Seeley, No. 3:09CV-P493-R, 2009 WL 5197870, at *3 (W.D. Ky. 
Dec. 23, 2009) (“[T]he Court will allow the individual-capacity claims for 
damages for retaliation based on alleged threats of death . . . .”). 
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those facing capital prosecution or capital charges.197  In the lead up 
to actual executions, the mental torment death row inmates face is, 
no doubt, off the charts.
In states that still put people to death, due process and 
fairness considerations inevitably yield to finality.  “Today’s 
executions,” Robert Johnson writes in Death Work: A Study of the 
Modern Execution Process, “are highly bureaucratic jobs with clearly 
delineated roles, responsibilities, and procedures articulated in 
execution protocols.”198  These protocols are often laden with minutia 
about how the executions will be carried out, yet the protocols 
put condemned inmates on notice, in no uncertain terms, that the 
197 E.g., Bussey v. State, 184 So. 3d 1138, 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) 
(detectives’ repeated threats of the death penalty amounted to coercion 
that rendered a murder defendant’s confession involuntary); id. at 1145−46 
(“The purpose of the detectives’ comments regarding the death penalty 
. . . was not to inform [Bussey] of the penalties he faced.  Rather, the 
purpose of the comments was to instill fear in Bussey that he would face 
the death penalty with the hope that his fear would cause him to confess 
to the robbery and murder.”); cf. Galenski v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-SC-
000407-MR, 2013 WL 6730018, at *2 n.9 (Ky. Dec. 19, 2013) (citation 
omitted) (“The Beatrice Six is the colloquial name given to a group of six 
youths that were wrongfully convicted of murder in Beatrice, Nebraska, as a 
result of confessions induced by the threat of the death penalty.”); People v. 
Sanders, 976 N.Y.S.2d 205, 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (Hall, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted) (“The defendant was threatened, by the FBI agent, with 
the possibility of death.  This threat was used to overcome the defendant’s 
will, which is so ‘fundamentally unfair as to deny due process.’”); State v. 
Knight, No. 04-CA-35, 2008 WL 4369764, at *8−13 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 
26, 2008) (Donovan, J., dissenting) (asserting that a murder confession was 
involuntary and “improperly induced” because “threats of the electric chair” 
introduced a “torture of fear” in order to “overbear” the suspect’s will).  It 
has long been understood that torturous practices, which can include the use 
of death threats, can lead to false confessions.  As one judge on the Supreme 
Court of Washington stressed in 2009: “We have reason to believe that, 
even in our own country and even in our own time, men have gone to prison 
and even death row on the strength of confessions wrought by torture.”  
State v. Riofta, 209 P.3d 467, 477 (Wash. 2009) (en banc) (Chambers, J., 
concurring in dissent).  The threat of death may also influence the decision-
making of lawyers representing those facing the prospect of capital charges 
or death sentences.  E.g., Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 475, 482−84 (2013) (finding that the threat of the death 
penalty increases the probability of a plea agreement by approximately 20 
percent, and noting that capital charges enable prosecutors to empanel 
“death-qualified” juries and that “the use of the death penalty as leverage in 
plea negotiations raises important legal and ethical issues”).
198 Robert Johnson, Death Work: A Study of the Modern 
Execution Process 42 (1998).
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government aims to kill them.  In a 2001 news story, The New York 
Times reported about the 56-page “Execution Protocol” to be used by 
the staff of the federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.199  While 
professing to allow executions to be carried out “in an efficient and 
humane manner,” it provided a “systemic countdown to execution” 
that includes several pre-execution checklists.200  “As soon as 
practical after establishment of the execution date,” one section of 
the protocol read, “the warden at U.S.P. Terre Haute or designee, 
will personally brief the condemned individual regarding relevant 
aspects of the execution process.”201 “A briefing sheet outlining these 
aspects of the execution will be given to the individual,” the protocol 
continued.202  In other words, not only is a death row inmate already 
fully aware that a death sentence has been imposed, but a prison 
official describes to the inmate the process by which that inmate’s 
life will be extinguished by the state.
Under that Execution Protocol, the warden’s briefing with 
the condemned inmate was to take place “By 30 Days Before the 
Execution,” as was a conference with the condemned inmate 
pertaining to the selection of execution witnesses, to include “one 
spiritual adviser, two defense attorneys and three adult friends or 
relatives (at least 18 years old).”203  In addition, the condemned 
inmate was to be asked about “Disposition of Body” and “Disposition 
of Personal Property and Accounts,” with the inmate “to provide 
instructions concerning the disposition of his/her body no later 
than 14 days prior to the execution.”204  Throughout the process, the 
condemned inmate would be continually reminded, in ways big and 
small, that the execution was approaching.  “At least seven days prior 
to the execution, the warden or designee will contact the condemned 
individual to arrange for his/her last meal,” the protocol read.205 
“Between 24 and 12 Hours Prior,” it continued, “[t]he warden will 
contact the condemned individual to finalize arrangements for his/
her final meal and ensure that it is properly prepared and served by 
199 See Jane Fritsch, Word for Word/Execution Protocol; Please Order Your Last Meal 










staff.”206  After the termination of the condemned inmate’s telephone 
privileges “24 hours prior to the execution,” the condemned inmate’s 
final meal was to be served “Between 12 and 3 Hours Prior” to the 
execution.207  The death row inmate would, of course, also be aware 
of an attorney’s final efforts to save the inmate’s life as well as the 
submission of any clemency petition, all of which the inmate would 
be helpless to predetermine the outcome.208
According to the Execution Protocol,209 the warden, during 
the period “Between 3 Hours and 30 Minutes Prior” to the execution, 
was to “designate a recorder who will begin logging execution 
activities in the official execution log book.”210  And in “The Final 
30 Minutes,” several items were listed to be accomplished by 
prison authorities.211  In particular, the Execution Protocol’s section 
for “Bringing the Condemned Individual to the Execution Room” 
required the condemned individual to be removed from an inmate 
holding cell, strip-searched, and then “dressed in khaki pants, shirt 
and slip-on shoes,” “secured with restraints, if deemed appropriate by 
206 Id.
207 Id. 
208 The chances of a clemency petition being granted are quite small.  David 
R. Dow, Executed on a Technicality: Lethal Injustice on 
America’s Death Row 86 (2005) (“Death penalty lawyers file clemency 
petitions on behalf of their clients because when someone’s life is at stake, 
lawyers tend to leave nothing on the cutting room floor, but when they are 
writing the petitions, they know it is a mere formality.”); see also id. (italics 
in original) (noting that “hope is too strong a word to describe the clemency 
process in Texas”; “[d]eath row inmates do not receive clemency in Texas”).
209 This execution protocol is one of many throughout the United States that 
methodically detail how executions are to be carried out.  The texts of 
various execution protocols can be found on the Death Penalty Information 
Center’s website.  State by State Lethal Injection, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection (last visited Sept. 28, 
2018) (containing links to available protocols).  But see Evan J. Mandery, 
Capital Punishment in America: A Balanced Examination 
492 (2d ed. 2012) (“[M]any states do not make their procedures known.  
Professor Deborah Denno of Fordham Law School has tirelessly detailed the 
failings of states in this regard, offering many examples of states that have 
vague and even secret execution protocols.”); see also Daniel LaChance, 
Executing Freedom: The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment 
in the United States 91 (2016) (“[A]nthropological studies of 
executions in the modern era have drawn a connection between execution 
protocols and a loss of agency of both the condemned and the state actors 
engaged in ‘death work.’”). 
210 Fritsch, supra note 199.
211 Id.
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the warden,” and “escorted to the Execution Room by the Restraint 
Team.”212  “In the Execution Room,” the protocol continued, “the 
ambulatory restraints, if any, will be removed, and the condemned 
individual will be restrained to the Execution Table.”213  “Once the 
condemned individual has been secured to the table,” the protocol 
read for the execution’s final stage, “at the direction of the warden, 
staff inside the Execution Room will open the drapes covering the 
windows of the witness rooms.”214  “The warden,” the protocol 
then read, “will ask the condemned individual if he/she has any 
last words or wishes to make a statement.”215  Because executions 
extinguish life and many executions are botched, a fact that death 
row inmates are no doubt well aware of, the psychological torment 
as an execution approaches is especially heightened.216
IV.   The Torturous Nature of State-Sanctioned Killing 
A. Mental vs. Physical Pain or Suffering
Cruelty and torture—the aggravated form of cruelty—are 
prohibited by law.217  The U.N. Human Rights Committee, back in 




215 Id. Robert M. Bohm, DeathQuest: An Introduction to the 
Theory and Practice of Capital Punishment in the United 
States 202 (5th ed. 2017) (“When the first jolt of 2,000-volt electricity hit 
Tafero, the sponge in the headpiece gave off a combustible gas, which shot 
smoke and flames from the top of the leather hood hiding Tafero’s face.  The 
flames—described as 3 inches to a foot long—horrified witnesses.  Tafero’s 
attorney described the flawed execution as torture.”).
216 Austin Sarat, Gruesome Spectacles: Botched Executions 
and America’s Death Penalty 5 (2014). In some cases, death row 
inmates have been forced to spend an extended amount of time on the 
lethal injection gurney or to endure excruciating pain during the execution 
itself.  Rev. Carroll Pickett & Carlton Stowers, Within These 
Walls: Memoirs of a Death House Chaplain 79−98 (2017); Ziva 
Branstetter & Cary Aspinwall, Inmate Clayton Lockett Dies of Heart Attack 




217 Greenberg, supra note 170, at 366 (noting that the Convention Against 
Torture treats torture as an extreme form of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment).
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way as to cause the least possible physical and mental suffering.”218 
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court, while upholding the death 
penalty’s constitutionality in cases like Wilkerson v. Utah,219 In re 
Kemmler,220 Gregg v. Georgia,221 Baze v. Rees222 and Glossip v. Gross,223 has 
held that torture—as well as any barbaric method of execution224 
(or one causing a “lingering death”)—is prohibited by the U.S. 
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment.225  For instance, the Supreme 
218 Committee on Civil and Political Rights, NG v. Canada, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (Nov. 5, 1993). The Human Rights Committee 
expressed the view that there would be a real risk of cruel and inhumane 
treatment were gas asphyxiation to be used to carry out an execution. Id.; 
see also Committee on Civil and Political Rights, Kindler v. Canada, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (July 30, 1993).
219 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (upholding the constitutionality of 
the public firing squad).
220 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (upholding the constitutionality of New 
York’s electric chair).
221 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of 
Georgia’s death penalty).  At the same time as the Gregg ruling, the U.S. 
Supreme Court also upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in 
Florida and Texas.  Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 
428 U.S. 262 (1976).
222 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (upholding the constitutionality of 
Kentucky’s three-drug lethal injection protocol).
223 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (upholding the constitutionality of 
Oklahoma’s three-drug lethal injection protocol).  Although the Supreme 
Court struck down the death penalty as unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238 (1972), it reversed course four years later and upheld the death 
penalty’s constitutionality in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
224 Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135−36 (noting in dicta that “burning alive” and other 
“punishments of torture . . . in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are 
forbidden” by the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment).
225 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.  Dissents have asserted that particular 
methods of executions are unconstitutional.  E.g., Gomez v. U.S. Dist. 
Ct. for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 658 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted) (“More than a century ago, we declared that 
‘[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death.’  In 
light of our contemporary understanding of the methods of execution and 
in light of less cruel alternatives presently available, I believe that execution 
by cyanide gas is ‘incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.’”); Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 
1080, 1086 (1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment 
requires that, as much as humanly possible, a chosen method of execution 
minimize the risk of unnecessary pain, violence, and mutilation.  If a 
method of execution does not satisfy these criteria—if it causes ‘torture or a 
lingering death’ in a significant number of cases—then unnecessary cruelty 
inheres in that method of execution and the method violates the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause.”).
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Court—staking out its position—held more than a century ago, 
in its 1890 decision In re Kemmler: “Punishments are cruel when 
they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of 
death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the 
[C]onstitution.”226  The American founders’ use of cruel in the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court ruled, “implies . . . something inhuman 
and barbarous,—something more than the mere extinguishment 
of life.”227  But the In re Kemmler pronouncement about the death 
penalty’s constitutionality came decades before the U.S. ratification 
of the Convention Against Torture and its clear prohibition of 
“mental torture.”228
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has, over the years, upheld 
the constitutionality of the electric chair, the firing squad, and lethal 
injection,229 the Court has yet to take up—has yet to even consider 
on the merits—the death penalty’s adverse psychological impact. 
For example, while a few Justices have urged the full Court to take 
up the issue of the “death row phenomenon,” the Court has yet to 
accept for review a case dealing with prolonged stays on death row.230 
226 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
227 Id.
228 America Needs Human Rights 207 (Anuradha Mittal & Peter Rosset 
eds., 1999) (noting that the United States signed the Convention Against 
Torture on April 18, 1988, ratified it on October 21, 1994, and that the 
convention entered into force in the United States on November 20, 1994).
229 In such cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has focused on whether the particular 
method of execution would produce a lingering death and whether there 
would be excruciating, physical pain at the time of the inmate’s death.  
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of lethal 
injection, the most common method of execution today, Supreme Court 
Justices have sometimes dissented from the Court’s decisions.  E.g., Arthur 
v. Dunn, 137 U.S. 725, 725 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
petitioner Thomas Arthur had “amassed significant evidence that Alabama’s 
current lethal-injection protocol will result in intolerable and needless 
agony”); John D. Bessler, Introduction to Stephen Breyer, Against 
the Death Penalty 1−70 (John D. Bessler ed., 2016) (discussing the 
dissents in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015)).
230 See William A. Schabas, The Death Penalty as Cruel Treatment 
and Torture: Capital Punishment Challenged in the World’s 
Courts 124−25 (1996) (discussing the death row phenomenon); Patrick 
Hudson, Does the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner’s Human Rights under 
International Law? 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 833 (2000) (same); Kara Sharkey, Delay 
in Considering the Constitutionality of Inordinate Delay: The Death Row Phenomenon 
and the Eighth Amendment, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 861, 863 (2013) (“The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly declined to address the validity of the unconstitutional 
delay claim raised by Valle and other death row inmates before him.  The 
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Meanwhile, the Court has struck down multiple non-lethal corporal 
punishments that operate on the body231 as well as death sentences 
for assorted categories of offenders seen to have diminished capacity 
or responsibility.232
Since the prohibition against torture is absolute and non-
derogable,233 and because credible death threats and threats of 
serious bodily harm are, even now, properly considered to be acts of 
torture,234 the death penalty must be outlawed post-haste. Already, a 
issue first came to the Court’s attention over fifteen years ago, in Lackey v. 
Texas.” (citing Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011); Lackey v. Texas, 514 
U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial 
of certiorari)).
231 E.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733−35 & n.2, 738, 745 (2002) (alleging 
that prison officials handcuffed a shirtless inmate to a hitching post for seven 
hours, leading to “a substantial risk of physical harm” and unnecessary 
exposure to heat and sun, the Supreme Court held that such conduct 
constituted an “obvious” Eighth Amendment violation); Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (striking down as unconstitutional a 
sentence of cadena temporal that entailed a minimum twelve-year sentence 
of imprisonment, chained day and night at the wrists and ankles, while 
performing hard and painful labor while so chained).
232 E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (finding that the Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the death 
penalty for the non-homicidal rape of a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005) (declaring the unconstitutionality of the death penalty for 
juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (declaring the 
unconstitutionality of the death penalty for the intellectually disabled); Ford 
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (barring the execution of the insane); 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (setting aside the death penalty for 
the driver of a getaway car in a robbery-murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584 (1977) (finding the death penalty to be disproportionate punishment for 
the non-homicidal rape of an adult woman).
233 Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate 
Sanctions, 43 Val. U. L. Rev. 1535, 1535 (2009) (“Torture is a form of 
treatment of human beings that is absolutely prohibited under various forms 
of customary and treaty-based international law in all social contexts.”).
234 John Alan Cohan, Torture and the Necessity Doctrine, Val. U. L. Rev. 1587, 
1596 (2007) (“[I]n addition to physical torture there can be psychological 
torture, such as threatening to execute the suspect, putting a gun to his head 
and saying you will shoot, threatening to castrate him, telling him that you 
are going to kill his family members if he does not tell you the information 
you are seeking, and similar tactics that, while not physically painful, inflict 
mental pain or suffering, even when there is no intent to carry out such 
threats.”); see also The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib 179 
(Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (citations omitted) (“In 
criminal law, courts generally determine whether an individual’s words or 
actions constitute a threat by examining whether a reasonable person in the 
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number of American judges—many of whom have publicly expressed 
aversion for death sentences and executions235—have concluded 
that capital punishment should be declared unconstitutional.236 “I 
yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, 
abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical 
distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds,” 
Justice Harry Blackmun wrote in 1972 while dissenting from the 
Supreme Court’s landmark, 5–4 decision in Furman v. Georgia, which 
found then-existing death penalty laws to be unconstitutional.237 
Although he originally thought legislators, not judges, should decide 
the matter, Blackmun later changed his mind. “From this day forward, 
I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death,” he concluded 
in 1994, this time taking the view that capital punishment should 
be declared unconstitutional after seeing the reality of death penalty 
cases.238 “I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede 
that the death penalty experiment has failed,” he emphasized.239 
It is, in fact, simply impossible for the death penalty to be used 
or administered without resorting to credible threats of death, the 
very kind of threats that, when made by prison guards or non-state 
same circumstances would conclude that a threat had been made.”).
235 Many U.S. Supreme Court Justices, while on the Court or after retiring 
from it, have expressed moral or legal objections to capital punishment.  
Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry 
Blackmun’s Supreme Court Journey 113, 176−79 (2005); Michael 
Mello, Against the Death Penalty: The Relentless Dissents 
of Justices Brennan and Marshall (1996); John C. Jeffries, 
Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: A Biography 451−52 (2001).  
Through the years, trial court and appellate judges have expressed regret 
about imposing death sentences or described them as cruel and unusual 
punishments. E.g., 80 The Friend: A Religious and Literary 
Journal 99−100 (1907) (noting that Bird Wilson, the son of American 
Founding Father James Wilson and a judge on Pennsylvania’s Court of 
Common Pleas, expressed regret for the rest of his life after imposing a 
death sentence as part of his judicial duties; he was once heard to exclaim 
of the condemned man: “He was launched into eternity unprepared; but, 
O God  Impute it not to me ”); Kevin M. Barry, The Law of Abolition, 107 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 521 (2017) (discussing American judges who 
have expressed their objections to capital punishment).
236 Barry, supra note 235, at 535 (“In all, at least thirty-five federal and state 
judges have concluded that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se.”).
237 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405−06 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
238 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting 
from denial of cert.).
239 Id.
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actors, are already properly classified as acts of torture.240  Capital 
charges and death sentences are plainly credible threats of death 
because they are enforced by tremendous state power.  Not only 
do threats of death inflict severe mental anguish and psychological 
torture on their targets,241 but they inflict severe mental trauma on 
capital jurors,242 lawyers,243 and members of execution teams.244 
240 Threats against prison guards by an inmate have themselves been found to 
be highly credible where the guards “were placed in fear” because of the 
inmate’s “ability to obtain weapons” and his gang connections within the 
prison.  People v. Mosley, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
241 11 Handbook of Psychology: Forensic Psychology 431 (Alan 
M. Goldstein & Irving B. Weiner eds., 2003) (“Some [death row] inmates 
may find the sustained isolation and chronic deprivation of years of solitary 
confinement to be so psychologically painful that the escape of death appears 
preferable.”); Michael L. Perlin et al., Competence in the Law: 
From Legal Theory to Clinical Application 94 n.536 (2008) (“It 
has been estimated that ‘as many as fifty percent of Florida’s death row 
inmates become intermittently insane.’”); see also Lynda G. Adamson, 
Thematic Guide to Popular Nonfiction 206 (2006) (noting that 
San Quentin, California, guards yelled “dead man walking” when death row 
inmates were out of their cells).
242 Michael E. Antonio, “I didn’t know it’d Be so Hard”: Jurors’ Emotional 
Reactions to Serving on a Capital Trial, 89 Judicature 282, 283−84 (2006) 
(“[R]eseachers studying criminal cases have identified ‘one or more physical 
and/or psychological symptoms that could be related to jury duty.’ These 
included reoccurring thoughts about the trial that would keep the jurors 
awake at night or nightmares about the crime and the defendant, stomach 
pains, nervousness, tension, shaking, headaches, heart palpitations, sexual 
inhibitions, depression, anorexia, faintness, numbness, chest pain, and hives. 
. . .  Findings showed ‘jurors whose jury panel rendered a death penalty did 
sustain greater PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder] symptoms than did 
jurors whose jury panel rendered a life sentence.’”).
243 See generally Susannah Sheffer, Fighting for Their Lives: Inside 
the Experience of Capital Defense Attorneys (2013); see also 1 
Appeals and Writs in Criminal Cases §6.2 (3d ed. 2017) (“The job of 
appellate counsel in a capital case is complicated by the wide-ranging scope 
and fast-changing nature of capital jurisprudence, as well as the length of 
the time over which the litigation will continue.  In addition, the magnitude 
of the undertaking, including the severity of the consequences of losing the 
case, create a unique set of pressures.”); Sara Mayeux, Review of Fighting for 
Their Lives: Inside the Experience of Capital Defense Attorneys by Susannah Sheffer, 
H-Net (Nov. 2013), http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=40132 
(noting that capital defenders “cycle through rage, fear, anxiety, guilt, 
helplessness, and numbness; they fall into ruts of depression; they work all 
night, drink too much, and flail through nightmares”).
244 John D. Bessler, Death in the Dark: Midnight Executions 
in America 147 (1997) (noting that Utah and other states have stress 
inoculation programs to try to prevent prison staff members from suffering 
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In addition, executions inflict extreme mental pain or suffering 
on the condemned’s family and friends,245 and emotional trauma 
on execution eyewitnesses.246  Family members have experienced 
serious adverse health consequences in close proximity to the 
imposition or carrying out of death sentences,247 with one death row 
from post-traumatic stress disorder after executions); Annmarie Timmins, 
Former Warden ‘Haunted’ by Executions,  Concord Monitor (Aug. 13, 
2010), https://www.concordmonitor.com/Archive/2010/08/999787691-
999787691-1008-CM (quoting former warden Ron McAndrew, who oversaw 
Florida executions, as saying, “Many colleagues turned to drugs and alcohol 
from the pain of knowing a man had died at their hands. And I’ve been 
haunted by the men I was asked to execute in the name of the state of 
Florida.”).
245 Sandra Joy, Grief, Loss, and Treatment for Death Row 
Families: Forgotten No More 212 (2014) (“There are some surviving 
execution witnesses who strongly regret their decision to witness, thus feel 
led to advise other families against witnessing subsequent executions.”); 
Rachel King, No Due Process: How the Death Penalty Violates the Constitutional 
Rights of the Family Members of Death Row Inmates, 16 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 
195, 197−99, 209, 211−17 (2007) (describing the emotional and physical 
impacts of the death penalty on death row inmates’ family members, and 
listing migraine headaches, skyrocketing blood pressure, nightmares and 
sleeplessness, grief and uncontrollable crying, drug and alcohol abuse, 
recurring health problems, severe depression, heart attacks, and attempted 
suicide).
246 Robert L. Baldwin, Life and Death Matters: Seeking the Truth 
about Capital Punishment 205 (2009) (“Those whose jobs are part of 
the process of execution also suffer from long-term effects similar to post-
traumatic stress disorder.  Because executions are so grim, most states that 
allow capital punishment offer counseling to all execution witnesses (except 
those related to the condemned).”); Broken Images, Broken Selves: 
Dissociative Narratives in Clinical Practice 68, 84 (Stanley 
Krippner & Susan Marie Powers eds., 1997) (citing Freinkel, A. et al., 
Dissociative Symptoms in Media Execution Witnesses, 151 Am. J. of Psychiatry 
1335, 1335−39 (1994)) (“Freinkel et al. (1994) described that the witnessing 
of the execution of a convicted killer produced significant depersonalization 
among journalists observing the event.”); see also Scott Christianson, 
The Last Gasp: The Rise and Fall of the American Gas Chamber 
182 (2010) (“San Quentin’s prison personnel became accustomed to two 
or three witnesses fainting during each execution, and others vomiting or 
otherwise breaking down under the stress.”).
247 Helen Kearney, Children of Parents Sentenced to Death, in Capital 
Punishment: New Perspectives 162 (Peter Hodgkinson ed., 2016) 
(citations omitted) (describing examples that “illustrate the extraordinary 
levels of stress and trauma that the children and family” of death row 
inmates undergo, including a father in Belarus who suffered a heart attack 
shortly after learning of his son’s execution and the mother of an Indiana 
death row inmate who overdosed after joining her son for his last meal); id. 
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inmate’s mother suffering a heart attack and a stroke after a state 
governor signed a death warrant.248
B. The Torturous Effects of Death Sentences and Executions
Just as it is considered an act of torture to force someone to 
watch the rape, sexual assault, or torture of a loved one,249 it should 
be considered an act of torture to permit the imposition of a death 
sentence or the use of an execution.  Capital sentences and executions 
inflict severe psychological harm on those closest to the condemned 
as well as those associated with the process of state-sanctioned 
killing, from inmates and their family members to prison chaplains, 
lawyers, and executioners.250  The powerlessness of a loved one to 
at 145 (“Recent studies document the serious emotional and psychological 
distress experienced by the children and families of death row inmates, 
characterized by symptoms corresponding with post-traumatic stress 
disorder, ambiguous loss, and complicated and disenfranchised grief.”).
248 Shirley Dicks, Six Accounts of Wrongly Convicted Prisoners on Death Row, in 
Congregation of the Condemned: Voices Against the Death 
Penalty 146, 153−54 (Shirley Dicks ed., 1995).
249 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 149 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001) (“[T]he Furund’ija Trial 
Chamber found that being forced to watch serious sexual attacks inflicted 
on a female acquaintance was torture for the forced observer.  The presence 
of onlookers, particularly family members, also inflicts severe mental 
harm amounting to torture on the person being raped.”) (citing Furund’ija 
judgment); see also Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, 
¶ 153 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Aug. 2, 2007) (“[A] third party could 
suffer serious mental harm by witnessing acts committed against others, 
particularly against family or friends.”).
250 E.g., Walter C. Long, The Constitutionality and Ethics of Execution-Day Prison 
Chaplaincy, 21 Tex. J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 3 (2015) (“Execution-day chaplains 
work for the State, but there should be no question that they also form quick 
and strong emotional bonds with the men and women they are assigned 
to counsel and accompany to their deaths.”); Seema Kandelia & Peter 
Hodgkinson, The Greater Stigma? Family Visits to the Condemned, in Capital 
Punishment: New Perspectives 127 (Peter Hodgkinson ed., 2013) 
(“In Texas, at the instance of being sentenced to death, the condemned’s 
family become the untouchables—literally—and by implication, the entire 
constituency of the families of the condemned are marginalized and 
stigmatized.  In a world where there are so many examples of cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment and punishment, Texas’s treatment of the mothers, 
fathers, husbands, wives, children and grandchildren of its condemned must 
rank high.”); Louis J. Palmer, Jr., The Death Penalty in the United 
States: A Complete Guide to Federal and State Laws 240 (2d 
ed. 2014) (noting that John Hurlbert, the executioner at New York’s Sing 
Sing Prison during the 1920s, executed over 120 prisoners in Sing Sing’s 
electric chair, but resigned in 1926 and, deeply depressed, committed suicide 
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prevent harm to a close relative is—and long has been—an aspect of 
torturous conduct,251 and the only way to eliminate such torture is to 
eliminate executions altogether.  Just as it is an act of torture to kill 
a helpless or defenseless victim in the non-state actor context,252 it 
should be considered an act of torture to deliberately kill an inmate 
who is tied down on a gurney at the moment of his or her death.253
in the basement of his home three years later).  American laws typically 
allow condemned inmates’ family members, along with a small number 
of “reputable” or “respectable citizens,” to attend executions.  Bessler, 
Death in the Dark, supra note 244, at 44, 46, 72−73.  And death row 
inmates’ family members—who, themselves, are not responsible for the 
particular crimes committed by the condemned inmates—suffer severe 
pain and suffering as a result of executions.  Even if they do not actually 
attend an execution in person, they know when it will occur and yet will 
be utterly helpless to stop it.  This means that death row inmates’ family 
members experience “anticipatory grief”—a particularly bizarre form of 
loss.  E.g., Robert M. Bohm, DeathQuest III: An Introduction to 
the Theory and Practice of Capital Punishment in the United 
States 351 (3d ed. 2007).  
251 E.g., United States v. Juvenile (I.H., Jr.), 1 F. Supp. 2d 509, 520 (D.V.I. 1998) 
(noting that the defendant participated “in the brutal violation” of a man’s 
wife “while the husband was only some few feet away, powerless to spare 
her from such torture”).
252 E.g., Van Tran v. Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 622−23 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasizing 
that a victim’s helplessness or defenselessness, including in an “execution-
style murder,” “evinces torture or depravity of mind”); Lawlor v. 
Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 887 (Va. 2013) (“The psychological aspect 
of torture may be established, for example, ‘where the victim is in intense 
fear and is aware of, but helpless to prevent, impending death . . . for an 
appreciable lapse of time.’” (quoting Ex parte Key, 891 So. 2d 384, 390 (Ala. 
2004)); State v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 618, 643 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (finding 
evidence to support jury determination “that the murder was committed 
with depravity of mind because the crime involved binding Ms. Spicer, 
subjecting her to repeated acts of gruesome physical and sexual torture 
with the purpose of promoting her death, and that Mr. Davis killed or aided 
in killing Ms. Spicer while she was bound helplessly, thereby exhibiting a 
callous disregard for human life”); State v. Frye, 461 S.E.2d 664, 680 (N.C. 
1995) (finding the defendant’s crime involved “psychological torture”).
253 Clive Stafford Smith, Injustice: Life and Death in the 
Courtrooms of America 29−40 (2012) (“Over the years I have watched 
six of my clients die: two in the electric chair, two in the gas chamber and 
two on the lethal injection gurney.”); id. (“It always happens at night, in 
darkness.  I have never been able to decide whether it matters how they 
do it, since the prisoner ends up dead anyway.  In one sense the gurney is 
most surreal, since the scene is meant to emulate a clinical setting, yet the 
prisoner is strapped down in the shape of a cross, his arms wide to give 
room for the needle.  Sometimes the prison staff take ten minutes, twenty 
minutes, three-quarters of an hour probing the prisoner’s arm, trying to find 
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The Convention Against Torture specifically prohibits both 
physical and psychological torture, so the U.S. Supreme Court 
should no longer focus only on the risk of maladministration of 
lethal-injection drugs and the potential for excruciating physical 
pain at the very moment of an inmate’s execution, as it did in Baze v. 
Rees254 and Glossip v. Gross.255  Instead, the Supreme Court should use 
the modern definition of torture and broaden its focus to examine 
the psychological terror and self-evident mental torture associated 
with death sentences and executions.256  Mental torture is just as 
bad as physical torture, and both mental and physical torture are 
prohibited in the Convention Against Torture and similar human 
rights instruments.257  There is simply no legitimate justification 
to condemn one form of torture (i.e. the physical) while tolerating 
another (i.e. the psychological).
A person experiences severe psychological suffering when 
that person is incapacitated and helpless to prevent his or her 
death,258 and that is true for any person, regardless of what that 
person may have done—or not done—in the past.  Already, threats 
of violence and death threats can form the basis of an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim259 because they inflict 
a vein.”).
254 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
255 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
256 Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (“When courts seek to define torture in international law, they 
often look to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment . . . .  Accordingly, we, for ATA 
[Alien Tort Act] purposes, too look to the Convention when deciding what 
constitutes torture according to the law of nations.”).
257 See supra text accompanying notes 4−5; see also Elizabeth A. Sheehy, 
Defending Battered Women on Trial: Lessons from the 
Transcripts 259 (2014) (“Psychological torture causes as much mental 
and traumatic stress as physical torture, and it amplifies brain injuries, 
making it more difficult to treat for depression and anxiety those who have 
experienced both.”).
258 Smith v. State, 122 So. 3d 224, 242 (Ala. 2011) (“After the initial 
gunshots rendered Smith helpless to prevent her death she suffered great 
psychological torture as she listened to her abductors discuss how they 
were going to kill her and dispose of her body while she begged for medical 
attention.”).
259 Harris v. Cellco Partnership, No. 5:15-cv-529-Oc-30PRL, 2016 WL 
232235, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2016) (“In cases where Florida courts 
have permitted a plaintiff to move forward with an IIED claim, they often 
involve threats of death, rape, or severe bodily harm to the plaintiff or family 
members of the plaintiff.”); Allam v. Meyers, No. 09-cv-10580 (KMW), 2011 
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severe emotional distress and are considered to be “outside the 
bounds of decency.”260  And such threats can also be torturous when 
those threats are credible ones—as death threats made in the death 
penalty context naturally and inevitably are when one considers 
their immutable characteristics.  In American jurisprudence, “forms 
of torture” already include “mock executions by placing a gun” in 
someone’s mouth “and pulling the trigger.”261  Likewise, the use 
of Russian roulette during interrogation has been found to be a 
WL 721648, at *10−11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011) (allowing IIED claim based 
on a “five month-long, deliberate and malicious campaign of harassment 
and intimidation” that included “threats of violence” and death threats, 
as well as “relentless humiliation and emotional abuse”); Eves v. Ray, 840 
N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (App. Div. 2007) (sustaining verdict for defendant on 
IIED counterclaim where, “on several occasions,” plaintiff “threatened 
the defendant both physically and financially, and stalked him”); Nims v. 
Harrison, 768 So. 2d 1198, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding “as a 
matter of law” that “Nims’ complaints state a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of mental distress”; high school teacher stated cause of action 
against students for IIED where students participated in production and 
distribution of newsletter that threatened to kill teacher and to rape her and 
all of her children); Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72, 
81−82 (Tex. App. 1998) (general pattern of harassing behavior, including 
bomb and death threats, constituted extreme and outrageous behavior that 
could give rise to IIED claim); Behringer v. Behringer, 884 S.W.2d 839, 842, 
844−45 (Tex. App. 1994) (allowing IIED claim where evidence of death 
threats included talk of hiring a hit man, and where there were threats that 
a husband would be beaten up and, as a result of the death threats and the 
wife’s actions, the husband “was in fear of his life every day, all the time”).
260 E.g., Barrios v. Elmore, No. 3:18-cv-132-DJH-RSE, 2018 WL 3636576, at *4 
(W.D. Ky. Ct. App. July 31, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss IIED claim, 
with the court finding threats to someone’s life “to be sufficiently outside 
the bounds of decency to be considered outrageous”); see also Tania Tetlow, 
Criminalizing “Private” Torture, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 183, 233−34 (2016) 
(“‘Psychological torture’ should be defined, with reference to the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, as ‘the use of extreme and 
outrageous conduct to intentionally cause severe emotional distress.’”); id. 
at 238 (“IIED allows civil damages for ‘outrageous’ behavior resulting in 
‘extreme emotional distress.’”).
261 Cannon v. Burge, No. 05 C 2192, 2006 WL 273544, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 
2006); see also Massie v. Gov’t of North Kor., 592 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64, 66 (D. 
D.C. 2008) (describing a mock execution and men held in captivity who 
“endured individual threats of death, threats to kill others, severe beatings, 
torture, both physical and mental, and other means of coercion”).  Compare 
Zalewski v. City of New York, No. 1:13-CV-7015 (ARR) (PK), 2018 WL 
5113137, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018) (“Courts in this circuit have found 
that ‘verbal threats, combined with the brandishing of [a] weapon, could be 
unreasonable and therefore constitute excessive force.’”) (citations omitted).
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form of torture,262 as have “threats to kill” and “the anticipation of 
physical harm to one’s self or a loved one.”263  If a threat to kill an 
inmate in one context (i.e. where a prison guard makes the threat) 
is torturous, then a threat to kill an inmate in another context (i.e. 
where the judicial system makes the threat) should also be classified 
as torturous.  In the twenty-first century, the universal rights to 
human dignity and life and to be free from cruelty and torture should 
take center stage in the modern death penalty debate.
C. The Importance of Human Dignity
Not only are death threats torturous in nature, but they are 
unnecessary264 and utterly inconsistent with the right to life265 and 
262 In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1463 (D. 
Haw. 1995).  This case also found “[s]olitary confinement while handcuffed 
or tied to a bed” to be a form of torture.  Id.
263 State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 601 (Tenn. 1999) (“This Court has repeatedly 
held that the anticipation of physical harm to one’s self or a loved one 
constitutes mental torture.  The evidence here clearly supports a finding of 
mental torture.”) (citations omitted).
264 A core principle of the Enlightenment—one articulated by Cesare Beccaria, 
Montesquieu and others centuries ago—was that any punishment that 
goes beyond “absolute necessity” is “tyrannical.”  Bessler, The Death 
Penalty as Torture, supra note 26, at 37, 255; see also John D. Bessler, 
The Celebrated Marquis: An Italian Noble and the Making of 
the Modern World 7, 217−18 (2018) (discussing Montesquieu’s and 
Beccaria’s views of necessity as the justification for punishment); John D. 
Bessler, The Baron and the Marquis: Liberty, Tyranny, and the 
Enlightenment Maxim that Can Remake American Criminal 
Justice (2019) (discussing the history and modern-day implications of 
the maxim penned by Montesquieu—and then publicized by Beccaria—that 
any punishment not grounded in necessity is “tyrannical”).  In a world of 
maximum-security prisons, and in which life-without-possibility-of-parole 
sentences are authorized by law, it cannot be said that death sentences or 
executions are necessary, let alone absolutely necessary.  John D. Bessler, 
The Birth of American Law: An Italian Philosopher and the 
American Revolution 439 (2014).
265 Capital Punishment: Global Issues and Prospects 18−19 
(Peter Hodgkinson & Andrew Rutherford eds., 1996) (“The original draft 
of the Universal Declaration, prepared by John P. Humphrey in early 1947, 
recognized a right to life that ‘can be denied only to persons who have been 
convicted under general law of some crime to which the death penalty is 
attached’.  But Eleanor Roosevelt, who chaired the Drafting Committee, 
cited movement underway in some states to abolish the death penalty, and 
suggested that it might be better not to make any explicit mention of the 
matter.  René Cassin reworked Humphrey’s draft and removed any reference 
to the death penalty.  Cassin’s proposal found its way, virtually unchanged, 
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the notion of human dignity.266  Human dignity has long been called 
the “touchstone” of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment,267 
and dignity is also a central value of international law.  As the U.N. 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected 
to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment puts it: 
into the final version of the Declaration, despite some subsequent attempts to 
return to the original proposal.  It is clear from the travaux préparatoires that 
the death penalty was considered to be incompatible with the right to life, 
and that its abolition, although not immediately realizable, should be the 
goal of Member states.  Subsequent interpretations, by General Assembly 
and Economic and Social Council resolutions, support this conclusion.”) 
(italics in original).
266 Juan E. Méndez, The Death Penalty and the Absolute Prohibition of Torture and 
Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 20 Hum. Rts. Brief 
2, 5 (2012) (“I believe it is necessary for the international community to 
discuss this issue further and for states to reconsider whether the death 
penalty per se fails to respect the inherent dignity of the human person and 
violates the prohibition of torture or CIDT.”); see also Identoba v. Georgia, 
App. No. 73235/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 69−71 (2015) (citations omitted) 
(where, during a march conducted to mark the International Day Against 
Homophobia, LGBT people in Georgia were subjected to death threats, 
the European Court of Human Rights wrote of the target of those threats: 
“Given that they were surrounded by an angry mob that outnumbered them 
and was uttering death threats and randomly resorting to physical assaults, 
demonstrating the reality of the threats, . . . the situation was already one 
of intense fear and anxiety. . . .  [T]he Court concludes that the treatment 
of the applicants must necessarily have aroused in them feelings of fear, 
anguish and insecurity, which were not compatible with respect for their 
human dignity and reached the threshold of severity within the meaning of 
Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.”).
267 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying 
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.  While 
the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that 
this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”); see also 
Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017) (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 
1992) (“The Eighth Amendment prohibits ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ 
and ‘reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all 
persons.’”)); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (quoting Weems 
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) & Trop, 356 U.S. at 101) (“The 
Eighth Amendment ‘is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning 
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.’  To enforce the 
Constitution’s protection of human dignity, this Court looks to the ‘evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”)); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (referring to “the 
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment”).
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Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment is an offence to 
human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of 
the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and 
as a violation of the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.268
In Brown v. Plata,269 the U.S. Supreme Court itself made clear 
that offenders do not lose their right to human dignity by virtue 
of their incarceration.  As Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the 
Supreme Court in that case: “To incarcerate, society takes from 
prisoners the means to provide for their own needs.  Prisoners are 
dependent on the State for food, clothing, and necessary medical 
care.  A prison’s failure to provide sustenance for inmates ‘may 
actually produce physical ‘torture or a lingering death.’”270  “A prison 
that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate 
medical care,” Justice Kennedy emphasized, “is incompatible with 
the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society.”271 
In a world of universal human rights, inmates and even heinous 
offenders, just like everyone else, have a right to be free from torture 
and from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.272
268 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons, supra note 22, at 91. The 
preamble to the U.N. Charter, signed in 1945, the year World War II came 
to a close, explicitly recites that one of its purposes is “to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, 
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”  U.N. 
Charter pmbl.
269 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
270 Id. at 510 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting In re 
Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447)); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (citation omitted) 
(“An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; 
if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.  In the worst 
cases, such a failure may actually produce physical ‘torture or a lingering 
death,’ the evils of most immediate concern to the drafters of the [Eighth] 
Amendment.”).
271 Brown, 563 U.S. at 511.
272 John D. Bessler, The Inequality of America’s Death Penalty: A Crossroads for 
Capital Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 487, 555 (2017); Liesel J. Danjczek, The 
Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act and Its Inappropriate Non-
Violent Offer Limitation, 24 J. Contemp. Health L.  Pol’y 69, 97 (2007); 
see also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook 
for Prison Leaders: A Basic Training Tool and Curriculum 
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Death sentences and execution protocols, like other acts 
of torture, dehumanize individuals and strip offenders of their 
humanity, however tarnished by whatever crimes they have 
committed in the past.273  The Convention Against Torture plainly 
requires that nations prevent and criminalize torture,274 envisioning 
the elimination of torturous punishments in accordance with 
the dictates of that convention and the humanitarian impulses 
for Prison Managers Based on International Standards and 
Norms 27 (2010) (noting that certain rights “are non-derogable, meaning 
that they must be fully respected at all times and in all circumstances” and 
listing “the right to life, the right to be free from torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment” as among those rights; “[p]rison officials 
are responsible for ensuring that they do not violate any of these rights”).




274 Nigel Rodley & Matt Pollard, Criminalisation of Torture: State Obligations 
Under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 115 (2006).  
Various provisions of law around the world punish torturous acts, though 
laws proscribing torture vary widely in the actual punishments they impose.  
See generally Daniel O’Donnell, The Obligation to Establish Sentences for Torture 
that Are Commensurate with the Gravity of the Offense, 22 Buff. Hum. Rts. 
L. Rev. 95 (2016) (describing legal provisions in various countries that 
criminalize and punish torture); see also 18 U.S.C. § 114 (1996) (“Whoever, 
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 
and with intent to torture (as defined in section 2340), maim, or disfigure, 
cuts, bites, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, or cuts out or disables the tongue, or 
puts out or destroys an eye, or cuts off or disables a limb or any member of 
another person; or[,] Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, and with like intent, throws or pours upon 
another person, any scalding water, corrosive acid, or caustic substance—
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or 
both.”). 
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behind it.275  In Kennedy v. Louisiana,276 the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
considering an Eighth Amendment case, forthrightly proclaimed: 
“Evolving standards of decency must embrace and express respect 
for the dignity of the person, and the punishment of criminals must 
conform to that rule.”277  “When the law punishes by death,” Justice 
Anthony Kennedy wrote for the Court, “it risks its own sudden 
descent into brutality.”278  In declaring the use of the electric chair 
to be unconstitutional, the Nebraska Supreme Court said something 
quite similar, with that court writing in 2008: “We recognize the 
temptation to make the prisoner suffer, just as the prisoner made an 
innocent victim suffer.  But it is the hallmark of a civilized society 
that we punish cruelty without practicing it.  Condemned prisoners 
must not be tortured to death, regardless of their crimes.”279
D. The Coercive Nature (and Distorting Effects) of Death 
Threats
The use of any death threat, whether by a state actor or a 
non-state actor, should raise an immediate red flag because credible 
death threats, as shown, are already classified as torturous acts.280 
In fact, threats of death are serious enough that, in civil cases and 
the application of the criminal law,  they can be the basis of a duress 
defense.281  For example, where threats of death were made in the 
275 Not surprisingly, American law already expressly states that the purpose of 
the Convention Against Torture is to prohibit torture.  8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)
(3) (2018) (noting that the “object and purpose” of the Convention Against 
Torture is “to prohibit torture”); see also Ashika Singh, The United States, the 
Torture Convention, and Lex Specialis: The Quest for a Coherent Approach to the CAT 
in Armed Conflict, 47 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 134, 151 (2016) (noting 
a Swiss cable emphasizing that “the Convention Against Torture . . . has as 
its sole purpose the protection against torture”).  As criminologist Robert 
Johnson, of American University, writes of the importance of human dignity 
in punishment practices: “Punishment that dehumanizes is itself a crime; 
punishment that respects the human dignity of the criminal is justice.  In 
the matter of crime and just punishment, criminals dehumanize their 
victims but, ideally, the punishments meted out in society’s name do not 
dehumanize the criminals.”  Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: 
Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the Death House, 13 
Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 583, 587 (2014).
276 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
277 Id. at 420.
278 Id.
279 State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 279 (Neb. 2008).
280 See Paust et al., supra note 40.
281 See Bacigalupo v. Santoro, No. 94-cv-02761-BLF, 2018 WL 6272238, at *12 
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context of a divorce decree, the defense of duress was found to be 
“an issue of fact to be disposed of at the trial.”282  Death threats 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2018) (“Central to a defense of duress is the immediacy 
of the threat or menace on which the defense is premised.”); In re Chiquita 
Brands Int’l, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (holding that 
the duress defense “is narrowly construed, and viable only if defendant can 
show that he or she acted under an immediate threat of death or serious 
bodily injury at the time the conduct occurred; that he or she had a well-
grounded fear that the threat would be carried out, and that he or she 
had no reasonable opportunity to escape or inform the police”); Cormier 
v. State, 540 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Tex. Penal 
Code § 8.05(a) (1994)) (“Duress is an affirmative defense that applies if 
the defendant ‘engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was compelled 
to do so by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or 
another.’”); Oliver v. Ameriquest Mortg., No. 301444, 2012 WL 284618, at 
*3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012) (“[D]eath threats could potentially support 
a finding of duress . . . .”); Kristen Cherry, Comment, Marriage and Divorce 
Law in Pakistan and Iran: The Problem of Recognition, 9 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l 
L. 319, 330 (2001) (“If consent needed for the khul is obtained by duress, 
the divorce is void.  Such duress must be of a serious nature such as threats 
of death, bodily harm, or captivity.”); see also People v. Speer, 255 P.3d 1115, 
1119 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (discussing statutory defense of duress based 
on conduct resulting from “the use or threatened use of unlawful force” and 
applying “an objective standard of reasonableness,” said to exculpate “only 
for threats that a reasonable person would not have been able to resist”); 
People ex rel. Rusch v. Rivlin, 277 Ill. App. 183, 186 (1934) (citation omitted) 
(“‘The compulsion which will excuse a criminal act . . . must be present, 
imminent, and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well grounded 
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done.  A 
threat of future injury is not enough.’”). Compare People v. Anderson, 50 
P.3d 368, 376 (Cal. 2002) (“The reasons a person acted in a certain way, 
including threats of death, are highly relevant to whether the person acted 
with a conscious or wanton disregard for human life.”), with State v. Davis, 
No. A07-0331, 2008 WL 2020402, at *5 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 13, 2008) 
(noting that, in Minnesota, duress is a statutory defense that applies when a 
person “commits a crime because his will has been overborne by threats of 
death from another participant in the crime”), and Geert-Jan Alexander 
Knoops, Defenses in Contemporary International Criminal 
Law 98 (2d ed. 2008) (“Psychological threats, which amount to imminent 
death or serious bodily harm, may trigger the defense of necessity.”).
282 In re Kittinger’s Estate, 101 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. County, N.Y. 
1950).  Accord McIntosh v. McIntosh, 26 Cal. Rptr. 26, 27−28 (Cal. App. 
1962) (“[W]e are satisfied that the trial court was justified in finding that 
plaintiff was coerced into writing the waiver by fear of personal injury or 
death at the hands of defendant; that said fear was induced by the beating of 
November 13, 1959, coupled with the subsequent threats of defendant; that 
the waiver was not the voluntary act of plaintiff and was invalid.”).
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have been used to set aside a state court judgment,283 and threats 
of death—in both the civil and the criminal contexts—can be highly 
pertinent to a duress defense’s viability and legitimacy.284  
Death threats are inherently coercive.  They have been 
recognized as such since time immemorial, and that is so because 
death threats remove a person’s ability to make voluntary decisions 
based on free will.  Thus, in Avco Financial Services, Inc. v. Johnson,285 
the Supreme Court of Utah, citing an earlier precedent, put it this 
way: “In Fox v. Piercey,286 this Court reviewed the development of 
the law of duress since the time of Lord Coke, when only threats of 
death, dismemberment, mayhem or imprisonment were recognized 
as coercive actions constituting duress.”287  “In that case,” Utah’s 
highest court observed, “we followed the modern trend, and adopted 
the ‘subjective’ test, holding that ‘any wrongful act or threat which 
actually puts the victim in such fear as to compel him to act against 
his will constitutes duress.’”288 Death threats made to someone in 
police custody, it is important to remember, can easily produce false 
confessions, with such threats—whether made by police officers or 
prosecutors—leading individuals to make incriminating statements 
or plead guilty to crimes they have not committed.289
283 In re Slater, 200 B.R. 491, 496 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[T]he Debtor’s 
allegations that her brother physically assaulted her and threatened her life 
before and during the trial . . . does constitute extrinsic fraud sufficient to 
attack the state court judgment.”).
284 Rowley v. Rowley, 290 P. 181, 184 (Okla. 1930) (“Certainly, a threat to the 
effect that her husband would kill her and her baby would be sufficient 
to justify execution of an instrument, if she honestly believed the threat 
would be carried into execution did she not sign it.  The fact that she soon 
thereafter secured a divorce from her husband, on grounds of extreme 
cruelty and threats to kill, corroborates her statements and justifies her 
belief that in all probability his threats would be executed.”); cf. Hoffman 
v. Hoffman, 30 Pa. 417, 420 (Pa. 1858) (“There were no threats of death or 
bodily harm, which constitutes duress per minas in the case.”).
285 Avco Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Johnson, 596 P.2d 658 (Utah 1979).
286 Fox v. Piercey, 227 P.2d 763 (Utah 1951).
287 Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 596 P.2d at 660 (citing Fox, 227 P.2d at 766).
288 Id. (quoting Fox, 227 P.2d at 766).
289 Examples of false confessions in the death penalty context are not hard to 
find. The Witness Stand and Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Jr. 60 
(Cynthia Willis-Esqueda & Brian H. Bornstein eds., 2016) (citation omitted) 
(“[M]ore than 300 people in the United States have been exonerated by 
DNA, including several who served time on death row.  To everyone’s 
astonishment, false confessions have been a contributing factor in over 
25% of these wrongful convictions.”); Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty 
Reform: How It Happened, What It Promises, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
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E. Death Row, “Mock” Executions, and Threats to Life or 
Bodily Integrity
Death row inmates endure prolonged periods of confinement 
in harsh conditions.  They confront the prospect of death on a daily 
basis, inevitably experiencing extreme uncertainty and anxiety as 
the days and months and years go by and as all the capital litigation 
and pleas for mercy occur.  They are confined in small, spartan cells, 
and they often wait for death for years, even multiple decades, as 
their attorneys press their legal claims.  The waiting and anxiety 
can be torturous, especially as it is so prolonged,290 though threats 
of death—all by themselves—meet the torture threshold because 
of their inherent features.  As one recent study put it: “Common 
methods of psychological torture involve threats to the victim or 
the victim’s loved ones, isolation or solitary confinement, sleep and 
sensory deprivation, exposure to loud noise, or forcing a victim to 
watch or participate in the torture of others.”291  “A typical example,” 
381, 382−83 (2005) (noting that false confessions and snitch testimony 
were the two most common causes of error in Illinois exoneration cases); 
see also True Stories of False Confessions vii, 147 (Rob Warden & 
Steven A. Drizin eds., 2009) (“false confessions are amazingly common”; 
“the death penalty can be misused to intimidate an innocent person into 
making a false confession”); Dale S. Recinella, The Biblical Truth 
about America’s Death Penalty 133 (2004) (“False confessions can 
also be easily obtained from the mentally ill.”); David V. Baker, Women 
and Capital Punishment in the United States: An Analytical 
History 181 (2016) (“False confessions are a significant factor in female 
wrongful convictions; slightly more than one-fifth of female wrongful 
convictions involve false confessions.”).
290 Robert Johnson, Death Work: A Study of the Modern 
Execution Process 196 (1998) (“It is his confinement, culminating in 
the deathwatch and ending with his execution, that epitomizes death row 
confinement.  This confinement-unto-death, I will argue, is a clear and 
complete case of torture.”); cf. Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 782 
(8th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (“An unlawful or extrajudicial threat of 
imminent death comes within the definition of torture if it is specifically 
intended to bring about prolonged mental pain or suffering.  This intent 
requirement is satisfied if prolonged mental pain or suffering either is 
purposefully inflicted or is the foreseeable consequence of a deliberate act.”).
291 Ashley McCulley, The Physical and Psychological Sequelae 
in Adult Refugees or Asylum Seekers Who Have Survived 
Torture 8 (2013), https://ethnomed.org/clinical/torture/torture-
literature-review/AshleyMcCulley_Dec2013_final.pdf (“The most common 
types of psychological torture . . . were threats, witnessing torture, mock 
execution, humiliation, and sensory, hygiene, or sleep deprivation.”); id. 
(“Psychological sequelae are also a result of physical torture methods.  
For example, waterboarding is a physical torture method that simulates 
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Dr. Hernán Reyes, of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
writes of psychological torture, “is the ‘sham execution,’ a method 
known to be extremely traumatic in which prisoners are led out to 
what they believe is their summary execution.”292  “Verbal threats of 
death or mutilation” and “[t]hreats involving others (family etc.)” 
have elsewhere been labeled as forms of psychological torture,293 
along with “[t]hreats of being killed or infliction of serious injury” 
and “[t]hreats of separation from, torture of or killing of family 
members.”294
Mock executions, as a matter of fact, have been shown 
by researchers to be as severe as various physically torturous 
acts.295  In a study of torture conducted by Metin Başoğlu of King’s 
College London, Başoğlu and his colleagues surveyed 279 torture 
survivors—both soldiers and civilians—from the once war-torn 
former Yugoslavia.296  Between 2000 and 2002, those survivors 
answered questions about the types of torture that they endured.297 
drowning, but the sheer terror of feeling like you are going to die 
produces psychological sequelae. Merging both physical and psychological 
torture methods leaves survivors with relentless long-term psychological 
sequelae.”).
292 Hernán Reyes, The Worst Scars Are in the Mind: Psychological Torture, 89 Int’l 
Rev. of the Red Cross 591, 600, 611−12 (2007).
293 Caroline Gorst-Unsworth & Eva Goldenberg, Psychological Sequelae of 
Torture and Organised Violence Suffered by Refugees from Iraq, 172 British J. 




294 Engelke Randers, Torture; Mental Sequelae and Treatment Approaches—Are These 
Applicable in Low-Income Countries?, Universitetet i Oslo 8, https://
www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/29693/ProsjektxRanders.
pdf?sequence=2 (last visited Oct. 25, 2018).
295 E.g., Linda Piwowarczyk, Seeking Asylum: A Mental Health Perspective, 16 Geo. 
Immigr. L.J. 155, 162 (2001) (footnote omitted) (“Partly in response 
to more aggressive human rights monitoring, methods of torture have 
evolved to become more psychological in nature, thereby leaving fewer 
physical signs.  This shift is alarming in view of the experience from the 
Center for Victims of Torture in Minneapolis that indicated that greater 
psychological damage is inflicted by methods such as sham executions, 
sexual torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, especially with sensory 
deprivation, disappearance of a loved one, threats against family members, 
and witnessing the torture of others.”).
296 Roxanne Khamsi, Psychological Torture ‘as Bad as Physical Torture’, New 
Scientist (Mar. 5, 2007), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11313-
psychological-torture-as-bad-as-physical-torture/.
297 Id.
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In particular, they were asked to rate the distress they felt on a scale 
of zero (no distress) to four (maximum distress).  About 20 of the 
survivors experienced purely psychological torture, including sham 
executions, the torture of family members, or threats of rape, and the 
researchers collected medical data on whether the survivors showed 
signs of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).298  The study 
found that psychological manipulations—threats and witnessing 
the torture of others—were ranked very high on the scale.299  Sham 
executions (3.7), witnessing torture of close ones (3.6), threats of 
rape (3.6), threats against family (3.4), witnessing torture of others 
(3.4), threats of death (3.3), and threats of further torture (3.2) were 
rated in an essentially equivalent manner on the distress scale to 
these forms of physical torture: hanging by the wrists tied at the back 
(3.8),300 suffocation/asphyxiation (3.8), electric torture (3.7), falaga 
(3.6),301 burning parts of the body (3.6), forced extraction of teeth 
(3.6), stretching of the body (3.5), beating (3.5), hanging by hands 
or feet (3.5), needles under toenails or fingernails (3.4), beating over 
the ears with cupped hands (3.4), and pulling/dragging/lifting by 
hair (3.2).302  It is now clear that those who endure physical threats 
298 Id.  In 2013, the American Psychiatric Association revised the diagnostic 
criteria for PTSD in the fifth edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (“DSM-5”), a professional manual cited by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in a recent case dealing with the issue of intellectual disability.  Moore 
v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1045 (2017).  In the DSM-5, PTSD is included in 
a new category titled “Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders.”  One of 
the criteria for a PTSD classification includes exposure to death, threatened 
death, actual or threatened serious injury, or actual or threatened sexual 
violence in any of the following ways: direct exposure, witnessing the 
trauma, learning that a relative or close friend was exposed to a trauma, 
or indirect exposure to aversive details of the trauma in the course of 
professional duties (e.g., first responders, medics).  PTSD: National Center 
for PTSD, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, https://www.ptsd.va.gov/
professional/PTSD-overview/dsm5_criteria_ptsd.asp (last updated Feb. 22, 
2018).
299 Khamsi, supra note 296.
300 Cullen Murphy, God’s Jury: The Inquisition and the Making of 
teh Modern World 91 (2012) (hanging by the wrists tied at the back is 
also known, among other things, as “reverse hanging”).
301 Falaga involves beating the soles of the feet.  Darius Rejali, Torture 
and Democracy 274 (2007).
302 Khamsi, supra note 296. In speaking about the results of the study’s findings, 
Dr. Basoglu—a psychiatrist and specialist in trauma studies—made clear 
that the distinction between physical and psychological torture was artificial. 
“Until now, both sides of the debate have expressed opinions based on 
personal impressions,” Basoglu emphasized. “But these data,” he added, 
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and psychological torture experience severe pain and suffering, 
commonly developing major depressive disorder and PTSD.303
V. Taking Psychological Torture Seriously 
A. Death Threats as a Form of Psychological Torture
Psychological torture is just as abhorrent as physical 
torture.304  It is, however, sometimes more difficult to identify 
because the signs of it may not be discernible with the human 
“clearly suggest that you cannot make a distinction between physical forms 
of torture and something else called ‘cruel and degrading treatment.’”  
Nicholas Bakalar, The Line Between Torture and Cruelty, N.Y. Times (Mar. 6, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/06/health/psychology/06tort.
html.
303 Kabba v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008).  Psychological 
torture is itself a common feature of domestic violence and rape, which may 
or may not involve the loss of life.  E.g., Sneed v. Johnson, No. 1:04CV588, 
2007 WL 709778, at *59 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2007) (quoting report of 
Dr. Smalldon) (“Psychological torture often accompanied the rapes.  For 
example, David recalls the man threatening that his dog ‘would eat [David] 
up’ if he refused to do what he was told.”); People v. Coffman, 96 P.3d 30, 54 
(Cal. 2004) (“Certain features of defendants’ relationship fit the profile of a 
battering relationship: a pattern of escalating violence, sexual abuse within 
the relationship, jealously, psychological torture, threats to kill . . . .”); State 
v. Anthony, 555 S.E.2d 557, 597 (N.C. 2001) (“[T]he evidence showed 
that Semantha had an ex parte domestic violence order served on defendant 
shortly before her murder and made statements to several witnesses 
that defendant had threatened and followed her and that she feared him.  
Semantha even saw defendant slowly driving past the hair salon she was 
patronizing just hours before her murder.  This evidence supports the 
inference that Semantha experienced psychological unease and fear before 
her murder.”).
304 In the U.S., emotional and psychological harms are not currently treated as 
seriously as physical harms within prisons.  E.g., Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of 
Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 807 (10th Cir. 1999); Brooks v. Humphrey, No. 5:12-CV-
281 (CAR), 2012 WL 5866293, at *3 n.11 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2012) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (1996)) (“Plaintiff could not recover compensatory 
or punitive damages for the ‘mental, emotional, and psychological’ harm 
caused by his placement within range of Watson’s ‘daily and constant 
barrage of death threats.’  An inmate in prison who files a federal civil action 
cannot recover damages on the basis of mental or emotional injury suffered 
while in custody without demonstrating a related physical injury.”). The 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, enacted in 1996, has made it more difficult 
for prisoners to recover compensatory damages for psychological suffering.  
John Boston & Daniel E. Manville, Prisoners’ Self-Help 
Litigation Manual 528 (4th ed. 2010).  That federal law, however, does 
not change the well-settled definition of torture. 
71VOL. 11, NO. 1 NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
eye.  In Psychological Torture: Definition, Evaluation and Measurement, 
one expert, Pau Pérez-Sales, begins that scholarly monograph by 
labeling “the concept of torture (especially psychological torture)” 
as “elusive and blurred.”305  “There is not an official definition of 
or consensus on the meaning of psychological torture,” Pérez-Sales 
emphasizes.306  But that source nonetheless relays how various types 
of threats—from threats of death to threats against family members, 
and from threats of inflicting pain to threats to rape loved ones—have 
previously been classified as methods of torture.307  The New York-
based Center for Constitutional Rights, in a report on Guantánamo, 
has itself classified the following techniques as psychological torture: 
“Solitary confinement, light and sound manipulation, exposure to 
the elements and to extreme temperature, . . . sleep deprivation, and 
threats of transfer for torture in another country.”308
Courts have not always found death threats sufficient to 
constitute torture, with not every threat of death found to be credible 
or specific enough to qualify as such.309  One of the horrifying features 
of death threats, though, is the sheer uncertainty of knowing if, or 
when, they will be carried out.310  For example, as one California 
305 Pau Pérez-Sales, Psychological Torture: Definition, 
Evaluation and Measurement 2 (2017).
306 Id. at 7.
307 Id. at 120.
308 Id. at 7.  Pérez-Sales considers “psychological torture to be the use of techniques 
of cognitive, emotional or sensory attacks that target the conscious mind and cause 
psychological suffering, damage and/or identity breakdown in most subjects subjected 
to them; such techniques may be used alone or together with other techniques to produce 
a cumulative effect.”  Id. at 8; see also Edward Domovitch et al., Human Torture: 
Description and Sequelae of 104 Cases, 30 Can. Fam. Physician 827 (1984) 
(conducting a study of 104 torture victims and noting that common methods 
of torture included threats of death and sham executions); Katherine J. Eder, 
The Importance of Medical Testimony in Removal Hearings for Torture Victims, 7 
DePaul J. Health Care L. 281, 283 (2004) (footnote omitted) (“Common 
threats of psychological torture include isolation, threats, humiliation, sham 
executions, and witnessing the torture of others.  Rape and sexual assault 
are also forms of torture commonly practiced during arrest or imprisonment 
or during conflicts.”).
309 United States v. Rodriguez-Vasquez, 4 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1154 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013) (“The Court is aware of no case—and the defendant cites 
none—holding that death threats alone constitute torture under the CAT 
standard.  The receipt of these threats after he returned to Honduras, while 
undoubtedly disturbing, does not support the defendant’s claim that he 
could have established a plausible claim of torture prior to removal.”).
310 People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213, 263 (Cal. 1997) (“The crime undoubtedly 
inflicted mental torture as well as physical violence on the victim who 
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appellate court has written: “While a victim of domestic violence 
and continuing death threats might well suspect she will be attacked 
sometime in the future, she has no way of knowing exactly when 
or where that attack will occur.”311  Threats of death are thus often 
closely associated with—indeed, equivalent to and part and parcel 
of—torturous conduct.312  “Death threats are patently material to the 
grave risk analysis,” another California appellate decision determined 
in another case involving allegations of domestic violence.313  As 
that court wrote: “Due process required the trial court to decide the 
material issue of father’s alleged death threats and to afford mother 
the opportunity to offer relevant and competent evidence on that 
issue.”314  As another court, in Michigan, put it in the context of 
yet another domestic violence case: “The prior acts presented by 
the prosecution at trial also qualify as acts of domestic violence, 
since defendant ‘caus[ed] physical harm’ to the victim and made 
death threats toward her ‘that would make a reasonable person 
feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or 
molested.’”315
B. The Definition of Psychological Torture
Of critical importance, psychological torture has been 
defined in criminal cases as an awareness of, but a helplessness 
was forced to accompany defendant to the bedroom, submit to his sexual 
assault, and lie apprehensively on the floor awaiting her uncertain fate as he 
ransacked her belongings while she suffered oxygen deprivation.”); Neill v. 
State, 896 P.2d 537, 556−57 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (citations omitted) 
(“Mental anguish includes the victim’s uncertainty as to his ultimate fate.  
Our finding of torture is supported by the mental torment of Mr. Zeller prior 
to the shooting, rather than the events which took place afterwards.  In 
the present case, the evidence clearly supports a finding of mental anguish 
beyond that which necessarily accompanies a killing.  Accordingly, the 
evidence was sufficient to support the ‘especially heinous, atrocious or cruel’ 
aggravating circumstance.”).
311 People v. Arellano, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 172, 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
312 Hekmati v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 278 F. Supp. 3d 145, 160 (D. D.C. 2017) 
(“[I]n Moradi, this Court held that a detainee in Iranian prison experienced 
torture when his interrogators subjected him to ‘severe physical and mental 
pain, including threatening him with death and dismemberment . . . .’” 
(citing Moradi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 77 F. Supp. 3d 57, 68−69 (D. D.C. 
2015)).
313 Noergaard v. Noergaard, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 553 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
314 Id. at 554.
315 People v. Phillips, No. 323333, 2016 WL 232324, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 
19, 2016).
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to prevent, one’s impending death.316  “Psychological torture,” the 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama has held, “can be inflicted 
where the victim is in intense fear and is aware of, but helpless to prevent, 
impending death.”317  “Such torture,” that court has ruled, “must have 
been present for an appreciable lapse of time, sufficient enough 
to cause prolonged or appreciable suffering.”318  Although courts 
have not established a particular length of time that is necessary 
for a premeditated murder to be transformed into a torture-murder, 
and in reality there is no specific time requirement for a finding 
of torture to be made,319 it is clear that a few hours or even a few 
minutes can suffice.320  In fact, a murder victim’s awareness of, but 
316 Scott v. State, 937 So. 2d 1065, 1083 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).
317 Shanklin v. State, 187 So. 3d 734, 808 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (italics in 
original) (quoting Ex parte Key, 891 So. 2d 384, 390 (Ala. 2004)); accord 
Shaw v. State, 207 So. 3d 79, 122 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014); Boyle v. State, 
154 So. 3d 171, 234 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013); Albarran v. State, 96 So. 3d 
131, 208, 214 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). The court in Ex parte Key found that, 
in that case, “the victim suffered psychological torture for an appreciable 
period.” Ex parte Key, 891 So. 2d at 390.
318 Shanklin v. State, 187 So. 3d 734, 808 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting 
Ex parte Key, 891 So. 2d at 390); accord Shaw v. State, 207 So. 3d 79, 122 
(Ala. Crim. App. 2014); Boyle v. State, 154 So. 3d 171, 234 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 2013); Baker v. State, 87 So. 3d 587, 604 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009); Ex 
parte Deardorff, 6 So. 3d 1235, 1240 (Ala. 2008).  As the Court of Criminal 
Appeals of Alabama, explaining the operation of the standard in that death 
penalty jurisdiction, has put it: “‘[T]he factor of psychological torture must 
have been present for an appreciable lapse of time, sufficient enough to 
have caused prolonged or appreciable suffering, i.e., the period of suffering 
must be prolonged enough to separate the crime from ‘ordinary’ murders 
for which the death penalty is not appropriate.’”  Mitchell v. State, 84 So. 
3d 968, 986 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Norris v. State, 793 So. 2d 
847, 861 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)). See Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1317 
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (“In order to establish mental (in contrast to physical 
torture), the TVPA [Torture Victims Protection Act] requires a showing of 
‘prolonged’ mental harm that is caused by the threat that either the victim 
or another will be imminently subjected to death or severe physical pain or 
suffering. The TVPA does not define the length of time required for a finding 
of ‘prolonged’ mental harm.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 3(b)(2)).
319 E.g., State v. Gailey, No. 08-0628, 2009 WL 778772, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. 
Mar. 26, 2009) (“There is no requirement that torture be inflicted for any 
minimum period of time. . . .  We conclude there is substantial evidence 
to support the jury’s finding that Gailey intentionally subjected his wife 
and daughter to mental torture to support a conviction for first-degree 
kidnapping.”).
320 E.g., State v. Walters, 588 S.E.2d 344, 363 (N.C. 2003) (“The victims were 
subjected to at least an hour and a half of psychological torture by being 
trapped in the trunk of a car while pleading for their lives.  The victims 
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helplessness to prevent, impending death for an appreciable period 
of time, is a defining feature of “especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel” homicides.321  That aggravating circumstance—and a finding of 
torture—has been made, for example, where a perpetrator discussed 
whether or not to kill a victim in the presence of that victim or where 
were also abducted at gunpoint and robbed of jewelry.  Furthermore, Susan 
Moore was forced to witness Tracy Lambert being shot in the head.  We 
thus conclude that the evidence more than warranted the trial court’s 
submission of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance to the jury for both 
murders.”); State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tenn. 2003) (finding that 
photographs, including one of “Mrs. Jackson’s partially nude body” and one 
of “Mr. Jackson’s body in the closet,” aided “in establishing that the victims 
suffered torture in the form of severe mental anguish” because “[t]he jury 
could infer from these photographs that both victims anticipated physical 
harm,” with the court further emphasizing that “[m]ental torture” occurs 
“when a victim hears or anticipates the harm or killing of a spouse and is 
helpless to assist”); State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 886−87 (Tenn. 1998) 
(“the jurors were capable of evaluating the proof and determining whether 
the victim suffered severe mental pain when, over the course of a six hour 
time period, her body was burned and beaten in her own home, with four 
of her young children present”; “[t]he sufficiency of the evidence to support 
a jury’s finding of torture does not depend upon whether an expert witness 
utters the magical words ‘severe physical or mental pain’” but “whether, 
after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt”; “we conclude that the proof is 
sufficient to support a jury finding that both severe physical and mental pain 
was inflicted upon the victim while she remained alive and conscious”). 
321 E.g., Floyd v. State, No. CR-13-0623, 2017 WL 2889566, at *70 (Ala. Crim. 
App. July 7, 2017) (containing jury instruction to that effect); see also State v. 
McNeill, 624 S.E.2d 329, 339 (N.C. 2006) (noting that killings that involve 
the infliction of psychological torture leave the victim “in her last moments 
aware of, but helpless to prevent, impending death”); State v. Alston, 461 
S.E.2d 687, 718−19 (N.C. 1995) (finding a murder was “especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel” because of “evidence of psychological terror” that 
included defendant’s prior threats “to ‘smash in’ the victim’s face and kill 
the victim”; “[i]t is reasonable to infer that the victim suffered psychological 
torture and anxiety as her fears were realized and the defendant carried 
out his threats,” with the court citing prior cases where psychological 
terror was found before determining: “In the last minutes of the victim’s 
life, as her face was forced into the pillow and she struggled to breathe, 
she undoubtedly was left aware of, but unable to prevent, her impending 
death.”); accord State v. Bell, 603 S.E.2d 93, 121 (N.C. 2004); State v. Tirado, 
599 S.E.2d 515, 544 (N.C. 2004); State v. Barden, 572 S.E.2d 108, 142 (N.C. 
2002); State v. Mann, 560 S.E.2d 776, 788 (N.C. 2002); State v. Anthony, 
555 S.E.2d 557, 596−97 (N.C. 2001); State v. Spruill, 360 S.E.2d 667, 670, 
674 (N.C. 1987); State v. Gladden, 340 S.E.2d 673, 694 (N.C. 1986); State v. 
Hamlet, 321 S.E.2d 837, 846 (N.C. 1984).
75VOL. 11, NO. 1 NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the victim pleaded for his or her life.322
As the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama has written of 
that aggravating circumstance: “In determining the application of this 
aggravating circumstance ‘we must consider whether the violence 
involved in achieving the killing went beyond what was necessary to 
cause death, whether the victims experienced appreciable suffering 
after a swift assault, and whether there was psychological torture.’”323 
In determining if an offense is especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, 
Alabama courts examine these three factors: “(1) the infliction on 
the victim of physical violence beyond that necessary or sufficient 
to cause death; (2) appreciable suffering by the victim after the 
assault that ultimately resulted in death; and (3) the infliction of 
psychological torture on the victim.”324  As regards the last factor, the 
Alabama courts have stated: “Thus, mental suffering may be found 
where a victim witnesses the murder of another (particularly a family 
member) and then realizes that soon he or she will also be killed, as 
well as where the victim is expressly taunted with the prospect of his 
or her own death.”325  The consideration of the existing definition of 
psychological torture in death penalty states such as Alabama has 
important—and unmistakable—collateral consequences for capital 
punishment.
The Alabama case of Ex parte Deardorff326 is noteworthy. 
In that case, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered the 
case of Donald Deardorff, a man convicted of capital murder.  In 
determining that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or 
322 State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 357−58 (Tenn. 1997).
323 Smith v. State, 122 So. 3d 224, 241 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting 
Brownfield v. State, 44 So. 3d 1, 41 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007)).
324 Saunders v. State, 10 So. 3d 53, 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Brooks v. 
State, 973 So. 2d 380, 417−18 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007)).
325 Id. at 108−09; accord Brooks v. State, 973 So. 2d 380, 418−19 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 2007); Norris v. State, 793 So. 2d 847, 859−60 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1999).  Psychological torture has been found in multiple Alabama cases.  
E.g., Brown v. State, 982 So. 2d 565, 607 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (“The 
evidence establishes that the victim suffered for an appreciable amount 
of time following the assault and clearly endured extensive psychological 
torture.”).  But it has not been found where the victims were shot in rapid 
succession.  Norris v. State, 793 So. 2d 847, 862 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) 
(“[B]ecause the three victims were shot in rapid, uninterrupted succession, 
any momentary fear or anxiety of impending death did not last sufficiently 
long as to constitute the unnecessary torture required to elevate the offense 
to an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel offense . . . .”).
326 Ex parte Deardorff, 6 So. 3d 1235 (Ala. 2008).
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cruel when compared to other capital offenses, Alabama’s highest 
court set forth a detailed description of the murder—one involving 
binding the victim’s hands with duct tape, keeping the victim in a 
closet, driving him to a remote spot while his hands and mouth 
were taped, and then shooting him in the head four times while his 
head was covered with a pillowcase.327  Deardorff was sentenced to 
death for the execution-style murder,328 with the Court of Criminal 
Appeals finding sufficient evidence to support the determination 
that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.329  As 
the court pointed out, the victim feared for his life, “[t]he terror 
he experienced must have escalated tremendously when his mouth 
was taped and his hands were bound,” and “he had to know that his 
death was imminent.”330  In affirming Deardorff’s death sentence, 
the Supreme Court of Alabama specifically highlighted that the 
victim was “threatened with death” and “held in captivity and 
confined in a closet” while hooded and with his hands taped.331 
Those circumstances, the court observed, constituted “psychological 
torture so as to meet the standard for a murder that is ‘especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.’”332
Other courts in American death penalty states have also 
found the presence of psychological torture where the victim had 
an awareness of impending death but an inability to prevent it.  For 
example, in State v. Sloan,333 the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled:
327 Id. at 1237−40.
328 That various “execution-style” murders have been described as torturous in 
nature is itself telling about the torturous nature of actual executions.  E.g., 
Michael J. Boyle, Violence After War: Explaining Instability 
in Post-Conflict States 296 (2014) (quoting U.N. Assistance Mission 
for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Report (2006)) (“‘Dozens of bodies 
bearing signs of torture and showing execution style killings have continued 
to appear daily in and around Baghdad, as well as other parts of the 
country.’”); Clint Richmond, Fetch the Devil: The Sierra Diablo 
Murders and Nazi Espionage in America 60 (2014) (“The mother 
and daughter had been methodically tortured over a period of time and then 
carefully and deliberately put to death—execution style.  The prolonged 
torture of the victims and execution-style killings were the most heinous 
crimes either of the veteran criminologists had seen in their long careers.”).  
Both execution-style killings and state-sanctioned killings involve the 
infliction of severe pain or suffering.  
329 Ex parte Deardorff, 6 So. 3d at 1238.
330 Id. (quoting Deardorff v. State, 6 So. 3d 1205 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)).
331 Id. at 1240.
332 Id.
333 State v. Sloan, 756 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
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Here, the evidence shows that Jason was the last 
member of the Sloan family to be shot.  The jury 
could have reasonably believed that Jason had heard 
the previous gunshots and was therefore hiding under 
a blanket, his arms covering his head, in a hopeless 
effort to conceal himself from appellant’s aim.  This 
is sufficient evidence of psychological torture, as it 
indicates that Jason had the opportunity to anticipate 
and reflect upon his impending death while his 
parents and brother were shot.334
In another case, State v. Oliver,335 the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina similarly found especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
murders included those “calculated to leave the victim in his last 
moments as a sentient being, aware but helpless to prevent impending 
death, focusing on the deliberate, intentional and senseless aspect 
of a conscienceless and pitiless murder inflicting psychological 
torture.”336  In that case, the court found that the victim had pleaded 
“please don’t shoot me” before death, concluding that “the evidence 
was sufficient to support the submission to the jury of the factor 
that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”337  Of 
course, death row inmates in their final days and hours, if not so 
depressed that they simply abandon their appeals altogether, are 
also forced to beg for their lives, if only through their lawyers.  
In the context of criminal responsibility, findings of 
psychological torture have frequently been made where a murder 
victim begged for his or her own life.338  The fact that there is a 
334 Id. at 511.
335 State v. Oliver, 307 S.E.2d 304 (N.C. 1983).
336 Id. at 318.
337 Id. at 319.
338 Id. at 318−19 (defendant’s boasting to fellow inmates that he had enjoyed 
killing victim, who had begged for his life, was evidence of “conscienceless 
and pitiless murder inflicting psychological torture”); see also State v. Rhines, 
548 N.W.2d 415, 452 (S.D. 1996) (“The evidence also shows that Rhines 
possessed the necessary intent for a finding of torture.  When Schaeffer 
pleaded with Rhines for his life, Rhines did not tell officers of his desire to 
quickly end his victim’s life.  Instead, Rhines described his own sarcastic and 
scornful attitude toward Schaeffer’s suffering.  Rhines also stated that when 
he believed Schaeffer had survived the third stab wound, he tied his victim’s 
hands and left him to die.  This evidence supports a finding that Rhines 
intended to cause unnecessary pain to his victim.”).
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short time lapse between a victim’s abduction or incapacitation and 
the victim’s death—as one Tennessee court has put it—“does not 
alone support a finding that the victim was mentally tortured.”339 
As that court stressed: “[P]roof that the victim begged for his life 
in the last few seconds of his life is, by itself, insufficient to support 
a finding of mental torture that would distinguish this murder 
from any other murder.”340  “The fact that the victim begged for his 
life or that there were multiple gunshots,” the Supreme Court of 
Florida similarly emphasized, “is an inadequate basis to find this 
aggravating factor absent evidence that [the perpetrator] intended 
to cause the victim unnecessary and prolonged suffering.”341  But 
where the victim begged for life and was made to suffer for more 
than a fleeting amount of time (i.e. an appreciable amount of time), 
a finding of psychological torture has been made.342  Defendants 
in capital cases and those sentenced to death plainly suffer for an 
appreciable amount of time, with the prospect of an untimely death 
via a state-sanctioned killing hanging over their heads like the Sword 
of Damocles.343
Extreme mental anguish, it has been held, occurs where a 
person realizes that he or she is about to be killed but is unable to 
do anything to stop it.344  Indeed, torture techniques are specifically 
339 State v. Beckman, No. 02C01-9406-CR-00107, 1995 WL 568471, at *17 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 1995).
340 Id. 
341 Bonifay v. State, 626 So. 2d 1310, 1313 (Fla. 1993); see also id. (“The record 
fails to demonstrate any intent by Bonifay to inflict a high degree of pain or 
to otherwise torture the victim.”).
342 E.g., Fowler v. State, 779 P.2d 580, 588 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (“Mr. 
Barrier attempted to fight off the attack and begged for his life before he 
died.  Such evidence clearly demonstrated torture and serious physical 
abuse, thereby supporting the jury’s finding that the death of John Barrier 
was heinous, atrocious or cruel.”).  Whether any particular murder qualifies 
as a torture-murder can be a factual issue for a jury to determine.  Talamantez 
v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 629, 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
343 Valeri R. Helterbran, Why Flamingos Are Pink: . . . and 250 
Other Things You Should Know 102 (2007) (italics in original) (“The 
phrase sword of Damocles is defined as a threat, peril, or imminent danger.”).
344 Neill v. State, 896 P.2d 537, 556 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (“There is ample 
evidence of the extreme mental anguish suffered by these three (3) women 
prior to their deaths.  This evidence illustrates the realization by these 
women that they were going to be harmed and even killed by Appellant.  
Two (2) of the women suffered the additional mental anguish of hearing 
their co-workers being savagely murdered and realizing they could be 
next.  The cause of this extreme mental torture was Appellant’s intentional 
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designed to strip the object of the torture from any control or agency 
and to create a “state of total helplessness.”345  It is for that reason 
that threats of various kinds, subjecting their targets to an uncertain 
fate, have long been considered to be torturous in nature.346  In 
that regard, Almerindo Ojeda, the Director at University of 
California, Davis’s Center for the Study of Human Rights in the 
Americas, has specifically classified the following as acts of torture: 
threats “to self or to others”; “threats of death, physical torture, or 
rendition”; “mock executions”; and “forced witnessing of torture 
(visually or aurally).”347  “Mock” executions, of course, are simply 
credible threats of death, and thus considered classic examples 
of psychological torture because of their inherent characteristics.348 
Ironically, although a simulated or fake execution currently qualifies 
as an act of torture, state-sanctioned executions, which result in 
actual deaths, have yet to be categorized as acts of torture by modern 
jurists.349  If a mock execution or a mock amputation qualifies as an 
actions.”).
345 Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 27 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Metin 
Başoğlu et al., Torture vs Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment: Is the 
Distinction Real or Apparent?, 64 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 277, 283 
(2007)) (“Torture and ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ employed by the 
Government during the War on Terror have been shown to be ‘geared toward 
creating anxiety or fear in the detainee while at the same time removing any 
form of control from the person to create a state of total helplessness.’”).
346 Andrea Montavon-McKillip, CAT Among Pigeons: The Convention Against 
Torture, A Precarious Intersection Between International Human Rights Law and U.S. 
Immigration Law, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 247, 253−54 (2002) (“Mental torture 
can be inflicted by direct or implied threats that cause fear, including death 
threats or threats of serious injury against an individual or her family, or by 
forcing an individual to watch the abuse or murder of loved ones.”).
347 David Luban & Henry Shue, Mental Torture: A Critique of Erasures in U.S. Law, 
100 Geo. L.J. 823, 836−37 (2012).
348 Luban, supra note 1, at 166; see also Pérez-Sales, Psychological 
Torture, supra note 305, at 308, 333 (noting that “[t]hreats of death” and 
“mock executions,” along with “[p]sychological techniques to break down 
the individual,” are classified as torture under the Istanbul Protocol (1985), 
and listing mock executions as a form of psychological torture).
349 The debate about how to classify executions—and whether they are 
legitimate or illegitimate exercises of state power—has led to heated 
debate over the years.  Compare Hans Göran Franck, The Barbaric 
Punishment: Abolishing the Death Penalty 35 (William Schabas 
ed., 2003) (“The conditions surrounding the execution itself and the 
period between the sentence and the carrying out of the sentence, which 
is frequently quite long, make it possible to compare the death penalty to 
torture.”), with Ernest van den Haag, Introduction: Death but Not Torture, in 
The Death Penalty: A Debate 13 (1983) (containing Ernest van den 
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act of torture (as it should),350 then a real execution—logically and 
rationally—must also qualify.
C. The Torturous Nature of Non-Lethal Acts
Many acts short of death can qualify as torture under existing 
law.351  “Rape can constitute torture,” the Third Circuit explicitly 
ruled in Zubeda v. Ashcroft,352 for example.  As the Third Circuit stated: 
“Rape is a form of aggression constituting an egregious violation of 
humanity.  The scarring effects of rape compare with ‘psychological 
sequelae of . . . survivors of abuse constituting torture under 
international law . . . .’”353  Indeed, “rape” and “threats to rape” have 
been listed among common “torture techniques.”354  If acts short of 
death, including threats of non-homicidal rape or bodily harm, can 
qualify as torture, then (once again) it is only logical that credible 
threats of death—threats designed to put individuals in fear for their 
lives—should also qualify under that legal rubric.355  In short, just 
Haag’s views on the death penalty in a “Pro”/“Con” debate between Ernest 
van den Haag and John P. Conrad).
350 Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-
State Actors 180 (2010) (“In addition to the ‘classic’ examples of torture 
such as electric shocks, examples of acts which have been determined as 
torture or other prohibited ill-treatment, include methods such as severe 
beatings; mock executions and mock amputations; sensory manipulation and 
deprivation, and forced positions causing severe pain; rape and other sexual 
violence.”).
351 Such non-lethal acts include rape, forced impregnation, branding, beating, 
electric shocks administered to the genitals, pulling out fingernails, burning 
with hot irons, suspension from ceiling fans, and threats to inflict bodily 
harm.  E.g., Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995) (referring to allegations 
of “murder, rape, forced impregnation, and other forms of torture”); In 
re Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, 682 (N.D. Cal. 1988) 
(“shock sessions were interspersed with rapes and other forms of torture”). 
352 Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 472 (3d Cir. 2003).
353 Id. (citations omitted); see also id. (“courts have equated rape with conduct 
recognized under the law of nations as torture”).
354 Al-Saher, 268 F.3d at 1147; see also Anne-Marie L.M. de Brouwer, 
Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: 
The ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR 211 (2005) 
(“[T]he case law of the ICTY has recognised that rape and other forms of 
sexual violence can rise to the level of torture . . . .  [O]ther forms of sexual 
violence qualifying as torture are threats to sexually mutilate a person, 
threats to rape someone . . . .”).
355 Whether someone intends his words “to be taken as a threat,” and whether 
those words are “sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and 
specific” to convey to the target of them “an immediacy of purpose and 
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as prison officials are not allowed to threaten inmates with death or 
bodily harm during their confinement in prison, state actors should 
not be allowed to threaten inmates with death in connection with 
interrogations or during plea bargaining or as part of the criminal 
justice system more broadly.  A death threat is a death threat,356 
and the fact that an inmate has done something heinous in the past 
does not justify a government official in making a torturous threat of 
death that is backed by the enormous power of the state.357
That mock executions, non-judicial threats of death, and 
threats of severe pain or suffering are already classified as acts of 
torture makes clear that real executions should also be so classified. 
Tellingly, the U.S. Department of State has previously recognized 
mock executions to be a form of torture,358 as have federal courts in 
the United States.359  The United States Code itself defines “torture” 
immediate prospect of execution of the threat,” is to be based on “all the 
surrounding circumstances and not just on the words alone.”  People v. 
Mosley, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); cf. Nifadev v. Holder, 
577 F. App’x 481, 487 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Nifadev was subjected to credible 
threats to his life and subjected to a period of suffocation at the hands of 
the police when handcuffed and helpless in a police vehicle on account 
of a protected ground.  This treatment bears a striking resemblance to 
torture . . . .”).
356 As Shakespeare put it in a much different context: “A rose by any other name 
would smell as sweet.” Or, as Gertrude Stein once emphasized, playing off of 
Shakespeare’s line: “A rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.”  Sunil Sethi, The 
Big Bookshelf: Sunil Sethi in Conversation with 30 Famous 
Writers 83 (2011).
357 And this is to say nothing of the horror that must be experienced by 
innocent people who are mistakenly sentenced to death. Miscarriages of 
justice are relatively common, especially in death penalty cases. Innocence 
and the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center, https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty (last visited Sept. 24, 
2018); see also The National Registry of Exonerations, https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2018). The stories of just some of the exonerees are highlighted in 
a series of short documentary films produced in 2013 and available online.  
See One for Ten, http://oneforten.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).  
358 U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1993, S. Prt. 103-7 (Joint Comm. Print 1994) (recognizing 
mock executions as a form of torture in Chad, Columbia, Liberia, Moldova 
and Sudan).
359 Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 (C.D. Cal. 1988) 
(“The form of the persecution includes the following: arbitrary arrest, 
short term detention, torture including use of electric shock, capucha, 
beatings, rape, ‘disappearance’, extra-judicial executions, abductions, 
threats against family members, intimidation, forced ingestion of food, 
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to mean “an act committed by a person acting under the color of 
law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) 
upon another person within his custody or physical control.”360  Not 
only are “mock” executions already treated as acts of torture,361 
they are, under existing law put in place by U.S. Congress and the 
executive branch, banned by the U.S. Code362 and the U.S. Army 
false imprisonment, mock-executions, sleep deprivation, mass killings, and 
forced relocations.”); Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 271 F. Supp. 2d 179, 185 
(D. D.C. 2003) (“[T]he pilot POWs were tortured more severely than other 
POWs.  The torture inflicted included severe beatings, mock executions, 
threatened castration, and threatened dismemberment.”), vacated on other 
grounds, Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (2004); Acree, 271 F. Supp. 2d 
at 210, 218 (describing “mock executions” and “several death threats” by 
the Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Intelligence Service that caused “great distress” 
and “psychological torture,” and referring to Iraq’s “all-encompassing 
environment of physical and mental torture through extreme physical 
brutality and physical injury, mock executions, threats of death, intense 
fear”).  
360 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2004).  The phrase “severe mental pain or suffering” in 
that federal statute is defined as follows: “[T]he prolonged mental harm caused 
by or resulting from—(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of 
severe physical pain or suffering; (B) the administration or application, or 
threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other 
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; 
(C) the threat of imminent death; or (D) the threat that another person will 
imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the 
administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures 
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality . . . .” Id. § 2340(2)
(A)−(D) (italics added).
361 Tshitenge Muteba v. Zaire, Communication 124/1982, Human Rights 
Committee [U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/39/40)] at 182, ¶ 10.2 (Mar. 25, 1983), 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/session39/124-1982.htm (“During the first 
nine days of detention he was interrogated and subjected to various forms 
of torture including beatings, electric shocks and mock executions.”).  The 
Human Rights Committee lists “beatings, electric shocks, mock executions, 
deprivation of food and water and thumb presses” under the torture rubric. 
Sarah Joseph et al., Seeking Remedies for Torture Victims: A Handbook on 
the Individual Complaints Procedures of the UN Treaty Bodies 159 (2006). 
In 1999, the Clinton Administration—in a report to the U.N. Committee 
Against Torture—itself described “[t]he intentional infliction of ‘mental’ 
pain and suffering” to include “various psychological forms of torture and ill-
treatment,” including “mock executions.”  Bessler, The Death Penalty as 
Torture, supra note 26, at 324 n.18.
362 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(C) (2004); see also David R. Dow et al., The Extraordinary 
Execution of Billy Vickers, the Banality of Death, and the Demise of Post-Conviction 
Review, 13 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 521, 550 n.150 (2004) (“Mock 
executions and other threats of imminent death are widely recognized to be 
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Field Manual.363   “Sham executions,” a book on trauma notes of 
simulated executions, are “a widely practiced form of torture.”364
If threats of death or threats to inflict severe pain or suffering 
a form of unconscionable torture.  Legislation passed by the United States 
Congress on April 30, 1994, implementing the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, identifies ‘the threat of imminent death’ as a form of torture.  
This provision was designed to bring ‘mock executions’ within the ambit of 
the legislation.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(C) (2004); David P. Stewart, 
The Torture Convention and the Reception of International Criminal Law Within the 
United States, 15 Nova L. Rev. 449, 455−56 (1991)).
363 Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual 34−52: Intelligence 
Interrogation 1-8 (Washington, D.C., Sept. 28, 1992) (listing “Mock 
executions” as an example of “mental torture,” and listing the following 
as “[e]xamples of coercion”: “Threatening or implying physical or mental 
torture to the subject, his family, or others to whom he owes loyalty”); 
see also David P. Gushee, In the Fray: Contesting Christian 
Public Ethics, 1994−2013, 121 (2014) (noting that the U.S. Army Field 
Manual prohibits military personnel from beating prisoners, waterboarding 
them, sexually humiliating them, threatening them with dogs, depriving 
them of food and water, performing mock executions, shocking them with 
electricity, burning them, or causing other types of pain); David E. Graham, 
The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Detainees, 37 Geo. J. 
Int’l L. 61, 89−90 (2005) (noting that Army Field Manual 34-52 prohibits 
“[p]hysical or mental torture and coercion” and lists “Mock executions” as 
an example of mental torture); Matthew Lippman, Law and Society 
495 (2015) (“In 2005, Congress amended the Detainee Treatment Act to 
prohibit the use of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by government 
personnel and to prohibit military interrogators from employing 
interrogation techniques not authorized under the Army Field Manual.  The 
manual, for example, prohibits the use of dogs, hooding, forced nakedness, 
hypothermia, mock executions, electric shocks, and waterboarding.”).
364 Metin Başoğlu & Ebru Şalcioğlu, A Mental Healthcare Model 
for Mass Trauma Survivors: Control-Focused Behavioral 
Treatment of Earthquake, War, and Torture Trauma 41 (2011). 
As that source observes: “Sometimes the detainee is subjected to a prolonged 
threat of execution.”  For instance, detainees are told that “they are going to 
be shot the next morning.”  As that source continues of how such torturous 
acts unfold: “The next day they are taken from their cell, blindfolded and taken 
to another room where someone holds an unloaded gun at their head and 
pulls the trigger.  The same procedure may be repeated for days or weeks on 
end.”  Id.  Studies of torture have revealed that “[p]otentially life-threatening 
(e.g. deprivation of basic needs), fear-inducing treatments (e.g. threats of 
harm to self and close ones, sham executions, asphyxiation), and humiliating 
treatments were the major determinants of perceived severity of the torture 
experience.”  Id. at 52; see also id. at 61 (noting “various stressor events that are 
said not to involve intense physical pain” (e.g., “sham executions”) “can be as 
distressing as physical torture”).
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already are classed as acts of torture,365 then plainly such credible 
threats, when coupled with a clear intention that those threats be 
actualized, must also be classified as torture.366  It has sometimes 
365 E.g., James P. Terry, Torture and the Interrogation of Detainees, 32 Campbell L. 
Rev. 595, 612−13 (2010) (“The cases brought under the TVPA [Torture 
Victims Protection Act] reference seven distinct forms of severe abuse 
that would constitute torture: (1) severe beatings using weapons such 
as truncheons and clubs; (2) threats of imminent death, to include mock 
executions; (3) threats of removing body parts and[/]or extremities; (4) 
burning, especially burning with cigarettes; (5) electric shocks to genital 
areas, or threats to do so; (6) rape or sexual assault, to include injury to 
sexual organs, or threats of the same; and (7) forcing the detainee to watch 
the extreme physical or mental torture of others.  The severity of these 
examples of treatment found in civil proceedings suggests that similar 
severity would have to be found to warrant conviction under the criminal 
provisions in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.”). 
366 Torture has been described as a specific intent crime.  Michael 
Otterman, American Torture: From the Cold War to Abu 
Ghraib and Beyond 109 (2007); Commentary on the First 
Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field 2971 (2016).  But in the case of capital punishment, even if 
a particular judge has no specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffering, 
the result—in every case—is that severe pain and suffering is inflicted.  
Moreover, capital punishment is a torturous punishment that society 
imposes collectively.  The Death Penalty Today 115 (Robert M. Bohm 
ed., 2008) (“Vengeance is a human emotion experienced by individual 
people.  Retribution is a collective response to wrongdoing from society 
rather than individual family members.”).  Research shows that some like to 
see bad people suffer.  Malcolm Ritter, Men Enjoy Seeing Bad People Suffer, USA 
Today (Jan. 18, 2006).  To date, courts have yet to find executions, even 
botched executions, to be torturous acts.  E.g., Estate of Lockett v. Fallin, 
841 F.3d 1098, 1113 (10th Cir. 2016) (italics in original) (citation omitted) 
(“The Supreme Court has determined that, in the execution context, 
‘torture’ and ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ require that executing officials 
mean to choose an execution method that will cause extra pain beyond 
that necessary to carry out the death sentence.”).  The legal prohibitions 
against torture and cruelty, however, are designed to insulate ourselves 
from our baser instincts.  As Justice Thurgood Marshall once wrote: “The 
Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves.”  Charles L. 
Zelden, Thurgood Marshall: Race, Rights, and the Struggle 
for a More Perfect Union 149 (2013).  This helps explain why the 
prohibition against torture is—and should be—absolute.  The Routledge 
Handbook of Global Ethics 123 (Darrel Moellendorf & Heather 
Widdows eds., 2015) (“The function of the absolute moral prohibition 
against torture as an archetype of the fact that there are some activities in 
which civilized people do not engage is too important to allow a breach 
of the prohibition even if the degree of the wrongfulness of torturing 
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been suggested, including in the infamous Torture Memo prepared 
during the Bush Administration after 9/11, that a threat must be 
“imminent” in order for the threat to constitute torture.367  But 
when a capital charge is brought or a death sentence is imposed, 
the consequences of that capital charge or death sentence are clearly 
known by government officials at the very moment that it is brought 
or imposed.  An execution might not occur for years, or even decades, 
down the road.368  But it is readily apparent to all concerned that the 
threat of death for the offender will be real, immediate, and dire. As 
the execution date approaches, the seriousness of the threat of death 
(already highly credible) will only be magnified.369 And all of this is 
the person in question were not reason enough in itself.”); Richard 
Matthews, The Absolute Violation: Why Torture Must Be 
Prohibited 220 (2008) (“[T]he absolute prohibition against torture, 
including the nonderogability clause of the United Nations Convention 
against Torture, is morally sound.  Hence torture must be absolutely 
forbidden, no matter what.”).
367 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President 12  (Aug. 1, 2002) (on file with the U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice) (emphasis in original) (“The third predicate act listed in 
Section 2340(2) is threatening a prisoner with ‘imminent death.’  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2340(2)(C). The plain text makes clear that a threat of death alone is 
insufficient; the threat must indicate that death is ‘imminent.’ . . .  Common 
law cases and legislation generally define imminence as requiring that the 
threat be almost immediately forthcoming.  1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin 
W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 5.7, at 655 (1986).  By contrast, 
threats referring vaguely to things that might happen in the future do not 
satisfy this immediacy requirement.  See United States v. Fiore, 178 F.3d 917, 
923 (7th Cir. 1999).  Such a threat fails to satisfy this requirement not 
because it is too remote in time but because there is a lack of certainly 
that it will occur.  Indeed, timing is an indicator of certainty that the harm 
will befall the defendant.  Thus, a vague threat that someday the prisoner 
might be killed would not suffice.  Instead, subjecting a prisoner to mock 
executions or playing Russian roulette with him would have sufficient 
immediacy to constitute a threat of imminent death.  Additionally, as 
discussed earlier, we believe that the existence of a threat must be assessed 
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the same circumstances.”). 
368 The average time that an American death row inmate spends on death row 
between sentencing and execution is now more than fifteen years.  Michael 
Johnson, Fifteen Years and Death: Double Jeopardy, Multiple Punishments, and 
Extended Stays on Death Row, 23 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 85, 86,103−12 (2014).  
Death row inmates in other countries, including Pakistan and Japan, 
also spend many years on death row before execution.  Roger Hood & 
Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective 
ch. 5 (5th ed. 2015).
369 Cf. Volloldo v. Ruz, No. 1:14-MC-25 (LEK/CFH), 2017 WL 4838780 at 
*6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2017) (“Were Plaintiffs to provide evidence that 
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known well in advance by every actor in the criminal justice system, 
from prosecutors and defense lawyers to trial and appellate judges.
It is also known by everyone involved that the inmate 
will suffer tremendous psychological torment while that inmate 
is under a constant threat of death, whether or not the threat 
is carried out. A mock execution may not actually inflict any 
observable physical harm, though someone who goes through a 
sham execution obviously experiences extreme psychological terror 
during and after the ordeal.370 Just as the victim of a mock execution 
is tortured (and is considered a torture victim) despite the lack 
of any observable physical indicators that torture has occurred, a 
person capitally charged and sentenced to death suffers severe 
psychological torment371 even if an execution is physically painless 
Defendants made ‘imminent death threats,’ they may be able to establish 
torture under the TVPA [Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991].”).  In the 
non-state actor context, the line between a murder and a torture-murder often 
boils down to how long the victim was aware that his or her death would 
occur.  Compare Mitchell v. State, 84 So. 3d 968, 987 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) 
(“The record establishes that at least one victim suffered psychological 
torture. . . . ‘These murders were not accomplished in a rapid-fire manner; 
there was sufficient time between the . . . murders for the next victim to 
be placed in significant fear for his or her life . . . .’ Therefore, the circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that at least one of the victims 
suffered psychological torture.”) (quoting Taylor v. State, 808 So. 2d 1148, 
1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000)), with Norris v. State, 793 So. 2d 847, 861 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that the murder of three individuals was 
not psychologically torturous because the three victims were shot in rapid 
succession; the “first three shots were sudden, without any warning or 
precipitating event”; “[t]here was nothing preceding the first murder that 
would have evoked in the victims intense apprehension, fear, or anticipation 
of their deaths”).  In the death penalty context, a death row inmate is fully 
aware of his or her impending death—and is helpless to prevent that death—
for substantially longer than a typical victim of torture-murder.  The heinous 
actions of torture-murderers are inexcusable, but those actions do not justify 
the use of torture against already-incarcerated inmates.  Acts of torture 
should be prohibited in all circumstances.
370 John Conroy, Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The 
Dynamics of Torture 180 (2001) (“Dr. Rasmussen’s survey of two 
hundred victims (examined three days to twelve years after their torture) 
found that the incidence of mental symptoms at the time of examination 
was significantly higher among those who had been subjected to a mock 
execution.  Rasmussen’s Danish Medical Bulletin article noted that 83 percent 
of those who experienced mock executions exhibited mental symptoms, 
about 20 percent more than those who had not been subjected to that 
particular torture.”).
371 E.g., Amanda K. Eklund, The Death Penalty in Montana: A Violation of the 
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or averted altogether through an appeal or executive clemency.372 
Just as prison officials are not allowed to use correctional practices 
or techniques that exacerbate serious mental illnesses or that inflict 
psychological torture,373 government actors should not be allowed 
to use punishment practices that do just that.374 In allowing death 
Constitutional Right to Individual Dignity, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 135, 142−43 
(2004) (noting that “[t]here are numerous accounts of mental anguish 
suffered by death row inmates” and discussing the case of one inmate, 
Henry Arsenault, who was on death row for two years, “during which 
time he became obsessed with his impending death”; Arsenault’s 
“psychosis manifested itself in uncontrollable sweating, frequent inability 
to sleep or eat, unbearable nightmares, uncontrollable urination, and 
constant fidgeting”; when Arsenault’s execution was called off after the 
administration of last rites and less than half an hour before the execution 
was scheduled to take place, Arsenault “was so distraught that he was 
unable to walk, and guards had to carry him back to his cell”; a judge later 
described Arsenault’s condition of “raw terror and unabating stress” as 
“torture”).
372 During a mock execution and in lead up to an actual execution, the object 
of the mock execution or the actual execution also experiences physical 
symptoms such as an increased heart rate or urinating on oneself.  E.g., 
Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience 
with Terrorism 144 (2d ed. 2001) (describing a mock execution); 
Conroy, supra note 370, at 35−36 (same).  Prison officials themselves 
go through their own “mock” executions (of a different sort) as they test 
execution equipment or prepare for executions.  Louis J. Palmer, Jr., 
Encyclopedia of Capital Punishment in the United States 427 
(2d ed. 2008) (“testing of the execution equipment” in Florida “is performed 
a minimum of eight times each year”). 
373 Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872, 884 (Mont. 2003) (“[I]f the particular 
conditions of confinement cause serious mental illness to be greatly 
exacerbated or if it deprives inmates of their sanity, then prison officials 
have deprived inmates of the basic necessity for human existence and have 
crossed into the realm of psychological torture.”).
374 James L. Knoll IV & Gary E. Beven, Supermax Units and Death Row, in 
Handbook of Correctional Mental Health 435, 467 (Charles L. 
Scott ed., 2d ed. 2010) (citations omitted) (“[E]xtended stays on death row 
have been associated with psychiatric decompensation.  Prisoners on death 
row have been found to demonstrate aberrant behavior and paranoia.”); id. 
(“Treating psychiatrists should also be aware that the suicide rate of male 
death row inmates was found to be approximately five times higher than 
the rate among men in the community.”); Kenneth Williams, Most 
Deserving of Death? An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
Death Penalty Jurisprudence 103 (2012) (“It is not surprising that 
the conditions on death row often create or exacerbate inmates’ mental 
problems. For example, death row inmates in Texas are housed alone in 
small cells measuring 6½ feet by 10 feet, containing a bed and a toilet, 
for 23 hours a day. They are allowed to leave their cells for one hour a day 
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sentences and executions, government actors are engaged in, or 
acquiescing to, deliberate and intentional conduct that runs afoul of 
the absolute prohibition against torture.375
D. The “Lawful Sanctions” Issue
Death penalty proponents will assert that death sentences 
and executions are, and traditionally have been, classified as “lawful 
sanctions” that constitute an exception to the definition of torture. 
But death sentences and executions are no longer lawful or in use in 
many places throughout the world,376 and given the absolute, non-
of recreation, which is also done alone.”). See also 1 Encyclopedia of 
Gender and Society 187 (Jodi O’Brien ed., 2009) (“Because 75 percent 
of all women who are on death row are mothers, the failure to be able to 
connect with their children further fosters their isolation.  The isolation 
that women experience on death row is a risk factor for developing a mental 
illness or further exacerbating an existing mental condition.”).
375 Compare Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(citations omitted) (“Public officials acquiesce in torture if, ‘prior to the 
activity constituting torture,’ the officials: (1) have awareness of the 
activity (or consciously close their eyes to the fact [that] it is going on); 
and (2) breach their legal responsibility to intervene to prevent the activity 
because they are unable or unwilling to oppose it.”), and Sanchez-Ponce v. 
Whitaker, No. 17-579, 2018 WL 6266311, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 30, 2018) (“A 
government’s inability to prevent torture—even when some state actors 
take ‘preventative efforts’—may be adequate to state a CAT claim.”), with 
Mouawad v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 405, 413 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) 
(“A government does not acquiesce in the torture of its citizens merely 
because it ‘is aware of torture but powerless to stop it,’ but it does cross the 
line into acquiescence when it shows ‘willful blindness toward the torture 
of citizens by third parties.’”), and Ticas-Guillen v. Whitaker, No. 16-72981, 
2018 WL 6266766, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 2018) (citations omitted) 
(“[T]he government ‘does not acquiesce in the torture of its citizens merely 
because it is aware of torture but powerless to stop it.’”). Acquiescence 
“requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, 
have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal 
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)
(7) (2018).  See also Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 916 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(“[T]he acquiescence standard is met where the record demonstrates that 
public officials at any level—even if not at the federal level—would acquiesce 
in torture the petitioner is likely to suffer.”).
376 Bessler, Cruel and Unusual, supra note 190, at 64 (noting that a 
growing number of countries have outlawed executions either in law or in 
practice); see also Federico Mayor Zaragoza, The Abolition of the Death Penalty: 
A Question of Respect for Human Rights, in Death Penalty: A Cruel and 
Inhuman Punishment 11, 13 (L. Arroyo Zapatero et al. eds., 2013) 
(discussing the work of the International Commission against the Death 
Penalty, which seeks the universal abolition of capital punishment).
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derogable prohibition against torture,377 it seems self-evident that 
to genuinely be a “lawful sanction” the sanction itself should not 
constitute an otherwise torturous act.  There is already a jus cogens 
norm prohibiting torture,378 and a reservation to a human rights 
treaty such as the Convention Against Torture cannot violate the 
“object and purpose” of that treaty.379  The clear object and purpose 
of the Convention Against Torture is, manifestly, to combat, prevent, 
and outlaw acts of cruelty and torture.380  And a nation that publicly 
377 E.g., The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights 
Law 545 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013) (noting that the prohibition of torture is 
non-derogable).
378 Sarah Joseph et al., Seeking Remedies for Torture Victims: A 
Handbook on the Individual Complaints Procedures of the 
UN Treaty Bodies 488 (Boris Wijkström ed., 2006) (“The absolute nature 
of the prohibition of torture under treaty law is reinforced by its higher, jus 
cogens status under customary international law.  Jus cogens status connotes 
the fundamental, peremptory character of the obligation, which is, in the 
words of the International Court of Justice, “intransgressible.”  There is 
ample international authority recognising the prohibition of torture as 
having jus cogens status.  The prohibition of torture also imposed obligations 
erga omnes, and every State has a legal interest in the performance of such 
obligations which are owed to the international community as a whole.”). 
379 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “[a] State 
may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, 
formulate a reservation unless: (a) [T]he reservation is prohibited by the 
treaty; (b) [T]he treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do 
not include the reservation in question, may be made; or (c) [I]n cases not 
falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty.”  Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  Although the United 
States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it is considered to be the 
authoritative statement of the customary law of treaties. Meyer, Customary 
International Law in the 21st Century, in Progress in International Law 
197, 210 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies eds., 2008) (“[D]espite 
the fact that the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, other states view the United States as being bound by 
the customary law of treaties.  Insofar as the Vienna Convention is the most 
authoritative statement of what the customary law of treaties is, the United 
States is bound by the terms of the treaty.”).  Moreover, U.S. law already 
provides that a State Party to the Convention Against Torture cannot use the 
“lawful sanctions” exception in Article 1 to “defeat the object and purpose of 
the Convention to prohibit torture.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(3) (2018).
380 Chris Ingelse, The UN Committee against Torture: An 
Assessment 391 (2001) (“In view of the object and purpose of the 
Convention against Torture, the objective of the Committee is to combat 
torture.”); United Nations Convention Against Torture art. 2(1), Feb. 4, 
1985, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“Each State Party shall take effective legislative, 
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renounces torture should not, logically, then be allowed to turn 
around and engage in acts that bear all the indicia of torture.  As 
one commentator, writing about the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, has aptly pointed out: “[A] reservation going against a 
treaty’s object and purpose would be one whereby a State ratifying 
the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 seeks to exclude 
torture from it.”381  
A U.S. understanding of the Convention Against Torture—
part of the U.S. reservations, understandings, and declarations 
(“RUDs”) to the convention—specifically reflects the U.S. Senate’s 
concern that the “lawful sanctions” language may be too expansive.382 
Indeed, case law already makes clear that even a “lawful sanction” 
in a country must not defeat the “object and purpose” of the 
Convention Against Torture.383  For example, in Nuru v. Gonzales, 
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any 
territory under its jurisdiction.”).
381 Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 272 (2009).
382 See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of 
Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 341, 341−48 (1995) (noting the U.S. 
ratification of the Convention Against Torture in 1994 along with a package 
of RUDs); Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 120 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he 
United States understands that a State Party could not through its domestic 
sanctions defeat the object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit 
torture.” (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. S17,486-01, S17,491)); Tun v. INS, 445 
F.3d 554, 566, 571 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (“‘lawful sanctions’ ‘do 
not include sanctions that defeat the object and purpose of the Convention 
Against Torture to prohibit torture’”; “the Senate’s understanding that ‘a 
State Party could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the object and 
purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture,’ 136 Cong. Rec. S17491, 
¶ II (c), has been incorporated into this country’s refugee law.”); see also 
Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005) (italics in original) 
(“[T]he Attorney General promulgated implementing regulations defining 
‘lawful sanctions’ as ‘judicially imposed sanctions and other enforcement 
actions authorized by law, including the death penalty,’ but only so long as 
those sanctions do not ‘defeat the object and purpose of [CAT] to prohibit 
torture.’” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(3) (2018))).
383 Garcia-Miller v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nuru, 
404 F.3d at 1221) (“Torture is ‘an extreme form of cruel and inhuman 
treatment,’ 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2), ‘that either (1) is not lawfully 
sanctioned by that country or (2) is lawfully sanctioned by that country, but 
defeats the object and purpose of CAT[.]’”); Zhang v. Gonzales, 214 F. App’x 
3, 5 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (“To the extent that the agency found 
that Zhang’s prior treatment did not qualify because the harm he identified 
was the result of a lawful sanction, we find that the beating and dousing 
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the Ninth Circuit put it this way: “[T]orture cannot be ‘inherent 
in or incidental to lawful sanction’ and is never a lawful means of 
punishment.  The official sanctioning of torture necessarily defeats 
the object and purpose of the Convention.  CAT outlaws torture 
absolutely . . . .”384  In that same vein, it is clear that the protection 
provided by the Convention Against Torture extends to anyone 
accused of a crime385 or imprisoned for one.386 
There are existing U.S. regulations that purport to include 
in water were sanctions that defeated the object and purpose of CAT and 
therefore could qualify if that mistreatment otherwise meets the definition 
of torture under the regulations and BIA and court decisions.”); see also 
Pendrak v. Holder, 375 Fed. App’x 439, 443 (6th Cir. 2010) (emphasis 
added) (“‘[L]awful sanctions’ that do not defeat the object and purpose of the CAT 
are excluded from the definition of torture.”).
384 Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1222.
385 Lian v. Gonzales, 201 Fed. App’x 808, 810 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Khouzam 
v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2004)) (“[I]n Khouzam, we interpreted 
this provision to mean that CAT ‘extend[s] to situations where the victim 
has been accused of a crime,’”).  As the Second Circuit emphasized in 
Khouzam: “When the Senate considered the CAT, its concern over the 
CAT’s reference to ‘lawful sanctions’ led it to qualify its ratification with 
the understanding that a state ‘could not through its domestic sanctions 
defeat the object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture.’  In 
directing the Attorney General to implement the CAT subject to the Senate’s 
understandings, it was Congress’ aim for the CAT’s protections to extend to 
situations where the victim has been accused of a crime.”  Khouzam, 361 F.3d 
at 169.
386 E.g., J. Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius, The United Nations 
Convention Against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 120−21 (1988) (“The 1975 Declaration 
was drawn up by the Fifth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
the Treatment of Offenders in response to a request from the General 
Assembly ‘to include, in the elaboration of the Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners, rules for the protection of all persons subjected to 
any form of detention or imprisonment (italics added) against torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.  Two years after 
the adoption of the 1975 Declaration, the General Assembly requested the 
Commission on Human Rights to draw up a draft convention ‘in the light 
of the principles embodied in the Declaration’.  All work undertaken in the 
framework of the Commission for preparing the present Convention was 
performed under an agenda item reading ‘Question of the human rights 
of all persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment (italics added)’.  
The connection between the phenomenon of torture as dealt with in the 
Convention and deprivation of liberty is also apparent from articles 10 and 11 
which explicitly refer to persons ‘subjected to any form of arrest, detention 
or imprisonment’.”). 
92 Bessler
the death penalty as a “lawful sanction,” but those regulations also 
emphasize that “lawful sanctions” do not include “sanctions that 
defeat the object and purpose of the Convention Against Torture 
to prohibit torture.”387  In fact, when the U.S. Senate ratified the 
Convention Against Torture in 1994, it crafted the following 
understanding to make clear that the “lawful sanctions” exception 
was not without limits: “[T]he United States understands that 
a State Party could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the 
object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture.”388  In 
387 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(3) (2018) (“Torture does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.  Lawful 
sanctions include judicially imposed sanctions and other enforcement 
actions authorized by law, including the death penalty, but do not include 
sanctions that defeat the object and purpose of the Convention Against 
Torture to prohibit torture.”).  Those regulations also cannot somehow 
modify what a torturous act is; the factual nature of an act does not change 
with how one describes it.  A pronouncement on a piece of paper or in the 
Code of Federal Regulations cannot transform a torturous act into a non-
torturous one.  The act has the characteristics inherent in it, and in the case 
of the death penalty those characteristics (which include the fact that capital 
charges and death sentences constitute death threats) are immutable.
388 Gail H. Miller, Defining Torture, in Occasional Paper #3 (Benjamin N. 
Cardozo Sch. of Law/Floersheimer Ctr. for Constitutional Democracy, 
New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2005, at 21. In the past, it has been noted that 
the “lawful sanctions” provision of the Convention Against Torture has 
“precluded arguments that capital punishment constitutes torture.”  Id. at 
20.  But capital punishment has become unlawful in many places, and there 
has been much controversy surrounding the “lawful sanctions” exception 
(e.g., as regards the use corporal punishments in some countries).  As one 
commentator notes: “Many signatories agree that the lawful sanctions 
language creates problematic ambiguities.  It diminishes the universality of 
the definition by infusing exceptions based on national law.  As practices 
that may be lawful in one state may be unlawful in another, this provision 
undermines the effort to achieve a uniform definition of torture.” Id. at 
21. “The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Nigel S. Rodley, recognized 
the potential slippery slope of the lawful sanctions exemption and has 
interpreted the provision so that differences in national laws would not 
effect the strength of the CAT.  Rodley concluded that the term ‘lawful 
sanctions’ refers to practices that the international community widely 
accepts as permissible sanctions, such as imprisonment.  He cited the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners as an example 
of international standards that may guide determinations of acceptable 
practices.  In particular, Rodley concluded that corporal punishment may 
amount to torture: ‘I cannot accept the notion that the administration of 
such punishments as stoning to death, flogging and amputation—acts 
which would be unquestionably unlawful in, say, the context of custodial 
interrogation—can be deemed lawful simply because the punishment 
93VOL. 11, NO. 1 NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
other words, an act of torture is an act of torture—and a country 
cannot turn a torturous act into a non-torturous one simply by 
labeling it a “lawful sanction.”389  Given that the Eighth Amendment 
has already been interpreted to bar torture390 and that the Eighth 
Amendment’s meaning evolves with the times,391 and given that the 
modern definition and understanding of torture now plainly includes 
both physical and mental forms of torture,392 the U.S. Supreme 
Court should rule that death sentences and executions constitute 
impermissible sanctions because death threats are extremely cruel 
and torturous in nature.393 Torture, by definition, involves the 
infliction of severe pain or suffering,394 and that is exactly what 
has been authorized in a procedurally legitimate manner, i.e. through the 
sanction of legislation, administrative rules or judicial order.  To accept 
this view would be to accept that any physical punishment, no matter how 
torturous and cruel, can be considered lawful, as long as the punishment has 
been duly promulgated under the domestic law of a State.’” Id. at 22.
389 Ghebrehiwot v. Attorney General of U.S., 467 F.3d 344, 359 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citations omitted) (“[T]he regulation defines ‘lawful sanctions’ as ‘judicially 
imposed sanctions and other enforcement actions authorized by law, . . .’ 
but only so long as those sanctions do not ‘defeat the object and purpose 
of the [CAT] to prohibit torture.’  Consequently, ‘[a] government cannot 
exempt torturous acts from CAT’s prohibition merely by authorizing them 
as permissible forms of punishment in its domestic law.’”); Khouzam v. 
Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (“It would totally eviscerate 
the CAT to hold that once someone is accused of a crime it is a legal 
impossibility for any abuse inflicted on that person to constitute torture.’”).
390 Linda E. Carter et al., Understanding Capital Punishment § 
4.04 (3d ed. 2012) (“the Eighth Amendment prohibits torture or barbaric 
punishments”).
391 Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017) (quoting Hall v. Florida, 134 S. 
Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014)) (“‘To enforce the Constitution’s protection of human 
dignity,’ we ‘loo[k] to the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society,’ recognizing that ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment is 
not fastened to the obsolete.’”).
392 E.g., Encyclopedia of Interpersonal Violence 709 (Claire 
M. Renzetti & Jeffrey L. Edelson eds., 2008) (discussing physical and 
psychological torture).
393 Bessler, The Death Penalty as Torture, supra note 26, at 217−19.
394 State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d 783, 799 (S.D. 2006) (“Torture requires: ‘(1) the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of severe pain, agony, or anguish; and (2) 
the intent to inflict such pain, agony or anguish . . . .’”); State v. Zagorski, 
701 S.W.2d 808, 814 (Tenn. 1985) (“Although the victims died from gunshot 
wounds, the defendant also slit their throats, leaving them to bleed to death 
in the woods.  This evinces depravity of mind and is a form of torture.  
Defendant’s actions were an infliction of gratuitous violence, and needless 
mutilation of victims who were already helpless from fatal wounds . . . .”); 
cf. State v. Holman, 540 S.E.2d 18, 23 (N.C. 2000) (“We have interpreted 
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the death penalty—an unnecessary, barbarous and dehumanizing 
punishment—does.395  In a world of maximum-security prisons and 




The psychological torture associated with capital punishment 
is self-evident and undeniable.  Death threats have long been 
recognized as a form of torture, and there is no denying that the 
death penalty involves the use of death threats and worse (i.e. actual 
executions).  Capital punishment, in truth, is a torturous practice 
hiding in plain sight.  It has been used for centuries, with jurists in 
the past only occasionally, as in People v. Anderson,397 taking note of its 
torturous nature.  In the eighteenth century, Enlightenment thinkers 
thought of torture and capital punishment in separate categories. 
When the Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria, the anti-death 
penalty pioneer, wrote in Dei delitti e delle pene (1764) about torture 
and capital punishment, he did so in separate chapters.  Jeremy 
Bentham, the English criminal-law theorist, also conceptualized and 
compartmentalized torture and punishment as separate practices.398 
In writings not published in his lifetime, Bentham infamously 
justified the use of torture on the basis of utilitarianism, with pre-
the phrase ‘unnecessarily torturous’ to encompass both physical and 
psychological torture, and to include a killing that leaves the victim aware of 
impending death but helpless to prevent it.”). 
395 Gabriele Schwab, Haunting Legacies: Violent Histories and 
Transgenerational Trauma 155 (2010) (“We should no longer think 
of torture as a practice that happens in a torture chamber or dungeon and 
consists exclusively of the unnecessary and willful infliction of atrocious 
bodily pain, but as a much more encompassing practice of inflicting 
unnecessary pain and instrumentalizing pain for punitive and disciplinary 
measures or for purposes of control.”).
396 Bessler, Cruel and Unusual, supra note 190, at 334; see also 
E. Thomas Sullivan & Richard S. Frase, Proportionality 
Principles in American Law: Controlling Excessive 
Government Actions 132 (2009) (“The means-proportionality 
argument is that the death penalty is unnecessary and therefore excessive 
relative to the next-most-severe alternative penalty (life in prison, with or 
without parole) whenever death adds no additional deterrent or other social 
benefits.”).
397 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (1972) (referring to the 
“psychological torture” associated with the death penalty).
398 Bessler, The Death Penalty as Torture, supra note 26, at 310−11 
n.17.
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trial judicial torture frequently thought of in the civil law context 
as necessary to procure confessions (with post-conviction torture 
then used to discover the names of accomplices).399  But it is now 
crystal clear, as confirmed by the text of the Convention Against 
Torture, that punishments themselves can be torturous in nature. 
And whereas torture was largely seen in Beccaria and Bentham’s 
time as operating on the body, it is now clear that either physical 
or mental torture is possible—and that both are strictly prohibited.
In reality, capital punishment has always been torturous, 
even if it was more torturous in Medieval times when offenders were 
disemboweled and drawn and quartered or burned or boiled alive400 
instead of being put to death through lethal injection.401  Before 
Furman v. Georgia,402 the California Supreme Court—in a telling 
admission—candidly opined in its 1972 decision in People v. Anderson: 
“The cruelty of capital punishment lies not only in the execution 
itself and the pain incident thereto, but also in the dehumanizing 
effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to execution during which 
the judicial and administrative procedures essential to due process 
of law are carried out.”403 “Penologists and medical experts agree,” 
that court determined, “that the process of carrying out a verdict of 
death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to 
constitute psychological torture.”404 “When people on death rows are 
waiting to die,” the wrongfully convicted boxer Rubin “Hurricane” 
Carter stressed after his own exoneration, “it is easy for me to feel 
exactly what they are going through: the torture of waiting, the 
399 Michelle Farrell, On Torture 241−45 (Apr. 26, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, National University of Ireland Galway), https://aran.library.
nuigalway.ie/bitstream/handle/10379/2171/FarrellM_OnTorture_PhD2011.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. See also Leonore Loft, Passion, 
Politics, and Philosophie: Rediscovering J.-P. Brissot 112 
(2002); Thomas Glyn Watkin, An Historical Introduction to 
Modern Civil Law 415 (2017).
400 Bessler, The Death Penalty as Torture, supra note 26, at 3−4 
(describing ancient punishments).
401 Fordham law professor Deborah Denno has written at length about the 
progression of methods of execution in the United States.  E.g., Deborah W. 
Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 Geo L.J. 1331 (2014); Deborah 
W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death 
Penalty, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 49 (2007); Deborah W. Denno, Getting to 
Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 319 (1997).
402 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
403 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972).
404 Id.
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helplessness, the pain and humiliation, and the gagging death, the 
obliteration.”405 “It is real torture,” Oklahoma death row inmate, 
Richard Glossip, similarly observed from first-hand experience after 
his execution was delayed at the last minute after he spent 50 days 
in a windowless cell getting ready for his scheduled execution. “You 
are just in that cell and it is just like a morgue,” Glossip reported.406
It is hypocritical for governments and state officials to 
condemn the use of death threats, then turn around and use threats of 
death as part of a misguided policy that, in all candor, strays into the 
land of torture. It is also hypocritical for the judicial system to avoid 
labelling death sentences and executions as torturous when various 
non-lethal acts (and properly so) are already so characterized.407 
When a person is murdered and the victim is aware of, but helpless to 
prevent, death, American courts readily label the offender’s actions 
as involving an act of extreme cruelty (i.e. torture).408 Yet, when it is 
the offender who is aware of, but helpless to prevent, his or her own 
death, the judicial system currently terms it a “lawful sanction.” Just 
as governments should not tolerate individuals making death threats, 
societies should not themselves resort to Orwellian or Kafkaesque 
death threats. As Albert Camus warned against state-sanctioned 
killing and the death penalty’s disproportionality in relation to acts 
of criminality in “Reflections on the Guillotine”: 
405 Rubin “Hurricane” Carter & ken klonsky, Eye of the 
Hurricane: My Path from Darkness to Freedom 203 (2011).




407 John D. Bessler, What I Think About When I Think About the Death Penalty, 62 
St. Louis U. L.J. 781, 790 (2018); John D. Bessler, The Abolitionist Movement 
Comes of Age: From Capital Punishment as a Lawful Sanction to a Peremptory, 
International Law Norm Barring Executions, 79 Mont. L. Rev. 7, 38−40 
(2018).
408 E.g., State v. Cooper, 718 S.W.2d 256, 259−60 (Tenn. 1986) (“It would be 
difficult to describe a more deliberate, brutal and horrifying infliction of 
death upon an innocent, unarmed person.  In our opinion the circumstances 
of this homicide were heinous, atrocious and cruel.  The deliberate taunting 
and threatening of a victim for hours before shooting at her once, causing 
her and her fellow employee to dive to the floor for safety, and then 
deliberately pumping the contents of four shotgun shells into her while 
she was helplessly trapped inside a small building could, in our opinion, 
convince a reasonable jury that the victim was subjected to torture and that 
the perpetrator of such conduct evinced depravity of mind.”).
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For there to be equivalence, the death penalty would 
have to punish a criminal who had warned his victim 
of the date at which he would inflict a horrible 
death on him and who, from that moment onward, 
had confined him at his mercy for months.  Such a 
monster is not encountered in private life.409
409 “Reflections on the Guillotine,” in Resistance, Rebellion, and Death 
(J. O’Brien, trans. 1960).
